534 U.S. 161 (2002)
In April 1986, FBI officers arrested petitioner Larry Dean Dusenbery at a house trailer in Atwater, Ohio.1 Later that day, they obtained and executed a search warrant, seizing drugs, drug paraphernalia, several firearms, a ballistic knife, an automobile registered in the name of petitioner's stepmother, and $21,939 in cash, of which $394 was found on petitioner's person, $7,500 in the pocket of a coat, and $14,045 in a briefcase.2
Two months later, petitioner pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to possession with intent to distribute 813 grams of cocaine.3 He was sentenced to twelve years of imprisonment followed by six years of special parole.4 He was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan.5
In 1988, the FBI began the process of administratively forfeiting the cash and the automobile.6 It sent certified letters of its intention to forfeit the cash addressed to petitioner at the prison, to the address of the residence where he was arrested, and to an address in Randolph, Ohio.7 The FBI also placed the required notice in three consecutive Sunday editions of the Cleveland Plain Dealer.8 No response was received within the allotted time, and the items were declared forfeited, with the cash turned over to the United States Marshals Service on December 13, 1988.9
Nearly five years later, petitioner moved in the District Court pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking return of the seized property.10 The District Court denied the motion.11 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to construe the motion as a civil complaint challenging the adequacy of the notice.12
Following remand, the District Court allowed discovery and presided over a telephone deposition of James Lawson, an Inmate Systems Officer at FCI Milan who had signed the certified mail receipt for the notice.13 Lawson described the prison procedures for certified mail, including daily pickup from the post office, logging in the mailroom, signature by a Unit Team member, and distribution during mail call, though logbooks were retained for only one year.14 Both parties moved for summary judgment; the District Court ruled for the United States, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether the FBI's use of certified mail sent to a federal prisoner at his place of incarceration, together with publication, provided constitutionally adequate notice of administrative forfeiture proceedings?16
The Due Process Clause requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.17
Yes. The FBI's use of certified mail addressed to Dusenbery at FCI Milan, combined with publication in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, satisfied the Mullane standard.18 The government carried its burden by demonstrating the procedures employed, which included daily pickup of certified mail from the post office, logging in the mailroom, signature by a Unit Team member, and distribution during mail call.19
The Due Process Clause does not require actual receipt of notice or heroic measures such as escorted post-office visits or contemporaneous proof of delivery to the inmate's cell.20
The FBI's notice was constitutionally adequate.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg dissented. She contended that the notice fell short because the prison-to-prisoner transmission lacked demonstrated reliability.22 The record contained no evidence of specific safeguards once mail left the mailroom, only a general description of distribution during mail call.23
Ginsburg emphasized that the government's complete control over the prisoner's location required more careful internal procedures.24 She pointed out that later BOP rules requiring inmates to sign a logbook for certified mail showed such improvements were practicable at minimal cost even in 1988.25 The absence of any proof-of-delivery mechanism rendered the chosen method constitutionally deficient under Mullane.26