60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
Dred Scott, along with his wife Harriet and their two children Eliza and Lizzie, was held as a slave by the defendant John F. A. Sandford in the State of Missouri.1 Scott initiated an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri asserting his and his family's right to freedom.2 The declaration averred that Scott was a citizen of Missouri and the defendant a citizen of New York to establish diversity jurisdiction.3
The defendant responded with a plea in abatement asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction because Scott was not a citizen of Missouri.4 Scott was a negro of African descent whose ancestors were of pure African blood and had been brought into the country and sold as slaves.5 Scott demurred to this plea.6 The Circuit Court overruled the plea and required the defendant to answer over.7 The defendant then filed pleas in bar.8 After a trial on the merits the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, leading to judgment for him.9 Scott then prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court.10
The underlying facts showed that Scott had been the slave of Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the United States Army.11 In 1834 Emerson took Scott from Missouri to Rock Island in Illinois, where he held him as a slave until 1836.12 Emerson then removed Scott to Fort Snelling in the Territory of Upper Louisiana north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, holding him there until 1838.13 Harriet, originally the slave of Major Taliaferro, was also brought to Fort Snelling and sold to Emerson.14 Scott and Harriet were married at Fort Snelling in 1836 with Emerson's consent, and their children were born there or during the return journey.15 In 1838 Emerson brought the family back to Missouri, where they resided until Emerson sold them to Sandford.16
The case reached the Supreme Court after two arguments.17 The Court ordered reargument on some of the points due to differences of opinion among the justices and the importance of the questions involved.18
Whether the Circuit Court of the United States had jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between Dred Scott and John F. A. Sandford?19
In the courts of the United States, which are courts of limited jurisdiction, a plaintiff claiming the right to sue under the Constitution in controversies between citizens of different States must distinctly aver in his pleading that the parties are citizens of different States.20 The defendant may challenge this by plea in abatement.21 If the facts show the plaintiff is not a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution, the court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the suit.22
No. Dred Scott, along with his wife Harriet and their two children Eliza and Lizzie, was held as a slave by the defendant John F. A. Sandford in the State of Missouri.23 Scott initiated an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri asserting his and his family's right to freedom.
The declaration averred that Scott was a citizen of Missouri and the defendant a citizen of New York to establish diversity jurisdiction. The defendant responded with a plea in abatement asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction because Scott was not a citizen of Missouri. Scott was a negro of African descent whose ancestors were of pure African blood and had been brought into the country and sold as slaves. Scott demurred to this plea.
The Circuit Court overruled the plea and required the defendant to answer over. The defendant then filed pleas in bar. After a trial on the merits the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, leading to judgment for him. Scott then prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court.
Upon arrival in the Supreme Court, the case was argued twice due to differences of opinion among the justices.24 The plea in abatement and the judgment on it are part of the record brought up by the writ of error.25 Applying the rule to these facts, the admitted allegations in the plea in abatement establish that Scott is a descendant of African slaves and therefore not a citizen entitled to invoke diversity jurisdiction under the Constitution.26
The Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the case because Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution and therefore could not sue in the courts of the United States.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Wayne concurred entirely in the opinion of the court as written by the Chief Justice without any qualification of its reasoning or conclusions.28 He noted that the opinion meets fully and decides every point made in the argument by counsel on either side.29 Nothing belonging to the case was left undecided, and no point was discussed that was not called for by the record or necessary for the judicial disposition.30
Wayne emphasized that the court neither sought nor made the case but discharged its duty as a distinct and efficient department of the Government as the framers intended when the Constitution was ratified.31
Justice Grier concurred in the opinion delivered by Justice Nelson on the questions discussed by him.32 He also concurred with the Chief Justice that the Act of Congress of March 6, 1820 is unconstitutional and void.33 Grier added that assuming the facts as stated the plaintiff cannot sue as a citizen of Missouri in the courts of the United States.34
The record shows a prima facie case of jurisdiction requiring the court to decide all questions properly arising.35 Since the decision on the pleas in bar shows the plaintiff is a slave and therefore not entitled to sue, the form of the judgment is of little importance.36
Justice McLean dissented and argued that the plea to the jurisdiction is not before the court on this writ of error.37 A demurrer to the plea was sustained in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant did not complain of that decision.38 He stated there is nothing in controversy here but the merits and proceeded to discuss them.39
McLean concluded that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed.40 McLean referred to the opinion of Justice Nelson with which he concurred on the point that the Constitution, laws, and policy of Illinois are peculiar respecting slavery.41
Justice Curtis dissented from the opinion pronounced by the Chief Justice and from the judgment the majority rendered.42 He argued that the sufficiency of the plea to the jurisdiction is before the court for judgment upon the writ of error.43 There is no sound reason why it should not be judged by the rules of the common law applicable to such pleas.44
Curtis stated that when the plaintiff has alleged the necessary citizenship the defendant must interpose a plea in abatement and prove the truth of his plea.45 He concluded that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.46
Whether Dred Scott, a negro whose ancestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves, was a citizen of the State of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution so as to be entitled to sue in the courts of the United States?47
