293 U.S. 474 (1935)
Respondent brought an action against petitioner in the federal district court for the district of Massachusetts.1 The action sought to recover damages for a personal injury resulting from the alleged negligent operation of an automobile on a public highway in Massachusetts.2
The jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent for the sum of $500.3 Respondent moved for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, that it was a compromise verdict, and that the damages allowed were inadequate.4 The trial court ordered a new trial upon the last named ground, unless petitioner would consent to an increase of the damages to the sum of $1500.5 Respondent’s consent was neither required nor given.6 Petitioner consented to the increase. In accordance with the order of the court, a denial of the motion for new trial automatically followed.7
Respondent appealed to the circuit court of appeals, where the judgment was reversed.8
Whether a federal trial court may condition denial of a plaintiff's motion for new trial on the ground of inadequate damages upon the defendant's consent to an increase in the amount of the jury verdict?9
The Seventh Amendment provides that in suits at common law the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.10
Resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.11 A careful examination of the English reports prior to that time fails to disclose any authoritative decision sustaining the power of an English court to increase the amount fixed by the verdict of a jury in an action at law for personal injuries.12 Limited ancient exceptions existed in mayhem cases.13 The rule was obsolete in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and never accepted in American courts.14
Although remittitur for excessive verdicts finds some support in early federal practice, the power to increase damages through additur has no common-law foundation.15
No. In the established facts of this case the jury awarded respondent Schiedt damages of five hundred dollars.16 The trial court found those damages inadequate and conditioned denial of the new-trial motion on petitioner Dimick consenting to an increase to fifteen hundred dollars.17 No jury ever passed upon the additional one thousand dollars, and respondent’s consent was neither required nor given.18 The procedure therefore re-examines a fact tried by a jury in a manner unknown to the common law of 1791 and violates the Seventh Amendment.19
A federal trial court may not condition denial of a plaintiff's motion for new trial on the ground of inadequate damages upon the defendant's consent to an increase in the amount of the jury verdict.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis And Mr. Justice Cardozo
Justice Stone dissented.21 He maintained that the trial court properly exercised its long-recognized common-law discretion to deny a new-trial motion once the defendant gave binding consent to an increased recovery the court deemed adequate.22 In his view the Seventh Amendment protects the essential function of the jury to decide questions of fact but does not freeze every detail of 1791 procedure.23
The court’s determination of the legal limits of recovery and its acceptance of the defendant’s consent do not re-examine facts in a forbidden manner.24 Justice Stone observed that the accepted practice of remittitur rests on the same principles of judicial discretion. Denying a new trial when the defendant consents to a proper increase is a logical and efficient extension that leaves the jury’s core role unimpaired.25 He further noted that appellate review of the denial of a new-trial motion is traditionally unavailable. The trial judge’s action here was supported by a sound reason rather than an abuse of discretion.26