410 U.S. 179 (1973)
Mary Doe, a 22-year-old married Georgia resident who was nine weeks pregnant when the complaint was filed, joined twenty-three other individuals and two nonprofit corporations in filing this federal action in the Northern District of Georgia against the state attorney general, the Fulton County district attorney, and the Atlanta chief of police.1
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-1201 to 26-1203, which made abortion a felony except when a licensed physician determined in his best clinical judgment that continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the woman's life or seriously and permanently injure her health, that the fetus would likely be born with a grave permanent defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape, and only after satisfying multiple procedural conditions including advance written request, hospital committee approval, performance in an accredited licensed hospital, and Georgia residency.2
Doe alleged that she had three children already placed in foster care or for adoption, had been a patient at the state mental hospital, lived in poverty with her reconciled husband who worked only sporadically, and had been advised by her physician that an abortion would be safer for her health than carrying the pregnancy to term, yet her application to the Grady Memorial Hospital abortion committee was denied because her situation did not fit the statutory exceptions.3
A three-judge district court tried the case on the pleadings and interrogatories, held that only Doe presented a justiciable controversy, invalidated the limitations on reasons for abortion and the residency requirement, upheld the hospital and committee requirements, granted declaratory relief, and denied injunctive relief; both sides appealed and the Supreme Court postponed probable jurisdiction.
Whether Mary Doe and the physician plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Georgia abortion statutes?4
A plaintiff has standing when presenting a justiciable controversy with a direct threat of personal detriment from enforcement of the challenged statute, and pregnancy cases are not moot when capable of repetition yet evading review.
Yes. Mary Doe was denied an abortion by the Grady Memorial Hospital committee because her circumstances did not fit the statutory exceptions and faced the choice of carrying an unwanted pregnancy or seeking an illegal procedure.5 The physician plaintiffs, as Georgia-licensed doctors, face direct criminal prosecution under Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-1201 to 26-1203 if they perform abortions outside the narrow exceptions and procedural requirements.6
Mary Doe and the physician plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Georgia abortion statutes.7
Whether the Georgia abortion statutes' limitations on the reasons for which an abortion may be performed violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?8
Yes. The Georgia statutes limit abortions to cases of danger to the woman's life or health, grave fetal defect, or rape.11 These restrictions are not reasonably related to protecting maternal health or potential life and arbitrarily burden the fundamental right recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird.12 Mary Doe's application was denied despite her physician's judgment that abortion was in her best interest with less danger to health than carrying the pregnancy, directly illustrating the statutes' overbreadth.13
The Georgia abortion statutes' limitations on the reasons for which an abortion may be performed violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment striking down the Georgia statutes.15 He stressed that the decision does not recognize an absolute right to abortion on demand.16 The Court acknowledges the state's important interest in protecting potential fetal life, an interest that becomes compelling at some point during pregnancy.17
Burger noted that the Georgia scheme sweeps too broadly and imposes unnecessary procedural burdens on the woman's right.18 He observed that the vast majority of physicians act on the basis of carefully deliberated medical judgments and that the Constitution does not require abortions on demand.19
Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court but wrote separately to emphasize that the right of privacy is fundamental.20 That right includes freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion into decisions whether to bear or beget a child.21 Douglas explained that the Georgia statutes intrude too far by limiting the reasons for which an abortion may be performed and by imposing multiple layers of physician approval that destroy the privacy inherent in the physician-patient relationship.22
He concluded that the statute is overbroad because it equates the value of embryonic life immediately after conception with the worth of life immediately before birth.23
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice White dissented for the reasons stated in his Roe v. Wade dissent.24 He maintained that the Constitution confers no right to an abortion.25 The issue of abortion regulation is one for the legislatures of the states to decide.26
White concluded that the Georgia legislature made a reasonable judgment limiting abortions to specified circumstances and that the Court lacks any warrant to override that judgment by creating a new constitutional right.27 He would have reversed the judgment of the District Court.28
Justice Rehnquist joined the dissenting opinion of Justice White.29 He also dissented for the reasons stated in his dissent in Roe v. Wade.30 Rehnquist viewed the compelling-state-interest standard as an inappropriate measure of the constitutionality of state abortion laws.31
He argued that the decision in these cases is an exercise in raw judicial power.32 The Court has no authority to impose its own policy preferences on the states in an area where the Constitution is silent.33 Rehnquist concluded that the people of Georgia are entitled to make their own judgments about the circumstances in which abortions should be permitted.34
Whether the Georgia abortion statutes' procedural requirements of hospital committee approval, concurrence of two consulting physicians, and performance in a licensed hospital are constitutional?35
No. The requirements of advance hospital committee approval by at least three staff members, written concurrence by two additional physicians after separate examinations, and performance only in a JCAH-accredited licensed hospital are not reasonably related to health protection.38 These provisions add substantial delay and expense and are not imposed on any other medical procedure.39 They unduly restrict both the patient's access and the physician's independent clinical judgment, as shown by the denial of Mary Doe's application and the median fifteen-day workup time at Grady Memorial Hospital.40
The Georgia abortion statutes' procedural requirements of hospital committee approval, concurrence of two consulting physicians, and performance in a licensed hospital are unconstitutional.41
Whether the Georgia residency requirement for abortions violates the right to travel?
A state may not condition access to medical services available within its borders on residency, as this violates the right to travel protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Yes. The Georgia statutes require certification that the woman is a bona fide resident and that the physician believes her to be so.43 This bars non-residents from obtaining abortions even in private hospitals or from private physicians.44 The restriction has no justification in preserving state-supported facilities and directly impedes the right to travel for medical care.45
The Georgia residency requirement for abortions violates the right to travel.46
Whether the District Court erred in denying injunctive relief after granting declaratory relief?47
When declaratory relief is granted declaring a statute unconstitutional, injunctive relief against enforcement is ordinarily unnecessary if prosecutorial authorities are assumed to respect the judgment, absent a showing that enforcement will continue.48
No. The District Court correctly denied injunctive relief after granting declaratory relief.49 Georgia's prosecutorial authorities may be assumed to give full recognition to the federal judgment.50 The Supreme Court likewise declined to order injunctive relief because no showing was made that enforcement would continue in defiance of the declaratory judgment.51
The District Court did not err in denying injunctive relief after granting declaratory relief.52