138 S. Ct. 767 (2018)
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, each containing whistleblower protections that differ in scope and procedure.1 Petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc., a real estate investment trust that owns, acquires, and develops data centers, employed respondent Paul Somers as a Vice President from 2010 to 2014.2 Somers reported suspected securities-law violations by the company to senior management and was terminated shortly afterward; he had not alerted the SEC before termination and did not file an administrative complaint within 180 days afterward.
Somers sued Digital Realty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging among other claims a cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank.3 Digital Realty moved to dismiss that claim on the ground that Somers did not qualify as a whistleblower because he had not reported any violations to the SEC.4 The district court denied the motion, finding the statute ambiguous and deferring to the SEC’s implementing regulation.5
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.6 The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory definition of whistleblower need not be applied to the anti-retaliation provision and deferred to the SEC rule under Chevron.7 This created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit, which had required SEC reporting to obtain Dodd-Frank protection, while the Second Circuit had reached a result similar to the Ninth Circuit.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.9
Whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision extends to an individual who has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC?10
A statute’s explicit definition must be followed, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.11 Section 78u–6(a) instructs that the statute’s definition of “whistleblower” “shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is, throughout §78u–6.12 The whistleblower definition operates in conjunction with the three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) to spell out the provision’s scope.13
No. The definition first describes who is eligible for protection—namely, a whistleblower who provides pertinent information “to the Commission.”14 Somers reported suspected securities-law violations only to senior management at Digital Realty and did not alert the SEC prior to his termination. An individual who falls outside the protected category of “whistleblowers” is ineligible to seek redress under the statute, regardless of the conduct in which that individual engages.15
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision does not extend to an individual who has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Breyer, J.
Justice Sotomayor joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to defend the use of legislative history.17 She explained that committee reports are a particularly reliable source because they represent the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.18 She noted that even when a statute’s meaning is clear from its text, consulting reliable legislative history can corroborate and fortify the Court’s understanding while showing respect for a coequal branch of government.19
Joined by Alito, J., And Gorsuch, J.
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion only to the extent it relies on the text of Dodd-Frank.20 He stated that the statutory definition in §78u–6(a)(6) resolves the question because it means a person who provides information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.21 He refused to join portions of the opinion that discuss the supposed purpose of the statute derived from a Senate Report, emphasizing that the Court is governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.22
Whether the SEC’s Rule 21F–2 receives Chevron deference when it defines whistleblower differently for anti-retaliation purposes than the statutory text requires?23
Because “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842, deference is not accorded to the contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule 21F–2.24
No. The statute’s unambiguous whistleblower definition precludes the Commission from more expansively interpreting that term.25 The district court and Ninth Circuit erred by finding ambiguity and deferring to the SEC regulation that permits anti-retaliation protection without SEC reporting.26 Somers did not provide information to the Commission before his termination by Digital Realty, so he did not qualify as a whistleblower at the time of the alleged retaliation.27
The SEC’s Rule 21F–2 does not receive Chevron deference.28