532 U.S. 141 (2001)
Donna Rae Egelhoff was married to David A. Egelhoff.1 Mr. Egelhoff was employed by the Boeing Company, which provided him with a life insurance policy and a pension plan.2 Both plans were governed by ERISA, and Mr. Egelhoff designated his wife as the beneficiary under both.3
In April 1994, the Egelhoffs divorced.4 Just over two months later, Mr. Egelhoff died intestate following an automobile accident.5 At that time, Mrs. Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary under both the life insurance policy and the pension plan.6 The life insurance proceeds, totaling $46,000, were paid to her.7
Respondents Samantha and David Egelhoff, Mr. Egelhoff's children by a previous marriage, are his statutory heirs under state law.8 They sued petitioner in Washington state court to recover the life insurance proceeds.9 In a separate action, respondents also sued to recover the pension plan benefits.10
The trial courts, concluding that both the insurance policy and the pension plan "should be administered in accordance" with ERISA, granted summary judgment to petitioner in both cases.11 The Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed.12 Applying the statute, it held that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of both the insurance policy and the pension plan.13 The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed.14
Courts have disagreed about whether statutes like that of Washington are pre-empted by ERISA.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.16
Whether ERISA preempts the Washington statute that automatically revokes a former spouse's beneficiary designation on nonprobate assets upon divorce?17
ERISA's pre-emption section, 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), states that ERISA shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan covered by ERISA.18 We have held that a state law relates to an ERISA plan if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.19
Yes. The Washington statute binds ERISA plan administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining beneficiary status.20 The administrators must pay benefits to the beneficiaries chosen by state law, rather than to those identified in the plan documents.21 This directly conflicts with ERISA's commands.22 A plan shall specify the basis on which payments are made to and from the plan.23 The fiduciary shall administer the plan in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan, making payments to a beneficiary who is designated by a participant, or by the terms of the plan.24
The statute also interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.25 Plan administrators cannot make payments simply by identifying the beneficiary specified by the plan documents.26 Instead they must familiarize themselves with state statutes so that they can determine whether the named beneficiary's status has been revoked by operation of law.27 This creates potential choice-of-law problems when the employer is located in one State, the plan participant lives in another, and the participant's former spouse lives in a third.28
The Washington statute is preempted by ERISA.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court, since he believes that the relate to pre-emptive provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is assuredly triggered by a state law that contradicts ERISA.30 As the Court notes, the statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in accordance with plan documents.31 He remains unsure as to what else triggers the relate to provision.32 If it is interpreted to be anything other than a reference to established jurisprudence concerning conflict and field pre-emption, it has no discernible content that would not pick up every ripple in the pond, producing a result that no sensible person could have intended.33
He persists in the view that the relate to clause should be interpreted as a reference to ordinary pre-emption jurisprudence.34
Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that there is no plausible pre-emption principle that leads to a conclusion that ERISA pre-empts the statute at issue here.35 He argued that the Washington statute simply sets forth a default rule for interpreting documentary silence.36 The statute specifies that a nonprobate asset will pass at death as if the former spouse had died first unless the instrument governing disposition expressly provides otherwise.37
He emphasized the presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such as family law.38 He concluded that the administrative burden does not justify pre-emption because the statute poses no significant obstacle to ERISA's objectives.39