500 U.S. 614 (1991)
Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black construction worker, was injured in a jobsite accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave, when a Leesville Concrete Company employee permitted one of the company's trucks to roll backward and pin him against some construction equipment.1 Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.2
During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove black persons from the prospective jury.3 Edmonson, who is himself black, requested that the District Court require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the two jurors, but the District Court denied the request on the ground that Batson does not apply in civil proceedings.4
As empaneled, the jury included 11 white persons and 1 black person.5 The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson, assessing his total damages at $90,000, but attributed 80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence and awarded him the sum of $18,000.6
Edmonson appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Batson applies to private litigants in civil trials.7 The full court then ordered rehearing en banc and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that a private litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability for alleged racial classifications.8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.9
Whether the use of peremptory challenges by a private litigant in a civil case constitutes state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause?10
Under the Equal Protection Clause, private conduct constitutes state action when the private party exercises a right or privilege having its source in state authority.11 The private party can fairly be described as a state actor when evaluated by examining reliance on governmental assistance, performance of a traditional governmental function, and aggravation of injury by governmental authority.12 This follows the two-part framework from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.13
Yes. Thaddeus Donald Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company in federal district court and invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. During voir dire Leesville exercised two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1870 to remove black prospective jurors. The federal judge oversaw the entire jury selection process, summoned the venire, ruled on challenges for cause, and excused those struck by peremptory challenges.14
These facts establish that Leesville relied on the overt and significant assistance of the court, performed the traditional governmental function of selecting members of a governmental body, and caused injury aggravated by the incidents of governmental authority within the courtroom itself.15
The use of peremptory challenges by a private litigant in a civil case constitutes state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor joined the opinion of the Court. She wrote separately to emphasize that today’s decision does not undermine the usefulness of peremptory challenges in general.17 The decision only prohibits their use in a racially discriminatory manner.18
Trial courts must be vigilant in preventing racial discrimination while preserving the traditional function of peremptory challenges.19 Her separate writing underscores the need to retain peremptory challenges as a practical tool for securing impartial juries while eliminating the specific harm of racial discrimination from their exercise.20
Whether a private litigant has standing to raise the equal protection claim of an excluded juror?21
A litigant has standing to raise the equal protection claims of excluded jurors when the litigant suffers an injury in fact, maintains a close relation to the excluded jurors, and faces some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect its own interests, as set forth in Powers v. Ohio.22
Yes. Edmonson suffered an injury in fact because racial discrimination in jury selection casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process and compromises the right to a fair trial.23 He maintained a close relation to the excluded jurors because racial stereotypes reflect on the litigant’s own standing in the community and the integrity of the judicial system.24 Significant barriers hindered the excluded jurors’ ability to vindicate their own rights, including lack of notice that a peremptory strike was race-based and the practical difficulty of filing a separate lawsuit.25
A private litigant has standing to raise the equal protection claim of an excluded juror.26
Whether the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause when done by a private litigant in a civil case?27
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits all forms of governmental discrimination based on race.28 Once state action is established, the same prohibition against race-based exclusion of jurors that applies in criminal cases extends to civil cases.29 Racial discrimination in jury selection harms excluded jurors and undermines the fairness of the proceeding regardless of whether the case is civil or criminal.30
Yes. After establishing state action through the court’s oversight of peremptory challenges authorized by federal statute, the principle from Batson v. Kentucky that race-based exclusions by the government violate equal protection applies directly.31 Leesville’s removal of black prospective jurors on account of race in a federal civil trial therefore violated the equal protection rights of those jurors.32 The Constitution demands race neutrality in the selection of jurors for any governmental body, civil or criminal.33
The exclusion of jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause when done by a private litigant in a civil case.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the decision represents an unwarranted expansion of the state action doctrine that will complicate civil trials and encourage satellite litigation over the basis for peremptory strikes.35 He observed that the practical effect will be a net loss to minority litigants in criminal cases because the ruling prevents defendants from using race-based strikes to secure more diverse juries.36 The dissent noted that the decision adds enormous complexity to an already burdened justice system without producing desirable concrete results, although it acknowledged the holding carries significant symbolic value in demonstrating hostility to race-based judgments.37