11 Cal.4th 376, 902 P.2d 740, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 (1995)
John Della Penna, doing business as Pacific Motors, operated as a wholesale automobile dealer who purchased vehicles from Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and resold them to retail dealers under a 1985 Wholesale Agreement that designated approved dealership locations.1
After Toyota introduced the Lexus line into the American market in 1989, the company inserted no-export clauses into dealership agreements.2 It compiled an offenders list of dealers and wholesalers believed to be involved in reexporting vehicles to Japan.3 Toyota distributed the list to Lexus retail dealers along with warnings that continued dealings with listed parties could result in reduced allocations or reevaluation of franchise agreements.4
During 1989 and 1990 Della Penna purchased Lexus vehicles chiefly from the Lexus of Stevens Creek outlet at near-retail prices and exported them to Japan for resale.5 He maintained a profitable business until late 1990 when his sources, including Stevens Creek, ceased supplying him primarily because of the offenders list.6
In February 1991 Della Penna filed suit against Toyota alleging both Cartwright Act violations and intentional interference with his economic relationships with Lexus retail dealers.7 At the close of his case-in-chief the trial court granted nonsuit on the antitrust claims.8 The interference claim proceeded to a jury under a modified BAJI instruction that required proof the defendant's conduct was wrongful.9
The jury returned a nine-to-three verdict for Toyota.10 The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered a new trial on the ground that wrongfulness was not an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.11 The Supreme Court granted review.
Whether a plaintiff alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage must plead and prove as part of the prima facie case that the defendant's conduct was wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the interference itself?12
The tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage requires a plaintiff to plead and prove five elements.13 These include an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party with the probability of future economic benefit. The defendant must know of that relationship.14 Intentional acts by the defendant must be designed to disrupt the relationship.15 Actual disruption of the relationship must occur.16 Economic harm to the plaintiff must be proximately caused by the defendant.17 To accommodate the competing interests of protecting economic relationships and preserving legitimate marketplace competition, the interference must be wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the interference itself.18 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's conduct was independently tortious or otherwise unlawful under positive law.19
Yes.20 The Supreme Court of California resolved the conflict among Court of Appeal decisions by adopting the requirement that wrongfulness is an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.21 John Della Penna operated as a wholesale dealer under the 1985 Wholesale Agreement with Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.22 After the 1989 Lexus introduction, Toyota implemented a no-export policy, compiled an offenders list of wholesalers and dealers involved in reexports to Japan, and warned retail dealers of sanctions including reduced allocations for continued dealings with listed parties.23 At trial, after nonsuit on the Cartwright Act claims, the interference claim was submitted under a modified instruction requiring proof of wrongful conduct.24
The jury returned a nine-to-three verdict for Toyota. The evidence Della Penna presented consisted solely of Toyota's distribution of the offenders list and associated warnings, which amounted to ordinary competitive measures to protect its distribution network and did not constitute independently tortious acts such as fraud, defamation, or antitrust violations.25 Because Della Penna failed to prove any conduct wrongful by a measure beyond the interference itself, the trial court correctly entered judgment on the verdict, and the Court of Appeal erred in holding that wrongfulness need not be shown as part of the prima facie case.26
A plaintiff alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage must plead and prove as part of the prima facie case that the defendant's conduct was wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the interference itself.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment reversing the Court of Appeal but disagreed with the majority's adoption of an undefined wrongfulness standard.28 He argued that the tort should be reformulated to require the plaintiff to prove either interference by independently tortious means or interference through restraint of trade.29 This approach would eliminate the problematic focus on motive that has rendered the common law incoherent.30 Mosk emphasized that motive is immaterial to liability.31 The prima facie tort doctrine underlying traditional formulations improperly shifts burdens and threatens values of free competition and First Amendment protections.32
He concluded that the modified jury instruction, though imperfect, was not prejudicial because it demanded far less of the plaintiff than the proper objective standard of unlawful conduct would require.33 Therefore any error did not affect the verdict for Toyota.34