410 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1411, 35 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1973)
Respondent initiated this lawsuit on February 12, 1969, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by alleging that in 1968 Police Officer John R. Carlson of the Metropolitan Police Department arrested him without probable cause and beat him with brass knuckles while he was being held by two other officers.1 The complaint further asserted that the precinct captain, the chief of police, and the District of Columbia had negligently failed to properly train, instruct, supervise, and control Officer Carlson concerning arrest procedures and the use of force.2 Respondent sought damages under both common law tort principles and the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3
The District Court dismissed the entire complaint against all defendants without providing an opinion.4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed that dismissal, holding that the allegations were sufficient to state causes of action under both the common-law and federal statutory theories of liability.5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.6
Whether the District of Columbia constitutes a State or Territory within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983?7
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects another to the deprivation of constitutional rights, but this language reaches only conduct under color of state or territorial law and does not extend to the District of Columbia, which is subject to Congress's plenary authority under Article I rather than the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment that animated the 1871 Act.8
No. The events giving rise to this action occurred entirely within the District of Columbia and involved officers of its Metropolitan Police Department acting under color of District law.9 Because the language of § 1983 reaches only conduct under color of the law of a State or Territory, the statute does not authorize the respondent's claims against the District or its officers.10 The Court of Appeals therefore erred in sustaining those claims, and its judgment must be reversed to that extent.11
The District of Columbia does not constitute a State or Territory within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12