494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990)
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church employed at a private drug rehabilitation organization in Oregon.1 They ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a church ceremony.2
Their employer fired them for this conduct, treating it as work-related misconduct.3 Smith and Black applied to the Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources for unemployment compensation benefits, but the Division denied the claims on the ground that the firings constituted misconduct.4
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the denials, holding that they violated the respondents' free exercise rights under the First Amendment.5 The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits.6
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a determination whether Oregon law prohibited the sacramental use of peyote.7 On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute made no exception for sacramental use and reaffirmed its conclusion that denying benefits violated the respondents' constitutional rights.8 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time.9
Oregon law prohibits knowing or intentional possession of peyote, a Schedule I controlled substance, making it a Class B felony.10 The respondents' peyote use occurred at a Native American Church ceremony and formed the sole basis for their terminations and benefit denials.11
Whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug?12
The Free Exercise Clause does not require a religious exemption from a neutral law of general applicability that incidentally burdens religious conduct.13 The compelling interest test applies only to laws that target religious practice or present hybrid claims combining free exercise with other constitutional protections such as speech or parental rights.14
Yes. Oregon's controlled substances statute is a neutral law of general applicability that prohibits peyote possession without regard to religious motivation.15 Smith and Black's sacramental ingestion at a Native American Church ceremony triggered their terminations for misconduct and the subsequent denial of unemployment benefits under state law.16 No hybrid claim involving speech or parental rights is present.17
The prohibition therefore falls within the category of generally applicable criminal laws that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt from enforcement on religious grounds.18
The Free Exercise Clause permits Oregon to prohibit religiously inspired peyote use under its generally applicable criminal law.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, And Justice Blackmun (as To Parts I And Ii)
Justice O’Connor concurs in the judgment but rejects the majority's categorical rule that neutral generally applicable laws never require religious exemptions.20 She would apply the traditional compelling interest test to the burden on the respondents' sacramental practice.21 She finds the state's interest in uniform enforcement of drug laws compelling because peyote is a Schedule I substance and selective exemptions would undermine that uniformity.22
She emphasizes that the test must be applied case by case rather than abandoned. Her analysis anchors the result to the specific facts of controlled-substance enforcement rather than a broad exemption from strict scrutiny.23
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissents, contending that the state's asserted interest must be narrowed to its refusal to grant a religious exemption rather than a generalized war on drugs.24 He notes the absence of evidence that ceremonial peyote use has caused harm.25 He highlights that the Native American Church's internal restrictions and advocacy of sobriety align with state interests against alcohol abuse.26
In his view, the severe impact on a minority religion's central ritual, combined with exemptions granted by the federal government and other states, demonstrates that uniform application is not essential.27 The denial of benefits therefore violates the Free Exercise Clause.28
Whether the State may deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use?29
When a generally applicable criminal prohibition on conduct is constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause, a state may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation to individuals discharged for engaging in that conduct.30
Yes. Because the criminal prohibition on peyote possession is constitutional, the state may treat the respondents' religiously motivated use as work-related misconduct.31 The facts establish that the firings rested solely on the peyote ingestion during the church ceremony and that the Division applied its misconduct rule without regard to religious motivation.32 The denial of benefits therefore follows directly from the valid criminal prohibition.33
The State may deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed for religiously inspired peyote use that violates a constitutional criminal prohibition.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, And Justice Blackmun (as To Parts I And Ii)
Justice O’Connor concurs in the judgment on the benefits issue because she concludes that the state's compelling interest in uniform drug enforcement justifies the burden even under strict scrutiny.35 She stresses that the criminal prohibition itself is enforceable against religious use.36 The unemployment denial is a permissible collateral consequence of that valid prohibition.37
She notes that other governments have chosen to grant exemptions but that Oregon's specific interest in uniform application of its drug laws permits it to decline to do so without violating the First Amendment.38 Her analysis applies the compelling interest test on a case-by-case basis to the particular facts of controlled substance regulation rather than abandoning the test entirely.
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissents on the benefits issue as well, arguing that because the criminal prohibition cannot constitutionally be applied to the respondents' religious conduct, the state lacks a sufficient interest to deny benefits.39 He notes that the denial rests on the same religious exercise that the Free Exercise Clause protects.40 Other governments have accommodated the practice without undermining their drug laws.41
He emphasizes that the state's interest must be narrowed to its refusal to grant a religious exemption rather than a generalized war on drugs.42 He notes that the Native American Church's internal restrictions substantially obviate health and safety concerns.43 In his view the severe impact on a minority religion's central ritual demonstrates that uniform application is not essential to the state's interests.44