532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976)
In 1964 Eastern Air Lines decided to replace its propeller-driven fleet with jet aircraft and became the last major trunk carrier to order a large number of jets.1 Between July 1965 and October 1967 Eastern and Douglas Aircraft Company executed a series of eight contracts, later amended, for the manufacture and sale of 99 DC-9 and DC-8 jet aircraft at a total price of approximately a half billion dollars, each contract specifying particular calendar-month delivery dates and containing an excusable delay clause and a California choice-of-law provision.2
Beginning in January 1966 Douglas repeatedly notified Eastern of impending delivery delays, attributing them to subcontractor problems, labor shortages, and the nation's rapidly increasing commitments in Southeast Asia.3 Delays continued after the April 1967 merger of Douglas with McDonnell Aircraft Company to form McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and the final aircraft was delivered in January 1969, resulting in 90 planes arriving an average of 80 days after the contract dates for a total of 7,426 days of delay.4
Eastern protested the delays in letters dated March 15, 1966, October 6, 1967, and November 7, 1968, and on May 29, 1969 formally presented a claim for damages after its board of directors authorized the action. McDonnell Douglas rejected the claim, and Eastern filed suit on July 31, 1970 in the Southern District of Florida; the case was transferred to the Central District of California.5
The district court bifurcated the trial.6 After a three-month liability phase the jury answered special interrogatories finding that none of the delays was excusable.7 After a six-week damages phase the same jury awarded Eastern $22,219,601 in compensatory damages plus interest; the district court later added $2,333,058.11 in prejudgment interest and $241,149.02 in costs, entering judgment for approximately $24.55 million.8
McDonnell Douglas appealed, challenging the rulings on the terminated contract, the notice requirement, the excusability of delays caused by informal government priorities, the foreseeability instruction, and the damages evidence; Eastern cross-appealed the prejudgment interest determination.9
Whether the July 14, 1966 termination agreement preserved Eastern's claims for late deliveries of the final seven DC-9-14 aircraft under Contract 65-41-L?10
Under California law, to terminate a contract means to abrogate so much of it as remains unperformed, doing away with an existing agreement upon the terms and with the consequences mentioned in the writing.11 Thus, as of July 14, 1966, Contract 65-41-L was no longer binding on Douglas unless the termination agreement specifically continued certain portions of it in effect.12 The unambiguous language of the Agreement to Terminate provided that all obligations, duties and liabilities of the parties thereunder are of no further force and effect, except for any liabilities and obligations which may have accrued thereunder and which may not have been performed or discharged prior to the date hereof.
No. The termination agreement explicitly stated that all obligations and liabilities were of no further force and effect except for any which may have accrued prior to July 14, 1966. The obligations for the last seven DC-9-14 aircraft had not accrued because they were not scheduled for delivery until after that date under the original contract schedule.13 Eastern's proposed construction that the obligation to deliver accrued when the contract was first executed would render the entire termination agreement a nullity, contrary to its plain terms.14 The facts show that Douglas exercised the option to sell the planes to Bankers Trust and Eastern executed a lease with the bank on substantially later delivery dates, confirming that the original schedule was not preserved.15
The termination agreement did not preserve Eastern's claims for late deliveries of the final seven DC-9-14 aircraft under Contract 65-41-L.16
Whether Eastern's claims for delays in the first eight DC-9-14 aircraft under Contract 65-41-L were barred by California's four-year statute of limitations?17
Under California law, an action for breach of a written contract must be brought within four years of the time in which it accrued.18 The cause of action under Contract 65-41-L accrued, at the latest, on July 14, 1966 when, for all intents and purposes, performance under the contract ceased upon termination.19
Yes. Eastern's cause of action for the first eight DC-9-14 aircraft accrued no later than July 14, 1966, the date the termination agreement ended performance under the contract.20 Suit was not filed until July 31, 1970, more than four years later.21 The facts establish that the first eight planes were delivered between April and July 1966 and the termination agreement expressly preserved only accrued obligations, which had come into existence as enforceable rights by that date.22
Therefore the claims for those eight aircraft are time-barred under California's four-year statute of limitations.23
Eastern's claims for delays in the first eight DC-9-14 aircraft under Contract 65-41-L were barred by California's four-year statute of limitations.24
Whether Eastern was required to give McDonnell Douglas reasonable and timely notice of breach under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-607(3)(a) for the delivery delays?25
Under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-607(3)(a), where a tender has been accepted the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.26 The notice must inform the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach and thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.27 The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched.28 The buyer must be held to a higher standard of commercial good faith when the buyer is a merchant.29
Yes. Eastern accepted the aircraft and therefore was required to give reasonable and timely notice under section 2-607(3)(a) that it considered the delivery delays to be a breach.30 The facts show that Eastern's letters protested the delays and requested assistance but did not clearly assert a claim of breach until the formal demand on May 29, 1969, after years of continued performance and new contract negotiations.31 Eastern, as a merchant buyer, was held to the higher standard of commercial good faith requiring that its entire course of conduct inform McDonnell Douglas that the delays were claimed as breaches.32
A jury could reasonably find that Eastern's communications and conduct failed to satisfy this standard.
