474 U.S. 344 (1986)
On December 19, 1980, petitioner Robert Davidson, an inmate at the New Jersey State Prison at Leesburg, was threatened by fellow inmate McMillian following a disciplinary hearing related to a prior fight.1
Davidson reported the threat in a note that was delivered to respondent Cannon, the Assistant Superintendent, who read it and forwarded it to respondent James, a Corrections Sergeant, without treating the matter as urgent because Davidson had not contacted him directly on previous serious occasions.2
James received the note around 2 p.m. on December 19 and was informed of its contents but attended to other matters he considered emergencies before forgetting about the note entirely by the end of his shift.3
Neither Cannon nor James worked on December 20 or 21, so no other officers were notified of the threat during that period, and Davidson took no further steps such as requesting protective custody, having written the note partly to exonerate himself in case of a fight and to prompt reprimand of McMillian.4
On December 21, 1980, McMillian attacked Davidson with a fork, causing a broken nose and other wounds to his face, neck, head, and body.5
Davidson subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against Cannon, James, and two other officials, alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.6
After a bench trial, the District Court found that the respondents had negligently failed to protect Davidson, resulting in his injuries.7
The District Court awarded Davidson $2,000 in compensatory damages after concluding that New Jersey law provided no remedy due to statutory immunity for injuries caused by one prisoner to another.8
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the judgment, accepting the finding of negligence but holding that it did not constitute a deprivation under the Due Process Clause.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985 to review the case alongside Daniels v. Williams.10
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated when prison officials negligently fail to protect an inmate from attack by another inmate?11
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty, or property.12 In other words, where a government official is merely negligent in causing the injury, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.13
No. The District Court found that respondents Cannon and James negligently failed to take reasonable steps to protect petitioner Davidson but did not act with deliberate or callous indifference to his needs.1415 Cannon read the note reporting the threat from McMillian but did not view the situation as urgent because Davidson had not contacted him directly on previous serious occasions.16 James received the note around 2 p.m. on December 19 but attended to other matters he considered emergencies and forgot about the note entirely by the end of his shift.17 Neither Cannon nor James worked on December 20 or 21, so no other officers were informed of the threat, and Davidson took no further steps such as requesting protective custody.18
This lack of due care led to the attack on December 21 but does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was designed to prevent.19
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by the negligent failure of prison officials to protect an inmate from attack by another inmate.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan agrees that merely negligent conduct by a state official, even though causing personal injury, does not constitute a deprivation of liberty under the Due Process Clause.21 He believes, however, that official conduct which causes personal injury due to recklessness or deliberate indifference does deprive the victim of liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Brennan notes that the record in this case strongly suggests that the prison officials' failure to protect petitioner from attack was reckless and not merely negligent.23
Accordingly, he would vacate the judgment and remand this case so that the Court of Appeals may review the District Court's holding that respondents' conduct was not reckless.24
Justice Blackmun dissents from the holding that negligence never implicates the Due Process Clause.25 He argues that when the State assumes sole responsibility for an inmate's physical security and then ignores his call for help, the State cannot claim that it did not know a subsequent injury was likely to occur.26 Blackmun distinguishes this case from Daniels because the State prevented Davidson from defending himself and therefore assumed some responsibility to protect him from the dangers to which he was exposed.27
He further contends that the acts of the state officials may well have risen to the level of recklessness.28 They had actual notice of the threat from an inmate with a known history of violence and an opportunity to prevent harm.29 Blackmun would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the District Court award of $2,000 or, if accepting the rigid rule in Daniels, would vacate and remand for review of the recklessness finding.30
Whether the absence of a state-law remedy for injuries caused by one prisoner to another violates due process when the officials' conduct was merely negligent?31
No. Respondents' negligence did not work a deprivation of petitioner's liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.34 Therefore, the fact that New Jersey law provides that neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for any injury caused by a prisoner to any other prisoner does not violate due process.35 Petitioner's claim based on respondents' negligence is quite different from one involving injuries caused by an unjustified attack by prison guards themselves or by another prisoner where officials simply stood by and permitted the attack to proceed.36 The absence of a postdeprivation remedy under state law therefore creates no constitutional violation.37
The absence of a state-law remedy for injuries caused by one prisoner to another does not violate due process when the officials' conduct was merely negligent.38