358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959)
In September 1956, federal narcotic agent Marsh, stationed in Denver with twenty-nine years of experience, received information from Hereford, a special employee of the Bureau of Narcotics who had been paid small sums for tips over the prior six months and whose information had always proved accurate and reliable.1 On September 3, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently taken up abode at a stated address in Denver and was peddling narcotics to several addicts in that city.2 Four days later, on September 7, Hereford reported that Draper had gone to Chicago by train the previous day and would return to Denver by train on either the morning of September 8 or September 9 carrying three ounces of heroin, while also supplying a detailed physical description of Draper, the clothing he would be wearing, a tan zipper bag he would carry, and noting that he habitually walked real fast.3
On the morning of September 8, Marsh and a Denver police officer watched all incoming trains from Chicago at Union Station but saw no one matching the description.4 The next morning, September 9, they observed a man alighting from a Chicago train who possessed the exact physical attributes, wore the precise clothing described, carried a tan zipper bag in his right hand, kept his left hand thrust in his raincoat pocket, and walked fast toward the exit.5 Marsh and the officer overtook, stopped, and arrested the man, later identified as petitioner James Draper, then searched him and recovered two envelopes containing 865 grains of heroin clutched in his left hand inside the raincoat pocket and a hypodermic syringe inside the tan zipper bag.6 Hereford died four days after the arrest and did not testify at any hearing.7
Draper was charged with knowingly concealing and transporting narcotic drugs in Denver in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174.8 Before trial he moved to suppress the heroin and syringe as the product of an unlawful search and seizure.9 After a hearing the District Court denied the motion, the evidence was admitted over renewed objection at trial, and Draper was convicted.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the sole ground that the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.11
Whether hearsay information from an informant may be considered by an officer in determining whether probable cause or reasonable grounds exist to make an arrest without a warrant?12
Hearsay may be used to establish probable cause for an arrest.13 There is a large difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search.14 The quanta and modes of proof differ substantially between the two.15 Officers may rely on information from informants if it is reasonably trustworthy, even if the informant does not testify and the information is hearsay.16 This distinction prevents requiring proof sufficient to establish guilt to substantiate the existence of probable cause.17
Yes. The information given to narcotic agent Marsh by special employee Hereford may have been hearsay to Marsh, but coming from one employed for that purpose and whose information had always been found accurate and reliable, it is clear that Marsh would have been derelict in his duties had he not pursued it.18
The rule from Brinegar applies directly here because the informant Hereford had a track record of accuracy over the six months prior to the events in question.19 Marsh received the tip on September 7 regarding Draper's travel plans and physical description.20 The District Court properly considered this hearsay in denying the motion to suppress the heroin and syringe seized from Draper on September 9 at the Denver Union Station.21
Hearsay information from a reliable informant may be considered by an officer when determining whether probable cause exists to make an arrest without a warrant.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the arrest violated the spirit of the Fourth Amendment because the officers acted solely on the informer's word without any evidence known to them that could be presented to a magistrate. He argued that the requirement of reasonable grounds demands some facts suggestive of guilt within the officer's knowledge, not merely the unverified report of an informer.23 Douglas traced the historical objections to arrests on suspicion alone, from the general warrants condemned in England through the American rejection of lettres de cachet and writs of assistance.
He warned that lowering this standard risks making the role of the informer—odious in our history—once more supreme, leaving law-abiding citizens vulnerable to whispered accusations without any evidentiary basis known to the arresting officer.
Whether the information known to the arresting officer was sufficient to establish probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had committed or was committing a violation of the narcotics laws?24
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.25 This practical, nontechnical standard allows officers to act on probabilities derived from everyday life considerations rather than technical rules of evidence.26
Yes. When Marsh saw a man having the exact physical attributes and wearing the precise clothing described by Hereford, he alighted from one of the very trains from the very place stated by Hereford.27 He started to walk at a fast pace toward the station exit while carrying a tan zipper bag.28 Marsh had personally verified every facet of the information given him by Hereford except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag.29
With every other bit of Hereford's information being thus personally verified, Marsh had reasonable grounds to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's information that Draper would have the heroin with him was likewise true.30 The arrest of Draper at the Denver Union Station on September 9, 1956, was therefore supported by probable cause under both the Fourth Amendment and 26 U.S.C. § 7607.31 The subsequent search incident to that arrest yielded the envelopes containing 865 grains of heroin and the hypodermic syringe.32
The information known to the arresting officer was sufficient to establish probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had committed or was committing a violation of the narcotics laws.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas maintained that the officers had no evidence apart from the mere word of an informer that the petitioner was committing a crime.34 He pointed out that the fact that the petitioner walked fast and carried a tan zipper bag was not evidence of any crime.35 If the officers had gone to a magistrate with only the informer's accusation, no warrant would have been granted.36
Douglas stressed that the officer must act on some evidence known to him through his own senses or investigation, not on unverified suspicion, lest the constitutional standard protecting both officer and citizen be eroded.