381 U.S. 68 (1965)
In January 2003, petitioner Keshia Dixon purchased multiple firearms at two gun shows.1 During the purchases, she provided an incorrect address and falsely stated that she was not under indictment for a felony.2
Dixon was indicted and convicted on one count of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).3 She was also convicted on eight counts of making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of § 922(a)(6).4 At trial she admitted that she knew she was under indictment when she made the purchases and that she knew doing so was a crime.5 Her defense was that she acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him.6
In her request for jury instructions on the duress defense, Dixon asked that she have the burden of production and that the Government then be required to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt.7 The trial court, finding itself bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, denied the request.8 Instead, the court instructed the jury that Dixon had the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.9
After her conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected Dixon's contention that the instructions were erroneous.10 Given contrary treatment by other federal courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether the trial court's jury instructions improperly required the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence rather than requiring the Government to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt?12
No. The trial court instructed the jury that Dixon had the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.15 The offenses at issue are defined in the Safe Streets Act of 1968, which contains no indication that Congress considered how the duress defense should operate.16 The common-law rule, as applied in McKelvey v. United States, requires one relying on an affirmative defense to set it up and establish it.17 Dixon's request for an instruction placing the burden on the Government was contrary to Fifth Circuit precedent.18
The trial court properly followed that precedent in allocating the burden to the defendant. The facts show that Dixon admitted knowing she was under indictment and that purchasing the firearms was a crime, yet she claimed duress from her boyfriend's threats.19 The jury instructions were consistent with the requirement that the defendant bear the burden for this excuse defense, which does not negate the mens rea elements of knowledge and willfulness.20
The trial court's jury instructions were correct, and the Court of Appeals properly rejected Dixon's contention.21
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Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.22 When Congress is silent on the duress defense, courts should apply ordinary default rules and their exceptions.23 The better approach is to ask where the facts needed to prove or disprove the defense lie.24
Because the facts relevant to duress typically lie peculiarly in the defendant's knowledge, there is reason to place the burdens of production and persuasion on the party raising the issue.25 With these observations, Justice Kennedy joined the Court's opinion.26
Justice Alito joined the opinion of the Court.27 He did so with the understanding that the allocation of the burden of persuasion on duress does not vary from one federal criminal statute to another. Duress was an established defense at common law.28
Congress presumptively intended the burdens to be placed on the defendant as they were at common law.29 He would not assume Congress makes a new implicit judgment each time it creates or revises a statute.30
Whether the Due Process Clause requires the Government to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt on the ground that the defense controverts the mens rea element of the offenses?31
No. The crimes require that Dixon acted knowingly or willfully.34 This means she had knowledge of the facts constituting the offense and knowledge that the conduct was unlawful.35 Dixon herself testified that she knowingly provided a false address, falsely claimed to be the buyer, and knew she was breaking the law.36 Duress may excuse the conduct but does not controvert the mens rea.37
The defendant still possessed the required evil-meaning mind even if her will was overborne by threats.38 The existence of duress normally does not negate any element of the offense itself.39
The Due Process Clause does not require the Government to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt in this context.40
Whether modern common law or federal practice requires the Government to bear the burden of persuasion on a duress defense in prosecutions for federal firearms offenses?41
No. Petitioner relied on Davis v. United States and the Model Penal Code.44 Davis was premised on the particular mens rea for murder.45 Davis does not apply here because duress evidence does not tend to disprove any element of the firearms offenses.46 The Model Penal Code provides no reliable evidence that Congress adopted its allocation of burdens.47
Although some circuits have placed the burden on the prosecution, the existence of disagreement demonstrates that no such consensus existed.48 The common-law rule supports placing the burden on the defendant.49
Modern common law and federal practice do not require the Government to bear the burden of persuasion on the duress defense for these offenses.50
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Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Breyer dissented.51 He agreed that the burden of production lies on the defendant.52 He believed that in the absence of any indication of a different congressional intent the burden of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt should lie with the prosecution.53
He would begin with the common law and allow rules to evolve through judicial practice informed by reason and experience to produce uniform federal practice.54 Factors favoring the prosecution include the resemblance of duress to mens rea questions.55 Federal courts' practice with related defenses like self-defense and entrapment also favors the prosecution.56
The value of uniformity in burden allocations across defenses supports his view.57