The descendants of African slaves were not intended to be included under the word citizens in the Constitution and can claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for citizens of the United States.48 They were considered at the time of the Constitution as a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.49
No. The facts stated in the plea in abatement, admitted by the demurrer, show that Dred Scott is a negro of African descent whose ancestors were of pure African blood and were brought into this country and sold as slaves.50 The court applied the rule by examining the Constitution's text, the historical understanding at adoption, and the two clauses that point directly to the negro race as a separate class.51 Neither that description of persons nor their descendants were embraced in the provisions conferring rights of citizenship.52 The change in public opinion since adoption cannot alter the Constitution's true meaning and intention when formed.53
Dred Scott was not a citizen of the State of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution and therefore was not entitled to sue in the courts of the United States.54
Whether the Act of Congress of March 6, 1820, prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude in the Territory of Upper Louisiana north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude was constitutional?55
The power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States does not authorize it to deprive citizens of their property in slaves without constitutional warrant.56 The Constitution recognizes the right of property in a slave and provides guarantees such as due process of law that limit congressional power over personal and property rights in the territories.57
No. The facts show that Dr. Emerson took Dred Scott to Fort Snelling in the Territory of Upper Louisiana north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude and held him there as a slave until 1838.58 The court applied the rule by rejecting the argument that the territorial clause applies only to territory ceded while the States were separate sovereignties.59 The clause refers to territory the United States might afterwards acquire.60 The Act of March 6, 1820 is not warranted by the Constitution and is void, so Scott's residence there conferred no freedom.61
The Act of Congress of March 6, 1820 is unconstitutional and void and did not confer freedom upon Dred Scott or his family.62
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Nelson stated the grounds upon which he arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.63 He explained that the suit was brought for the purpose of asserting freedom.64 The defendant pleaded in abatement that the plaintiff is not a citizen of Missouri because he is a negro of African descent whose ancestors were brought into the country and sold as slaves.
Nelson noted that the Circuit Court sustained the demurrer and that after trial on pleas in bar a verdict was given for the defendant.65 He concluded that it belongs to the State to determine for itself the status of slavery within her jurisdiction subject only to limitations in the Federal Constitution.66
Justice Daniel affirmed that since the establishment of the several communities now constituting the States there never has been submitted questions surpassing in importance those now before the court.67 He adverted succinctly to the facts upon which the questions of law have arisen.68 The action of trespass vi et armis was instituted in the Circuit Court in the name of the plaintiff a negro held as a slave for recovery of freedom for himself his wife and two children.69
After careful consideration of the arguments and the history of the times, Daniel concurred in the view that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.70
Justice Campbell concurred in the judgment pronounced by the Chief Justice but filed a separate opinion due to the importance of the cause.71 He recounted that the plaintiff in 1834 was a negro slave in Missouri, the property of Dr. Emerson. Emerson took him to Rock Island on the border of Illinois and in 1836 to Fort Snelling in the present Minnesota.72
Campbell explained that the result of the discussions is that the status or civil and political capacity of a person is determined in the first instance by the law of the domicil where he is born.73 Questions of status are closely connected with considerations arising out of the social and political organization of the State where they originate.74 His conclusion is that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.75
Justice Catron stated that the defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction that the plaintiff was a negro of African blood, the descendant of Africans imported and sold as slaves and thus had no capacity as a citizen of Missouri.76 He noted that the Circuit Court sustained a demurrer to this plea and a trial was had upon the pleas of the general issue and that the plaintiff and his family were slaves belonging to the defendant resulting in a verdict for the defendant.77 Catron concluded that the judgment of the Circuit Court upon the plea in abatement is not open to examination in this court upon the plaintiff's writ.78
On the merits the plaintiff claims to have acquired property in himself by being kept in Illinois during two years but under the peculiar policy of Illinois the slaves do not acquire freedom unless the master becomes an inhabitant.79 He concluded that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.80
Whether the residence of Dred Scott and his family in the State of Illinois and the Territory of Upper Louisiana conferred freedom upon them?81
Residence in a territory where Congress has purported to prohibit slavery confers no freedom when the prohibiting act is unconstitutional and void.82 Upon return to Missouri the status of the plaintiff is determined by the laws of Missouri under which he did not become free by the acts relied upon.83
No. The facts establish that Emerson held Scott as a slave in Illinois from 1834 to 1836 and at Fort Snelling from 1836 to 1838 before returning the family to Missouri where they resided until sold to Sandford. The court applied the rule by holding that because the Act of March 6, 1820 is void the residence in the territory conferred no freedom.84 Under Missouri law Scott remained a slave incapable of suing as a citizen.85
The residence of Dred Scott and his family in Illinois and the Territory of Upper Louisiana did not confer freedom upon them.86
Whether the judgment of the Circuit Court in favor of the defendant should be reversed?87
When the want of jurisdiction appears on the record the appellate court must reverse the judgment and remand the case with directions to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court.88
Yes. The facts show that the Circuit Court gave judgment for the defendant after trial on the merits but the record establishes that Scott is not a citizen and the court therefore had no jurisdiction.89 The court applied the rule by holding that the judgment on the plea in abatement is erroneous.90 The judgment for the defendant on the merits is likewise erroneous because the suit ought to have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction.91
The judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.92