Eastern was required to give McDonnell Douglas reasonable and timely notice of breach under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-607(3)(a) for the delivery delays, and the adequacy of that notice presented a jury question.33
Whether the government's informal jawboning policy favoring military aircraft production during the Vietnam War constituted an excusable delay under the contracts' excusable delay clause?34
The excusable delay clause provides that the seller shall not be responsible nor deemed to be in default on account of delays in performance due to causes beyond Seller's control and not occasioned by its fault or negligence, including but not being limited to any act of government, governmental priorities, allocation regulations or orders affecting materials, equipment, facilities or completed aircraft, failure of vendors (due to causes similar to those within the scope of this clause) to perform their contracts.35 The clause excuses all delays coming within the general description regardless of their similarity to the listed excuses, and the government's informal but coercive jawboning policy constituted an act of government beyond McDonnell Douglas's control.36
Yes. The government's informal jawboning policy, under which military orders were to be given priority over civilian production through voluntary cooperation backed by the threat of formal directives, constituted an act of government within the meaning of the excusable delay clause.37 The facts establish that the policy was publicly announced, approved at the highest levels of the executive branch, and applied by Douglas's suppliers who testified they had no choice but to accord military requirements precedence.38 McDonnell Douglas and its subcontractors cooperated in good faith with this established procurement policy, and the resulting delays were therefore excusable under the clause.39
The government's informal jawboning policy favoring military aircraft production during the Vietnam War constituted an excusable delay under the contracts' excusable delay clause.40
Whether delays resulting from the government's informal priorities policy were excused under section 707 of the Defense Production Act?41
Section 707 of the Defense Production Act provides that no person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to this Act, notwithstanding that any such rule, regulation, or order shall thereafter be declared by judicial or other competent authority to be invalid.42 The term order includes informally presented requests for priority, and the provision is declaratory of the common law doctrine of impossibility.43
Yes. Delays resulting from the government's informal priorities policy were excused under section 707 of the Defense Production Act.4445 The facts show that McDonnell Douglas and its suppliers complied with the established, publicly announced policy of according military orders precedence, and the policy was implemented through the authority delegated under the Defense Production Act.46 Compliance with this policy, whether achieved by formal ratings or informal jawboning, directly caused the delivery delays, and section 707 exonerates such compliance regardless of the form of the government demand.47
Delays resulting from the government's informal priorities policy were excused under section 707 of the Defense Production Act.
Whether the district court erred in instructing the jury that excusing events under the contracts had to be unforeseeable at the time of contracting?48
When the promisor has anticipated a particular event by specifically providing for it in a contract, he should be relieved of liability for the occurrence of such event regardless of whether it was foreseeable.49 The rationale for the doctrine of impracticability is that the circumstance causing the breach has made performance so vitally different from what was anticipated that the contract cannot reasonably be thought to govern.50 When a risk has been contemplated and voluntarily assumed foreseeability is not an issue and the parties will be held to the bargain they made.51
Yes. The district court erred in instructing the jury that excusing events under the contracts had to be unforeseeable at the time of contracting.5253 The facts show that the contracts specifically listed governmental priorities, allocation regulations or orders affecting materials, equipment, facilities or completed aircraft as excusing events, and Eastern specifically contemplated and voluntarily assumed the risk of such delays.54 Therefore McDonnell Douglas was entitled to be excused for delays caused by those events without regard to foreseeability at the time of contracting.55
The district court erred in instructing the jury that excusing events under the contracts had to be unforeseeable at the time of contracting.
Whether the district court erred in refusing to apply Uniform Commercial Code section 2-615 commercial impracticability as a defense?56
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-615 excuses delay or nondelivery when the agreed upon performance has been rendered commercially impracticable by an unforeseen supervening event not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into.57 Express agreements as to exemptions designed to enlarge upon or supplant the provisions of this section are to be read in light of mercantile sense and reason.58 The excusable delay clause did not limit McDonnell Douglas to a narrower range of excuses than those available under section 2-615.59
Yes. The district court erred in refusing to apply Uniform Commercial Code section 2-615 commercial impracticability as a defense.6061 The facts show that the excusable delay clause used the words including but not being limited to before listing specific excuses, demonstrating that the parties intended to excuse all delays coming within the general description of causes beyond the seller's control.62 The clause therefore did not waive the protections of section 2-615, and McDonnell Douglas was entitled to raise the commercial impracticability defense.63
The district court erred in refusing to apply Uniform Commercial Code section 2-615 commercial impracticability as a defense.