163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007)
In 1991 Daniel DeNardo began renting a month-to-month apartment in Anchorage from Foreman's Properties for $385 per month.1
In March 2002 Pat Corneloup moved into the neighboring apartment and smoked cigarettes there, as the lease contained no smoking restrictions.2 DeNardo asserted that he complained to Corneloup about smoke entering his apartment and also claimed to have complained to Helen Foreman, though she denied receiving any such complaint under oath.3 Another resident complained once to Corneloup about smelling smoke and later testified that the issue resolved after her complaint.4
On June 7, 2002, DeNardo filed suit against Corneloup alleging battery, negligence, and trespass due to cigarette smoke invading his property.5 As of June 12 DeNardo owed $677.78 in rent and after a partial payment remained $492.78 in arrears, prompting the landlord to serve an eviction notice that same day.6 DeNardo amended his complaint on June 20 to add Foreman's Properties and its partners as defendants.7 He later testified that he gave written notice of withholding rent due to uninhabitability at the time he sued the landlord.8 On June 24 the landlord served a Forcible Entry and Detainer summons and complaint seeking eviction.9
DeNardo proceeded pro se asserting seven claims including breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of the covenant of habitability, negligence, trespass, battery, nuisance, and retaliatory eviction.10 The superior court dismissed all claims against Corneloup and granted summary judgment to the landlord on all claims except habitability and negligence.11 DeNardo then moved for entry of judgment dismissing the remaining claims against the landlord, which the court granted, resulting in a final judgment.12
During the litigation DeNardo moved for recusal of Superior Court Judge Sharon L. Gleason.13 Superior Court Judge Eric Smith reviewed the disqualification motion and found no sign of either incompetence or bias.14
Whether DeNardo preserved his claims of negligence and breach of the covenant of habitability for appeal after voluntarily moving for their dismissal in the superior court?15
A party who voluntarily moves for dismissal of claims in the trial court without reservation waives the right to appeal the dismissal of those claims on the ground that the trial court erred in granting the motion.16
No. DeNardo moved for entry of judgment dismissing the remaining claims of habitability and negligence after the superior court granted summary judgment on other claims.17 The superior court granted the motion and issued a final judgment dismissing the case.18 Because DeNardo asked the superior court to dismiss his claims of breach of the covenant of habitability and negligence, he is precluded from asserting that it was error to dismiss those claims. He may not pursue them on remand.19
DeNardo did not preserve his claims of negligence and breach of the covenant of habitability for appeal.20
Whether the landlord breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment by allowing cigarette smoke to enter DeNardo's apartment?21
The covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached if the lessee's enjoyment of the leased land is disturbed in a substantial manner either by the lessor or by the owner of a title paramount.22
No. DeNardo asserted that cigarette smoke entered his apartment from the neighboring unit occupied by Corneloup.23 The landlord took no action that substantially disturbed DeNardo's use of the land.24 Because DeNardo did not offer facts sufficient to prove that his landlord substantially disturbed his use of the land, it was not error to dismiss this cause of action.25
The landlord did not breach the covenant of quiet enjoyment.26
Whether DeNardo stated a viable battery claim based on contact with secondhand cigarette smoke?27
A person commits the tort of battery when the actor intends to cause harmful or offensive contact with another; one need not intend injury but must intend to cause contact.28
No. DeNardo asserted that smoke contacted him from Corneloup's apartment.29 DeNardo does not contend that anyone intentionally blew smoke into his apartment or intended that the smoke contact him.30 Because there was no contention that either defendant deliberately caused smoke to contact him, the battery claim fails.31
DeNardo did not state a viable battery claim.32
Whether DeNardo stated viable trespass or nuisance claims against Corneloup or the landlord arising from the neighbor's cigarette smoking?33
A landlord cannot be liable for trespass based on actions of a tenant over whom the landlord has no control, and a tenant does not owe a duty to another tenant to refrain from cigarette smoking absent a lease provision, statute, or ordinance declaring smoke a nuisance.34
No. DeNardo asserted claims of negligent trespass and nuisance against Corneloup and the Foreman's Properties based on cigarette smoke entering his apartment.35 The landlord had no control over Corneloup's smoking inside the leased premises.36 No Alaska statute or common law imposes a duty on one tenant to refrain from smoking in the absence of a lease restriction or local ordinance.37 Because the arguments DeNardo makes here for imposing a duty on the tenant to refrain from smoking are unpersuasive, and because he has not established that the landlord should be liable in trespass for tenant conduct it cannot control, the claims were properly dismissed.38
DeNardo did not state viable trespass or nuisance claims.39
Whether the landlord was entitled to summary judgment on DeNardo's retaliatory eviction claim because DeNardo was in default in rent?40
A landlord may bring an action for possession if the tenant is in default in rent, notwithstanding the tenant's engagement in conduct otherwise protected by the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.41
Yes. DeNardo asserted a retaliatory eviction claim after the landlord served an eviction notice following his partial rent payment that left him $492.78 in arrears.42 DeNardo was in default in rent on the date the notice to quit was served and on the date the FED summons and complaint was served.43 Because DeNardo has not established that his failure to pay his rent in full was excused, he was in default in rent per AS 34.03.310(c)(1) and ineligible to claim retaliatory eviction.44
The landlord was entitled to summary judgment on DeNardo's retaliatory eviction claim.45
Whether Superior Court Judge Sharon L. Gleason should have been disqualified for bias or prejudice?46
A judge should be disqualified if for any reason a fair and impartial decision cannot be given, but interpretations of the law are not sufficient by themselves to demonstrate the existence of bias, and disqualification was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings.47
No. DeNardo moved for recusal of Superior Court Judge Sharon L. Gleason after filing two lawsuits against her.48 Another superior court judge reviewed the file and found no sign of either incompetence or bias.49 The record reveals no basis for claiming an appearance of bias or conflict of interest.50 Because we detect no hint of bias, prejudice, or unfairness in the superior court's rulings, the judge should not have been disqualified.51
Superior Court Judge Sharon L. Gleason should not have been disqualified.52