438 U.S. 59 (1978)
When Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it provided for licensing of private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors for energy production under strict supervision by the Atomic Energy Commission.1
Private industry responded to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with the development of an experimental power plant constructed under the auspices of a consortium of interested companies.2 It soon became apparent that profits from the private exploitation of atomic energy were uncertain and the accompanying risks substantial.3 The risk of potentially vast liability in the event of a nuclear accident of a sizable magnitude was the major obstacle.4 Notwithstanding comprehensive testing and study, the uniqueness of this form of energy production made it impossible totally to rule out the risk of a major nuclear accident resulting in extensive damage.5
In 1957, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act, which limited the aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident to $500 million plus the amount of liability insurance available on the private market, some $60 million at the time.6 The Act was amended in 1966 to extend its basic liability-limitation provisions for another ten years and to require those indemnified to waive all legal defenses in the event of a substantial nuclear accident.7 In 1975, Congress again extended the Act's coverage until 1987, continued the $560 million limitation on liability, added a provision requiring each of the sixty or more reactor owners to contribute between $2 and $5 million toward the cost of compensating victims in the event of a nuclear incident, and explicitly provided that in the event of damages exceeding the aggregate liability Congress would thoroughly review the incident and take whatever action was deemed necessary.8
Appellant Duke Power Company, an investor-owned public utility, is constructing one nuclear power plant in North Carolina and one in South Carolina.9 In 1973, appellees, two organizations—the Carolina Environmental Study Group and the Catawba Central Labor Union—and forty individuals who live within close proximity to the planned facilities, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against Duke Power and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, seeking among other relief a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act is unconstitutional.10
After the parties engaged in extensive discovery, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on standing and ripeness and determined that appellees had standing and that their claim could properly be adjudicated.11 The District Court found that appellees suffered immediate effects including the production of small quantities of non-natural radiation invading the air and water, a sharp increase in the temperature of two lakes used for recreational purposes, interference with the normal use of the waters of the Catawba River, threatened reduction in property values, objectively reasonable present fear regarding the effects of increased radioactivity, and the continual threat of an accident with no assurance of adequate compensation.12 The District Court also found a substantial likelihood that Duke would not be able to complete construction and maintain operation of the plants but for the protection provided by the Price-Anderson Act.13 This finding rested on testimony of corporate officials and legislative history showing that reactor manufacturers and architect-engineers required escape clauses in contracts absent the liability limitation.14 The District Court held the Act unconstitutional.15 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1977.16
Whether appellees have standing under Article III to challenge the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act?17
To establish Article III standing a plaintiff must show a distinct and palpable injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Yes. The established facts show that appellees live, work, or own property near the McGuire and Catawba plants.18 They suffer immediate injuries including invasion by non-natural radiation, thermal pollution of lakes, interference with river use, reduction in property values, and reasonable fear of genetic effects.19 The District Court found a substantial likelihood that Duke Power would not have proceeded with construction and operation but for the liability limitation in the Price-Anderson Act.20
Invalidation of the Act would likely cause Duke to discontinue or modify the plants, thereby redressing the injuries.21
Appellees possess Article III standing to challenge the Price-Anderson Act.22
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Justice Stewart accepted that federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 exists with respect to the suit against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.23 He concluded, however, that there is no present justiciable controversy because the appellees were without standing to initiate this litigation.24 Stewart noted that the Court relies on the present injuries of increased water temperatures and low-level radiation emissions.25
He reasoned that even assuming that but for the Act the plant would not exist, there is no direct relationship between the injury alleged for standing purposes and the injury alleged for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.26 An interest in the local water temperature does not give these appellees standing to bring a suit to challenge the constitutionality of a law limiting liability in an unrelated and as-yet-to-occur major nuclear accident.27 For these reasons, Stewart would remand the cases to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.28
Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over appellees' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1337?29
Federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 exists when the complaint states a substantial claim arising under the Constitution even if the ultimate merits question remains unresolved and even if the claim is brought directly under the Constitution against a federal agency.30
Yes. The established facts show that appellees pleaded claims that the Price-Anderson Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and effects an uncompensated taking.31 These claims are sufficiently substantial and colorable to support jurisdiction under section 1331 against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.32 The claims do not arise under the Price-Anderson Act itself, so section 1337 is not the proper basis.33 Yet the constitutional allegations satisfy the section 1331 test.34
The district court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.35
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Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the complaint alleges only state-law tort claims against Duke Power and that the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act arises solely as an anticipated defense.36 Therefore neither section 1331 nor section 1337 confers jurisdiction, and the complaint should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.37 Rehnquist emphasized that the underlying claim arises under North Carolina tort law.38
The mere anticipation of a possible federal defense to a state cause of action is not sufficient to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.39 He further noted that the taking claim cannot support jurisdiction under section 1337 because the Price-Anderson Act did not create the asserted right.40 The Tucker Act provides the proper avenue for compensation claims but does not authorize the declaratory relief sought here.41
Justice Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that no federal jurisdiction exists in the first instance.42 He observed that the string of contingencies connecting the Act to appellees' injuries is too speculative to support adjudication.43 Stevens noted that but for the Price-Anderson Act there would be no financing of nuclear power plants, no development of those plants by private parties, and hence no present injury to persons such as appellees.44
He was then asked to remedy an alleged due process violation that may possibly occur at some uncertain time in the future.45 Stevens viewed the chain of contingencies as too delicate for the litigation to proceed.
Whether appellees' constitutional challenges to the Price-Anderson Act are ripe for adjudication?46
A constitutional challenge is ripe when the issues are fit for judicial decision and withholding review would cause hardship to the parties by leaving present injuries unredressed.47
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that appellees already suffer immediate environmental, aesthetic, and property injuries from the plants whose construction and operation were made possible by the Act.48 Delayed resolution would foreclose any relief from those ongoing injuries while also frustrating the Act's purpose of eliminating uncertainty about liability.49
The constitutional challenges are ripe for adjudication.50
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Justice Stevens viewed the chain of contingencies as too delicate to render the controversy ripe.51 He noted that the alleged due-process violation might occur only at some uncertain future time with no significant connection to any present injury.52 Stevens emphasized that the string of contingencies supposedly holding the litigation together is too delicate.53
The Court was told that but for the Price-Anderson Act there would be no financing of nuclear power plants and no development by private parties.54 He was then asked to remedy an alleged due process violation that may possibly occur at some uncertain time in the future. Stevens concluded that such a series of speculations is insufficient to establish that the controversy is ripe for decision.55
Whether the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on liability violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?56
Economic legislation such as the Price-Anderson Act satisfies due process if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose and Congress is not required to provide a perfect quid pro quo for common-law remedies it replaces.57
No. The established facts show that Congress enacted the liability limitation to encourage private development of nuclear power by removing the threat of potentially ruinous liability while providing a $560 million compensation fund plus a statutory commitment to supply additional relief if needed.58 This scheme bears a rational relationship to the legitimate goal of promoting nuclear energy and supplies a reasonably just substitute for the uncertain common-law remedies it replaces.59
The Price-Anderson Act's limitation on liability does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.60
Whether the Price-Anderson Act violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by treating nuclear accident victims differently from other accident victims?61
A classification in economic legislation satisfies equal protection if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.62
No. The established facts establish that the distinction between nuclear-accident victims and victims of other accidents is rationally related to Congress's legitimate purpose of encouraging private participation in nuclear power development given the unique magnitude of potential liability that private industry and insurers could not absorb without a statutory ceiling.63
The Price-Anderson Act does not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.64