135 S. Ct. 2028, 192 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2015)
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. operates several lines of clothing stores, each with its own style.1 The company maintains a Look Policy that prohibits caps as too informal for the company's desired image.2
Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim who wears a headscarf consistent with her religious beliefs, applied for a position at one of the stores.3 She was interviewed by assistant manager Heather Cooke.4 Cooke used the company's ordinary evaluation system and gave Elauf a rating that qualified her to be hired.5 Cooke was concerned, however, that the headscarf would conflict with the Look Policy.6
Cooke sought the store manager's guidance on whether the headscarf counted as a forbidden cap but received no answer.7 She then turned to district manager Randall Johnson and informed him that she believed Elauf wore the headscarf because of her faith.8 Johnson responded that the headscarf would violate the Look Policy, as would all other headwear, and directed Cooke not to hire Elauf.9
The EEOC filed suit against Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf.10 The district court granted summary judgment to the EEOC on liability, held a trial on damages, and awarded $20,000.11 The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded summary judgment to Abercrombie.12 It concluded that an employer cannot be liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice until the applicant provides the employer with actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether Title VII prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in order to avoid accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without undue hardship only if the applicant has informed the employer of his need for an accommodation?15
Title VII's disparate-treatment provision makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire an applicant because of the applicant's religion, which includes religious practice.16 An applicant need only show that the need for accommodation was a motivating factor in the decision.17 The statute imposes no actual-knowledge requirement.18
No. The rule requires only that the applicant's religious practice be a motivating factor in the failure to hire.19 In the established facts, Abercrombie failed to hire Elauf after Johnson directed Cooke not to hire her because the headscarf would violate the Look Policy.20 Cooke had informed Johnson that she believed the headscarf was worn because of faith.21 The motive of avoiding accommodation therefore triggered liability even though Elauf herself never informed the employer of any need for accommodation.22
The Tenth Circuit's actual-knowledge requirement finds no support in the statutory text.23
Title VII liability attaches without any requirement that the applicant personally inform the employer of the need for a religious accommodation.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas agrees with the majority that Title VII recognizes only two causes of action under the statute: disparate-treatment claims and disparate-impact claims.25 He parts company with the majority by concluding that mere application of a neutral policy such as the Look Policy cannot constitute intentional discrimination.26 Abercrombie applied the policy equally to all applicants unable to comply with its dress requirements, treating religious and secular practices the same.27
In his view, any adverse effects on applicants whose religious practices conflict with the policy present a classic disparate-impact question rather than a disparate-treatment claim.28 Thomas would therefore affirm the Tenth Circuit's judgment granting summary judgment to Abercrombie.29
Whether a claim based on a failure to accommodate an applicant's religious practice must be raised as a disparate-impact claim rather than a disparate-treatment claim?30
Because Title VII defines religion to include all aspects of religious observance and practice, an employer's refusal to hire an applicant because of a religious practice constitutes disparate treatment that must be accommodated absent undue hardship.31 Such a claim need not be brought exclusively under the disparate-impact provision.32
No. The established facts demonstrate that Abercrombie's decision not to hire Elauf was motivated by her religious practice of wearing a headscarf, satisfying the elements of a disparate-treatment claim.33 Congress expressly included religious practice within the protected characteristic of religion.34 An employer may not treat an applicant's religious practice less favorably than other practices without violating the statute's command against intentional discrimination.35
A claim for failure to accommodate a religious practice may properly be brought as a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas agrees that Title VII creates only two causes of action: disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims.37 He rejects the majority's conclusion that applying a neutral policy while refusing accommodation constitutes intentional discrimination.38 Abercrombie remained neutral by enforcing the Look Policy equally across applicants.39
Any claim arising from the policy's effects on religious practices belongs under disparate impact rather than disparate treatment.40 Thomas would therefore affirm the judgment of the Tenth Circuit.41