352 P.3d 863 (Cal. 2015)
In 1984, Irving Duke was 72 years of age when he prepared a holographic will.1
He left all of his property to his wife Beatrice Schecter Duke, who was then 58 years of age.2 He left to his brother Harry Duke the sum of one dollar.3 He provided that should his wife and he die at the same moment, his estate was to be equally divided between the City of Hope and the Jewish National Fund.4
The will appointed Beatrice the executrix of the estate.5 The only change Irving ever made to his will was the addition, in 1997, of the statement that all of their assets are community property.6 Beatrice died in July 2002, but the will was not changed to select a new executor.7
Irving died in November 2007, leaving no spouse or children.8 In February 2008, a deputy public administrator for the County of Los Angeles obtained the will from Irving’s safe deposit box.9 In March 2008, two charities, the City of Hope and the Jewish National Fund, petitioned for probate and for letters of administration.10 In October 2008, Robert and Seymour Radin filed a petition for determination of entitlement to estate distribution alleging that they are entitled to the distribution of Irving’s estate as Irving’s sole intestate heirs.11
The Radins moved for summary judgment.12 They asserted that the estate must pass to Irving’s closest surviving intestate heirs because Irving did not predecease Beatrice, nor did Irving and Beatrice die at the same moment, and there is no provision in the will for disposition of the estate in the event Irving survived Beatrice.13 In opposition to the motion, the charities offered extrinsic evidence to prove that Irving intended the will to provide that in the event Beatrice was not alive to inherit Irving’s estate when Irving died, the estate would be distributed to the charities.14 The probate court concluded that the will was not ambiguous, and on that ground it declined to consider extrinsic evidence of Irving’s intent and granted summary judgment for the Radins.15
The Court of Appeal affirmed, based on Estate of Barnes.16 The Court of Appeal noted that the will in this case is similar to the will in Barnes.17 It found the will sufficiently similar to compel the conclusion that it does not reflect a dominant dispositive plan to leave the estate to the charities.18 It rejected the admission of extrinsic evidence because the evidence did not address any ambiguity in the will.19 The Supreme Court of California granted review.20
Whether an unambiguous will may be reformed if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the will contains a mistake in the expression of the testator’s intent at the time the will was drafted and also establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted?21
California law previously barred reformation of unambiguous wills.22 The court considered whether the categorical prohibition remained justified after developments in the law of probate and interpretation of writings.23 An unambiguous will may be reformed if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the will contains a mistake in the expression of the testator’s intent at the time the will was drafted and also establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted.24
Yes. The will prepared by Irving Duke contained no provision addressing disposition of the estate if he survived Beatrice.25 The charities offered extrinsic evidence that at the time of drafting Irving specifically intended the charities to inherit in that circumstance.26 The rule requires clear and convincing proof both of an expression mistake in the will and of the testator’s actual specific intent at drafting.27
The facts show the will was unambiguous on its face.28 The probate court and Court of Appeal therefore excluded the evidence under prior precedent.29 Application of the new rule to these facts permits consideration of the extrinsic evidence.30 The charities’ showing, if credited at the clear and convincing level, would establish both the required mistake and the precise intended disposition.31
The Supreme Court therefore holds that reformation of an unambiguous will is available when clear and convincing evidence establishes both a mistake in the expression of the testator’s intent at the time the will was drafted and the testator’s actual specific intent at that time.32
Whether the charities’ theory that the testator actually intended at the time he drafted his will to provide that his estate would pass to the charities in the event his wife was not alive to inherit the estate is sufficiently particularized to support the remedy of reformation?33
Yes. The charities’ theory alleges that Irving specifically intended when drafting the will that the charities would take not only upon simultaneous death but also if Beatrice was not alive at his death.36 The will’s language failed to express that precise intent.37 This theory identifies both the exact error in expression and the exact disposition Irving meant to include.38
The facts demonstrate that the will addressed only simultaneous death and contained no clause for Beatrice predeceasing Irving.39 The alleged omission is a specific rendering mistake rather than an after-the-fact adjustment to achieve some broader goal.40 Because the theory supplies the missing term with particularity, it satisfies the requirement for reformation upon clear and convincing proof.41
The Supreme Court therefore holds that the charities’ theory is sufficiently particularized to permit reformation if the requisite clear and convincing evidence is presented on remand.42