74 So.3d 521
The defendant, John Dorsey, appeals his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and carrying a concealed firearm. These charges arose from a confrontation at a high school "keg" party that resulted in the deaths of two young men. We affirm the defendant's convictions for the weapons offenses, but conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions for second degree murder. The evidence instead supports convictions for manslaughter based on an impulsive overreaction to an attack. We also conclude the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the justifiable use of deadly force under the "Stand Your Ground" law without explaining the duty to retreat where the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity. Accordingly, we reverse the second degree murder convictions and remand for a new trial on manslaughter charges.
The defendant was indicted for first degree murder for the shooting death of Stephen "Bo" Bunting and second degree murder for the shooting death of John Lott. The evidence at trial showed that on August 25, 2006, the defendant attended a large keg party attended primarily by high school students or recent graduates. Lott and Bunting approached the defendant while he was either sitting on the hood of his SUV or leaning against it. Lott was angry about having been bumped earlier; Lott, Bunting, Lott's brother, and several friends formed a half-circle around the defendant. Shortly before the confrontation, the defendant had armed himself with a gun during an apparently unrelated dispute about a keg.
Witnesses observed the defendant with his hand in his pocket in a manner that suggested a confrontation was imminent. One witness testified that the defendant appeared to be smirking and did not appear afraid. Lott and the defendant exchanged curses, and a prosecution witness acknowledged that it looked like Lott was trying to start a fight. Bunting, encouraging a fight, asked Lott whether he was "going to let him [the defendant] talk to you like that?" At that point Lott struck the defendant in the face, hitting him "pretty hard" and causing the defendant to fall back against his vehicle.
Immediately after being punched, the defendant quickly produced a gun and shot Lott once and shot Bunting once.1 The victims were, at most, two or three feet away from the defendant. Lott died from a single gunshot wound to the chest and Bunting died from a single gunshot wound to the abdomen. After the shootings, the defendant entered his vehicle and drove away.
The medical examiner testified that the paths of the gunshot wounds were consistent with the decedents leaning forward when shot. The victims were at least one foot from the shooter. Lott's blood alcohol level was .249 grams per deciliter, more than three times the legal driving limit; Bunting's blood alcohol level was .05 grams per deciliter and he had Xanax in his system at therapeutic levels. Lott had a roll of coins wrapped in black electrical tape in his pocket. There was also evidence that both Lott and Bunting had reputations for violence, and one witness testified that they were known to jump people and liked to fight.
At the close of the State's case and again at the close of all the evidence, the trial court denied the defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal. Defense counsel argued that, as a matter of law, the evidence did not support murder convictions and that manslaughter would be the appropriate charge because the evidence showed only an impulsive overreaction to an attack.
The jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder as a lesser included offense on Count I and guilty of second degree murder as charged on Count II, and also convicted him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and carrying a concealed firearm on Counts III and IV.
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. If, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction. See Turner v. State, 29 So.3d 361, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002).
Second degree murder is defined as the "unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual." § 782.04, Fla. Stat. (2006). An act is imminently dangerous and evinces a depraved mind if it: (1) a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another; (2) is done from ill will, hatred, spite or an evil intent; and (3) is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life. Wiley v. State, 60 So.3d 588, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.4.
Florida courts have held that an impulsive overreaction to an attack or injury is ordinarily insufficient to prove ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent. See, e.g., Light v. State, 841 So.2d 623, 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); McDaniel v. State, 620 So.2d 1308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Although exceptions exist, second degree murder is normally committed by a person who knows the victim and has had time to develop enmity; hatred or spite usually require more than an instant to develop. See Light, 841 So.2d at 626.
Where a defendant's use of force is an impulsive overreaction to a victim's attack or injury, the proper conviction is manslaughter, not second degree murder. See Poole v. State, 30 So.3d 696, 698-99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Bellamy v. State, 977 So.2d 682, 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Rayl v. State, 765 So.2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); McDaniel, 620 So.2d at 1308.
Applying the law to the facts, the evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the State—is insufficient to sustain second degree murder convictions. It was uncontested that the defendant had his back against his vehicle when confronted by multiple men, including the victims; the victims had been drinking and Lott was heavily intoxicated. After words were exchanged, Lott punched the defendant in the face with Bunting's encouragement, causing the defendant to fall back. Although the defendant's use of a firearm could be viewed as excessive, negating self-defense, there was no evidence that the defendant acted from ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent. The State's claim that the defendant's pre-conflict demeanor proved a depraved mind is rejected. The use of deadly force occurred only after an attack and no record evidence shows a prior grudge or ongoing disputes between the defendant and the victims.
This case is not meaningfully distinguishable from Poole, Rayl, and McDaniel, where convictions for second degree murder were reduced to manslaughter because the evidence established an impulsive overreaction rather than action from ill will or spite. The trial court therefore erred in denying the defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal on the murder charges.
