567 U.S. 1 (2012)
The petitioners are former federal competitive service employees.1 They were discharged from their positions with Executive agencies, including the Department of the Treasury.2 This occurred after they knowingly and willfully failed to register for the Selective Service as required by the Military Selective Service Act.3
Another federal statute bars from Executive agency employment anyone who has knowingly and willfully failed to register.4 Among the petitioners, only Michael Elgin initially challenged his removal through administrative channels.5
Elgin appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board.6 He claimed that the statute barring his employment is an unconstitutional bill of attainder.7 He also claimed that it unconstitutionally discriminates based on sex when combined with the male-only registration requirement of the Military Selective Service Act.8 The MSPB referred Elgin’s appeal to an administrative law judge.9 The ALJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that an employee is not entitled to MSPB review of agency action based on an absolute statutory bar to employment.10 The ALJ also concluded that the MSPB lacked authority to determine the constitutionality of a federal statute.11
Rather than seeking further MSPB review or appealing to the Federal Circuit, Elgin joined the other petitioners in filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.12 The petitioners raised the same constitutional challenges to their removals.13 They sought a declaratory judgment that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional.14 They also sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the employment bar, reinstatement to their former positions, backpay, benefits, and attorney’s fees.15
The District Court determined that it had jurisdiction under the general federal-question statute.16 It denied petitioners’ constitutional claims on the merits.17 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment.18 It remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.19 The court held that challenges to a removal are not exempt from the statutory review scheme simply because an employee challenges the constitutionality of the statute authorizing the removal.20
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Civil Service Reform Act precludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims even though they are constitutional claims for equitable relief.21
Whether the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 precludes district court jurisdiction over claims by covered federal employees challenging their removals on the ground that the federal statute authorizing the removals is unconstitutional?22
The CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review for covered employees who challenge covered adverse employment actions, even when those employees argue that a federal statute is unconstitutional.23 It is fairly discernible from the CSRA’s text, structure, and purpose that Congress intended the statute’s review scheme to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review for covered employees who challenge covered adverse employment actions, even when those employees argue that a federal statute is unconstitutional.24
Yes. Petitioners are former federal competitive service employees.25 They were discharged pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §3328 after knowingly and willfully failing to register for the Selective Service.26 This makes them covered employees who suffered covered adverse actions under the CSRA review provisions in 5 U.S.C. §§7511–7513 and 7701–7703.27
The CSRA’s elaborate framework prescribes in great detail the protections and remedies applicable to adverse personnel actions.28 It channels review through the MSPB and then exclusively to the Federal Circuit.29 This demonstrates Congress’ intent to foreclose extrastatutory review in district court.30 Nothing in the CSRA’s text suggests that its exclusive review scheme is inapplicable simply because a covered employee raises a constitutional challenge to the statute authorizing the removal.31 The single express exemption in §7703(b)(2) for discrimination claims prohibited by enumerated federal employment laws shows that Congress knew how to create alternative forums when it wished to do so.32
The CSRA’s purpose of creating an integrated review scheme to replace inconsistent decisionmaking and duplicative judicial review would be seriously undermined if covered employees could challenge covered employment actions first in district court.33 They could do so simply by alleging that the statutory authorization for the action is unconstitutional.34 Petitioners’ constitutional claims can receive meaningful review within the CSRA scheme.35 The Federal Circuit is fully competent to adjudicate them.36 The MSPB can develop any necessary factual record.37 None of the Thunder Basin factors counseling against preclusion are present here.38
The CSRA precludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims.39 It is fairly discernible that Congress intended the statute’s review scheme to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review for covered employees.40 This applies even when those employees argue that a federal statute is unconstitutional.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Ginsburg And Kagan
Justice Alito dissented on the ground that petitioners’ facial constitutional claims are wholly collateral to the type of fact-specific employment disputes the MSPB is authorized to adjudicate.42 Such claims fall outside the Board’s expertise.43 The Board itself lacks authority to decide facial challenges to the validity of a federal statute.44
It would simply pass the claims along unaddressed.45 This forces the Federal Circuit to act as a court of first review with limited factfinding capacity.46 Alito argued that this arrangement breeds inefficiency.47
It is not fairly discernible from the CSRA.48 The CSRA was designed to handle ordinary personnel actions rather than claims attacking the constitutional validity of the statutory framework itself.49 He would have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over such facial constitutional challenges.50