411 A.2d 660 (Me. 1980)
Edward Davis, Helena Davis, and Eva C. Campbell owned the dominant estate at Harmon’s Harbor in the Town of Georgetown.1 Mary Bruk owned the adjacent servient estate.2 The plaintiffs commenced injunctive proceedings in the Superior Court in Sagadahoc County against Bruk.3 They sought to prevent obstructions to their right of way across Bruk’s land to the Town Road and to the seashore.4 They also sought damages for alleged interference with access to a natural spring on the Bruk property.5 Mona H. Powell was later substituted as a party plaintiff for Eva C. Campbell after Campbell transferred her interests to her daughter.6
Bruk initially counterclaimed for damages for unlawful widening of the right of way.7 By amendment she sought affirmative relief including an order enjoining use of the existing right of way in exchange for a proposed relocated right of way.8 She argued that the existing road passed so close to her home as to create a dangerous and hazardous condition.9 By decision dated January 21, 1977, received in the Clerk’s Office on January 24, 1977, the Superior Court ordered entry of a judgment.10 The judgment clarified the scope of the plaintiffs’ easement and denied Bruk’s counterclaim for relocation of the right of way to the Town Road.11 It ordered Bruk to permit use of another spring or pay three hundred dollars in damages.12 The judgment contained a proviso that Bruk was not precluded from filing a new proposal concerning the feasibility of any other proposed alternative right of way.13
On February 3, 1977, Bruk filed a timely motion to amend the judgment.14 After a hearing on July 14, 1977, the trial court made new findings of fact and revised the judgment to approve Bruk’s second proposal for relocation of the right of way to the Town Road.15 The court stated that the relocated route would not create an unreasonable burden on the plaintiffs.16 Bruk would assume the costs of constructing the new right of way.17 The plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from judgment.18 They later filed motions to amend findings of fact and for a new trial after the September 15, 1977 entry of the amended judgment.19
Further motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence were filed and denied.20 The final order denying the motion was entered on June 2, 1978.21 The plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on June 8, 1978.22 Bruk filed a cross-appeal raising an issue concerning the location of the Campbell-Powell shore easement.23 The trial court found that although the deeds did not fix the exact location of the right of way to the Town Road, the present location was fixed in 1896 and had never varied since that time.24 Bruk was aware of the right of way when she purchased the servient estate in 1963.25
Whether the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was timely filed?26
Yes. The Superior Court entered its initial judgment on January 24, 1977.29 Bruk filed a timely Rule 52(b) motion on February 3, 1977 that suspended the period.30 The amended judgment was entered on September 15, 1977.31
The plaintiffs filed further timely motions under Rules 52(b) and 59 that again suspended the period.32 The final order denying the motion for new trial was entered on June 2, 1978, after which the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on June 8, 1978 within the restarted thirty-day window.33
The plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was timely filed, so the Supreme Judicial Court possessed jurisdiction to hear the appeal.34
Whether the trial court had authority to order relocation of the plaintiffs’ right of way to the Town Road without the consent of the owners of the dominant estate?35
Once the location of an expressly granted easement has been established by the language of the deed or by subsequent acts of the parties.36 Neither the dominant nor the servient owner may unilaterally relocate the easement without the consent of the other.37 This rule applies unless the creating instrument itself reserves or grants a power of relocation.38
No. The plaintiffs’ deeds granted an express right of way to the Town Road in unqualified terms.39 The trial court found that the present location had been fixed on the ground in 1896 and remained unchanged thereafter.40 Bruk knew of the fixed location when she purchased the servient estate in 1963.41 The deeds contained no language authorizing unilateral relocation by the servient owner.42
The trial court lacked authority to permit Bruk to relocate the right of way to the Town Road without the plaintiffs’ consent, and that portion of the judgment must be vacated.43
Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for the defendant’s filling in of a particular spring on the Bruk property?44
An easement holder is entitled to damages for interference with an easement only when the servient owner obstructs a specifically located right.45 The precise site must have been fixed by the parties or by long use.46 Where the instrument grants access to a spring but does not designate a particular spring and no location has ever been fixed, the dominant owners may select any available spring.47 They suffer no compensable harm from the closure of one unfixed source.48
No. The plaintiffs’ deeds granted an easement to use a spring on the Bruk property without specifying any particular spring.49 The trial court found that the location of the spring easement had never been fixed by the parties.50 Other springs remained accessible on the servient estate.51 The plaintiffs therefore failed to prove any compensable interference with a fixed right.52
The plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for the filling in of the particular spring.53
Whether the plaintiffs should have been permitted to pave the right of way to the Town Road?54
An easement for a right of way, without more, confers no right to disturb the soil or materially alter the surface of the servient estate in a manner that would impose additional burdens such as increased traffic speed or safety hazards on the servient owner.55
No. The plaintiffs sought to pave the right of way to the Town Road.56 The easement grant contained no language authorizing such a material change to the surface.57 Paving would subject the servient estate to faster motor-vehicle traffic near Bruk’s home and create new safety concerns.58 The trial court correctly applied the settled rule that a bare right-of-way easement does not permit disturbance of the fee.59
The plaintiffs should not have been permitted to pave the right of way to the Town Road.60
Whether the trial court properly amended its findings of fact on its own initiative to locate the shore easement on the defendant’s property?61
Although Rule 52(b) requires a party motion to amend findings of fact, Rule 60(a) independently authorizes the court on its own initiative to correct clerical mistakes or slips of the tongue in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record at any time.62
Yes. The trial court’s January 21, 1977 findings and conclusions were internally inconsistent regarding the location of the Powell shore easement.63 The inconsistency arose from a simple misnomer of the servient owner.64 The court acted within its Rule 60(a) power to correct that clerical error on its own motion without awaiting a party request.65
The trial court properly amended its findings of fact on its own initiative to locate the shore easement on the defendant’s property.66