380 U.S. 479 (1965)
In October 1963 appellant Dombrowski and intervenors Smith and Waltzer were arrested by Louisiana state and local police and charged with violations of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law.1 Their offices were raided and files and records seized.2 A state judge later quashed the arrest warrants as not based on probable cause and discharged the appellants, then granted a motion to suppress the seized evidence on the ground that the raid was illegal.3
Louisiana officials continued to threaten prosecution of the appellants after these events.4 In November the appellants filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief and an injunction against the Governor, police and law enforcement officers, and the Chairman of the Legislative Joint Committee on Un-American Activities in Louisiana.5 Appellant Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. is active in fostering civil rights for Negroes in Louisiana and other Southern states, with Dombrowski as its Executive Director, Smith as its Treasurer, and Waltzer as Smith’s law partner and an attorney for the organization.6
A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.7 Shortly after the three-judge court was convened a grand jury was summoned in the Parish of Orleans to hear evidence looking to indictments of the individual appellants.8 Judge Wisdom issued a temporary restraining order against prosecutions, but the district court dissolved the order and dismissed the complaint.9
Thereafter the grand jury returned indictments under the Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law against the individual appellants.10 Dombrowski and Smith were indicted for failing to register as members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund and for acting as Executive Director and Treasurer of a subversive organization.11 Smith and Waltzer were indicted for failing to register as members of the National Lawyers Guild.12 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.13
Whether the complaint alleges facts showing sufficient irreparable injury to justify federal equitable relief against threatened state criminal prosecutions?14
Federal courts may grant equitable relief against state criminal prosecutions threatening First Amendment rights.15 This is permitted when the complaint alleges that defense of the prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights.16 A substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if the parties must await state court disposition.17
Yes. The established facts show that in October 1963 Dombrowski, Smith, and Waltzer were arrested and their offices raided with files seized under the Louisiana statutes.18 A state judge quashed the warrants for lack of probable cause and suppressed the evidence as illegally seized.19 Louisiana officials nevertheless continued to threaten prosecution.20
The appellants filed their section 1983 complaint in November seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.21 After the three-judge court was convened a grand jury was summoned, Judge Wisdom issued a temporary restraining order that the district court dissolved before dismissing the complaint, and indictments followed under the Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law.22 These events, together with repeated announcements by appellees that the appellant organization is a subversive or Communist-front organization, whose members must register or be prosecuted under the Louisiana statutes, have, appellants allege, frightened off potential members and contributors.23 Seizures of documents and records have paralyzed operations and threatened exposure of the identity of adherents to a locally unpopular cause.24 The facts therefore establish the critical hazard of loss of protected expression that traditional defense in state prosecutions cannot remedy.25
The complaint alleges facts showing sufficient irreparable injury to justify federal equitable relief.26
Whether the abstention doctrine applies when state statutes regulating expression are attacked on their face as abridging free expression or as applied to discourage protected activities?27
The abstention doctrine does not apply where state statutes regulating expression are attacked on their face as abridging free expression.28 It also does not apply where the statutes are challenged as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities.29 The threat of irreparable injury from overbroad statutes and bad-faith enforcement requires prompt federal resolution rather than awaiting piecemeal state construction through criminal prosecutions.30
No. The established facts demonstrate that the appellants attacked the statutes on their face as overbroad and vague.31 They also attacked the statutes as applied through bad-faith threats and prosecutions intended to harass civil rights workers rather than to obtain valid convictions.32 The arrests, raids, continued threats after judicial suppression of evidence, and post-complaint indictments occurred without any expectation of ultimate success under constitutional standards.33 Because the conduct charged is not hard-core activity obviously prohibited under any narrowing construction, abstention would subject the appellants to the very uncertainties and chilling effects the vagueness doctrine is meant to prevent.34
Federal relief is therefore required without awaiting state court interpretation.35
The abstention doctrine does not apply to the present case.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice Clark
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the decision abolishes the abstention doctrine in all suits attacking state criminal statutes for vagueness on First Amendment grounds.37 He maintained that the allegations do not demonstrate incompatibility between abstention and vindication of constitutional rights.38 In his view state courts remain capable of promptly protecting constitutional interests, as the Louisiana courts had already suppressed the seized evidence in this very case.39
Harlan argued that the possibility of impairment of expression is not avoided by the federal route.40 The Constitution does not prevent a state from testing First Amendment claims through criminal proceedings subject to ultimate Supreme Court review.41 He would have retained federal jurisdiction only to ensure that state prosecutions proceeded promptly and in good faith.42
Whether specific provisions of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law are invalid on their face?43
A state statute regulating expression is invalid on its face when its definition of subversive organization is unduly vague, uncertain, and broad in the same manner as a statute previously held unconstitutional.44 The overbreadth creates a danger zone within which protected expression may be inhibited.45 The threat of prosecution remains real and substantial even if ultimate success is improbable.46
Yes. The established facts include indictments of Dombrowski and Smith under section 364(4).47 They were charged with acting as officers of the Southern Conference Educational Fund.48 That organization is alleged to be a subversive organization identical to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare cited by congressional committees.49 The statutory definition of subversive organization in section 359(5) is substantially identical to the Washington definition held invalid in Baggett v. Bullitt.50 Because protected freedoms of expression and association are involved, the definition supplies no ascertainable standard.51 It creates the same impermissible danger zone for protected conduct.52
The provisions are therefore void on their face.53
The specific provisions of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law under which the indictments rest are invalid on their face.54
Whether the registration requirement and presumptions in the Louisiana statutes impose an impermissible burden on protected expression?55
A registration requirement for members of organizations officially cited as communist fronts is invalid on its face when it rests on a presumption that lacks the minimum procedural safeguards of notice and hearing.56 The presumption impermissibly shifts the burden of persuasion to the individual in an area where the transcendent value of speech requires the state to bear that burden.57
Yes. The established facts show that Smith and Waltzer were indicted under section 364(7) for failing to register as members of the National Lawyers Guild.58 Dombrowski and Smith were indicted for failing to register as members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund.59 Section 359(3) provides that official citation by the Attorney General, the Subversive Activities Control Board, or any congressional committee constitutes presumptive evidence without any requirement of prior compliance with notice-and-hearing procedures.60 This presumption casts an impermissible burden on the appellants to disprove the factual status of the organizations.61
Because the value of speech is transcendent, due process requires the state to bear the burden of persuasion, rendering the registration requirement unconstitutional on its face.62
The registration requirement and presumptions impose an impermissible burden on protected expression.63