Ordinarily we would reduce the second degree murder convictions to manslaughter convictions, but an instructional error regarding self-defense and the duty to retreat under the Stand Your Ground law requires a new trial on the manslaughter charges.
Section 776.012, Florida Statutes (2006), provides that a person is justified in the use of deadly force and need not retreat if: (1) he or she reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony; or (2) under those circumstances permitted pursuant to § 776.013. § 776.012, Fla. Stat. (2006).
Section 776.013(3), Florida's "Stand Your Ground" provision, states: "A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat. (2006).
At the charge conference the defense asked that the Stand Your Ground instruction based on § 776.013(3) not be given because the defendant was presumably engaged in unlawful activity at the time he used deadly force: he was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and was carrying a concealed firearm. The trial court denied the request and gave the standard jury instruction consistent with § 776.013(3).
The defendant requested a special instruction advising the jury that if the defendant was engaging in unlawful activity or was attacked in a place where he did not have the right to be, the jury must consider whether the defendant had a duty to retreat; if retreat would have increased his danger, then his use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm could be justifiable. The emphasized portion of the requested instruction was taken from the pre-2005 standard jury instruction on deadly force. The prosecutor initially agreed but later objected, and the trial court declined to give the specially requested instruction.
A criminal defendant is entitled to a special jury instruction if: (1) the instruction is supported by the evidence; (2) the standard instruction does not adequately cover the defense theory; and (3) the special instruction correctly states the law and is not misleading. See Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 756 (Fla. 2001).
Prior to enactment of § 776.013, Florida common law (with the castle doctrine exception) required retreat to the wall before resorting to deadly force in most circumstances. See Weiand v. State, 732 So.2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999); State v. Smiley, 927 So.2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Even under that rule, however, there was no duty to retreat where a defendant had already "retreated to the wall" or where retreat would be futile. See Thompson v. State, 552 So.2d 264, 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
The legislature's 2005 enactment of § 776.013 "expanded the right of self-defense and abolished the common law duty to retreat" when deadly force is used to prevent imminent great bodily harm or death. McWhorter v. State, 971 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Section 776.013 created a broad no-duty-to-retreat rule in many circumstances and a new affirmative defense for using deadly force without first retreating. See Smiley v. State, 966 So.2d 330, 335 (Fla. 2007).
For offenses occurring after the effective date of § 776.013, some cases have found fundamental error where the jury received the pre-2005 instruction. See Williams v. State, 982 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Richards v. State, 39 So.3d 431, 433-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In this case, however, an issue existed as to whether the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity when attacked. The current standard instruction does not inform the jury of the parameters of the duty to retreat when the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity or was not in a place where he had a right to be. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2011).
Under the unique circumstances here, the trial court erred by instructing the jury on Stand Your Ground over the defendant's objection without also instructing the jury on the scope of the duty to retreat when the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity.
The plain language of § 776.013(3) limits the no-duty-to-retreat rule to persons who "are not engaged in an unlawful activity." We need not decide the full scope of the statutory term "unlawful activity" for all contexts, but we hold that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon qualifies as "unlawful activity" within the meaning of the Stand Your Ground statute. Cf. Dawkins v. State, 252 P.3d 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (holding illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun was unlawful activity disqualifying defendant from stand-your-ground relief, while noting that minor infractions might not constitute unlawful activity).3
Accordingly, when a defendant is engaged in unlawful activity or not in a place where he has a right to be at the time he is attacked, the common law duty to retreat remains applicable. See Ady v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 675 So.2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1996) (a statute is presumed not to alter common law beyond what is clearly specified). Even under that common law duty, however, there remains no duty to retreat if the defendant has already retreated to the wall or if retreat would be futile.
In this case the requested instruction on the duty to retreat was supported by evidence that the defendant was unlawfully possessing a firearm; the standard instruction did not adequately address the duty to retreat under those circumstances; and the special instruction, drawn from the pre-2005 standard instruction, correctly stated the common law duty to retreat and was not misleading.4
Because there was evidence that the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity, the trial court should not have given the standard Stand Your Ground instruction over the defendant's objection without also giving the specially requested instruction. Alternatively, in light of the defendant's objection and the evidence of unlawful activity, the court could have omitted the Stand Your Ground instruction and given the pre-2005 standard instruction on justifiable deadly force. Either approach would have explained to the jury the duty to retreat when the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity. Although the defendant's self-defense claim was arguably weak, he was nevertheless entitled to a correct instruction on the law. See Wright v. State, 705 So.2d 102, 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Based on the foregoing, we reverse for a new trial on manslaughter charges. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial on charges of manslaughter.2
Opinion by HAZOURI and LEVINE, JJ.
HAZOURI and LEVINE, JJ., concur.