405 U.S. 330 (1972)
James Blumstein moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to begin employment as an assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University in Nashville.1 With an eye toward voting in the upcoming August and November elections, he attempted to register to vote on July 1, 1970.2 The county registrar refused to register him on the ground that Tennessee law authorizes the registration of only those persons who, at the time of the next election, will have been residents of the State for a year and residents of the county for three months.3
After exhausting state administrative remedies, Blumstein brought this action challenging these residence requirements on federal constitutional grounds.4 A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, concluded that Tennessee’s durational residence requirements were unconstitutional.5 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.6
Tennessee appeals from the decision by a three-judge federal court holding that Tennessee’s durational residence requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.7 The issue arises in a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by appellee James Blumstein.8 Tennessee insists that, in addition to being a resident, a would-be voter must have been a resident for a year in the State and three months in the county.9 It is this additional durational residence requirement that appellee challenges.10
Whether Tennessee's durational residence requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?11
To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, courts examine the character of the classification, the individual interests affected, and the governmental interests asserted in support.12 Because durational residence requirements withhold the fundamental right to vote and classify on the basis of recent interstate travel, strict scrutiny applies.13 The state must demonstrate that the requirements are necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest and that no less restrictive means will suffice.14
Yes. Tennessee's one-year state and three-month county requirements completely bar from voting all bona fide residents who fail the fixed periods, directly denying James Blumstein the franchise after he moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, and sought to register on July 1, 1970.15 The asserted interests in ballot purity and knowledgeable voters are legitimate yet the requirements are not necessary, because Tennessee already verifies residence by oath at registration thirty days before the election, maintains criminal penalties for fraud, and can cross-check records, while the lengthy periods exclude many informed new residents without advancing the goals with precision.16
The requirements also fail tailoring because the state itself closes registration only thirty days before elections, demonstrating that shorter periods suffice for administrative needs, and because objective indicia of residence are readily verifiable without a conclusive presumption against recent arrivals.17
Tennessee's durational residence requirements violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
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Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.19 He cautioned that the Court's opinion effectively overrules the holding of Pope v. Williams rather than merely rejecting its dicta.20 Blackmun emphasized that states retain a profound interest in the purity of the ballot box and in an informed electorate.21
He noted that voting requirements need not be the same in each state.22 The resolution of longer time requirements less than those struck down remains a matter for future cases.23
Whether Tennessee's one-year state and three-month county durational residence requirements penalize the exercise of the right to travel?24
Freedom to travel throughout the United States is a basic constitutional right whose exercise may not be penalized.25 Any classification that singles out persons who have recently exercised the right to travel and withholds a benefit such as the franchise must be shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.26
Yes. The requirements penalize only those bona fide residents who have recently traveled interstate by denying them the vote for a fixed period after establishing residence.27 This occurred when James Blumstein relocated from another state to accept his Vanderbilt position and was barred from registering.28 Travel remains possible but only at the price of temporary disenfranchisement.29
The state has not carried its burden of proving necessity because simpler residence verification and existing criminal sanctions achieve the same ends without conditioning the franchise on forgoing recent travel.30
Tennessee's one-year state and three-month county durational residence requirements penalize the exercise of the right to travel.31
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented. He maintained that the holding of Pope v. Williams is as valid today as it was at the turn of the century.32 Burger reasoned that requiring newcomers to reside in the state for a reasonable period before voting is no greater denial of equal protection than requiring children to wait until age eighteen before voting.33
He argued that application of the compelling state interest standard to such lines condemns all durational rules because no statute can satisfy a test demanding perfection.34