185 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950)
Appellant appeared in person and with counsel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.1 He entered a plea of guilty to an indictment charging murder in the first degree under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.2 After the court conducted a careful examination of the defendant's understanding of the charge and the maximum sentence that could be imposed, and after hearing expert testimony as to his mental capacity to understand the charge and assist in his defense, the court accepted the plea and imposed a life sentence.3
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate under Section 2255, 28 U.S.C.A.4 In the motion, appellant asserted that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to charge in the statutory language that he murdered a "human being."5 Appellant also contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose sentence until a jury had first determined the issue of his guilt and the punishment to be imposed.6
The indictment alleged that appellant "with premeditation and malice aforethought, unlawfully, wilfully and deliberately and maliciously shot in the back of the head and murdered Ernest M. Harkins, an officer of the Post Office Department, of the United States Government, while engaged in the performance of his official duties."7 The indictment followed the language of the approved form for the murder of a Federal Officer.8 The district court denied the motion to vacate, from which order appellant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.9
Whether the indictment charging the murder of a named federal officer was fatally defective for failing to allege that the defendant murdered a "human being"?10
The specificity formerly held necessary to charge an offense is no longer required or sanctioned. See Rule 7(c), Criminal Rules of Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. The indictment is legally sufficient to inform the appellant that he was charged with the murder of a human being when it follows the approved form.11
No. The indictment charged that appellant "with premeditation and malice aforethought, unlawfully, wilfully and deliberately and maliciously shot in the back of the head and murdered Ernest M. Harkins, an officer of the Post Office Department, of the United States Government, while engaged in the performance of his official duties." This indictment is drawn literally in the language of the approved form of indictment for the murder of a Federal Officer and was legally sufficient.12
The indictment was not fatally defective.13
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Judge Phillips concurred in the result, thereby agreeing with the affirmance of the district court's order denying the motion to vacate the judgment and sentence under Section 2255.14
Whether the district court had authority to accept a guilty plea to first-degree murder and impose a life sentence without submitting the question of guilt and punishment to a jury?15
The court was authorized to accept the plea of guilty to the capital offense if it was freely and voluntarily entered, with the advice of counsel, and under the protection and oversight of the judge. Appellant's voluntary and deliberate plea of guilty constituted a waiver of his right to a jury trial. In a jury waived trial, the court could impose any sentence which the jury could have imposed, including life imprisonment.16
Yes. The appellant appeared in person and with counsel and entered a plea of guilty after careful examination and expert testimony. The power of the court to accept a plea of guilty is inherent. The only other interpretation would require the court to impose the death penalty mandatorily, which is a distorted and irrational result that Congress did not intend.17
The district court had authority to accept the guilty plea and impose the life sentence.18