68 Cal. 2d 453, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404, 489 P.2d 316 (1968)
The parties married in New York on May 4, 1956.1 Their daughter Kim Ivy was born on April 19, 1957.2 They divorced in Georgia on July 31, 1957.3 The divorce judgment incorporated in its entirety an agreement the parties had executed on July 3, 1957.4 That agreement placed $11,500 in trust to pay the child $60 per month until she reached age 18.5 It placed an additional $2,500 in trust for her college education.6
The agreement recited the parties' wish to have a complete and final settlement of their rights and obligations.7 The agreement provided that no changes in the financial condition or circumstances of the parties or of said minor shall authorize either of said parties and/or court to change or modify the terms or provisions of said agreement or any judgment or decree that might be rendered in any regard to any of the matters set out in said agreement.8
In 1965 plaintiff, residing in New York with the child, initiated proceedings pursuant to the URESA provisions of that state for an order directing defendant to provide fair and reasonable support of the dependent child.9 She now required $750 per month for the support of the child.10 She did not allege any failure by defendant to comply with the divorce decree.11 The New York court ordered the petition transmitted to the Superior Court of Los Angeles, where defendant resides, for proceedings under California's URESA provisions.12 That court denied the application for support by reason of the lump sum settlement under the Georgia statute.13
A 1955 Georgia statute provides that a judgment for alimony may not be revised if it awards payment from the corpus of the husband's estate in lieu of weekly, monthly, annual or other periodic payments to the wife or child.14 Under the 1956 statute, a duty to support dependent children is imposed upon a father notwithstanding any final decree of divorce.15 Duties of support applicable under this Act are those imposed or imposable under the laws of the State where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought.16 The defendant appears to have made California his home and place of business.17 Plaintiff appeals from an order denying her application for child support filed under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.18
Whether a Georgia divorce decree that incorporates a lump-sum child support settlement bars a California court from ordering additional support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act?19
No. The Georgia decree does not bar additional support under URESA because California law governs the duties of a father present in this state.22 The parties executed an agreement reciting a complete and final settlement of support claims with explicit waivers of modification rights based on changed circumstances.23 That agreement was incorporated into the Georgia divorce judgment.24 Plaintiff later initiated URESA proceedings in New York that were transmitted to the California superior court where defendant resides and maintains his place of business.25
California Civil Code section 139 renders child support orders modifiable notwithstanding any contrary agreement, and this rule has long been applied under reciprocal support legislation to protect the child's independent right to adequate support.26
A Georgia divorce decree that incorporates a lump-sum child support settlement does not bar a California court from ordering additional support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.27
Whether the full faith and credit clause prevents California from applying its own support law to a father who resides in California during the period for which support is sought?28
The full faith and credit clause does not require a state to give a foreign decree greater effect than the rendering state itself claims for it.29 This is particularly true when the obligor has established residence in the forum state and the decree arises from a continuing parent-child relationship rather than a fully terminated marital status.30
No. Full faith and credit does not compel California to treat the Georgia lump-sum decree as conclusive.31 Defendant has made California his home and place of business, creating a substantial relationship that justifies application of local support law.32 The Georgia decree was entered subject to that state's own URESA provisions, which expressly reserve to the obligor's residence the power to impose support duties according to its own standards.33 Giving the decree conclusive effect here would extend it beyond the limits Georgia itself placed upon it.34
The full faith and credit clause does not prevent California from applying its own support law to a father who resides in California during the period for which support is sought.35
Whether Georgia's adoption of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act limits the conclusive effect of its own nonmodifiable lump-sum support decree when the obligor resides outside Georgia?36
Georgia's URESA provides that duties of support are those imposed or imposable under the law of the state where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought.37 This limits the extraterritorial conclusive effect of any lump-sum decree rendered under Georgia's separate nonmodification statute.38
Yes. Georgia's enactment of URESA expressly cabins the reach of its nonmodifiable lump-sum judgments once the obligor leaves the state.39 The 1956 statute imposes a support duty on fathers notwithstanding any divorce decree and directs that applicable duties are measured by the law of the obligor's presence.40 Because defendant resides in California, Georgia law itself directs application of California support standards rather than freezing the 1957 decree.41
The national policy embodied in reciprocal legislation across the states reinforces this limitation on any single state's power to determine child welfare for all time.42
Georgia's adoption of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act limits the conclusive effect of its own nonmodifiable lump-sum support decree when the obligor resides outside Georgia.43