458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982)
On April 1, 1975, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Thomas and Eunice Kersey, aged 86 and 74, were robbed and fatally shot at their farmhouse in central Florida.1 Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong went to the back door of the Kersey house and asked for water for an overheated car.2 When Mr. Kersey came out of the house, Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, and told Jeanette Armstrong to take his money.3 Mr. Kersey cried for help, and his wife came out of the house with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her.4 Sampson Armstrong, and perhaps Jeanette Armstrong, then shot and killed both of the Kerseys, dragged them into the kitchen, and took their money and fled.5
Two witnesses testified that they drove past the Kersey house between 7:30 and 7:40 a.m.6 They saw a large cream- or yellow-colored car parked beside the road about 200 yards from the house.7 A man was sitting in the car.8 Another witness testified that at approximately 6:45 a.m. he saw Ida Jean Shaw, petitioner's common-law wife and Jeanette Armstrong's mother, driving a yellow Buick with a vinyl top which belonged to her and petitioner Earl Enmund.9 Enmund was a passenger in the car along with an unidentified woman.10 At about 8 a.m. the same witness saw the car return at a high rate of speed.11 Enmund was driving, Ida Jean Shaw was in the front seat, and one of the other two people in the car was lying down across the back seat.12
Enmund, Sampson Armstrong, and Jeanette Armstrong were indicted for the first-degree murder and robbery of the Kerseys.13 Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried together.14 The prosecutor maintained in his closing argument that Sampson Armstrong killed the old people.15 The judge instructed the jury on felony murder, including that the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the robbery.16 The jury found both Enmund and Sampson Armstrong guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery.17
A separate sentencing hearing was held and the jury recommended the death penalty for both defendants.18 The trial judge then sentenced Enmund to death on the two counts of first-degree murder after finding four statutory aggravating circumstances and that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances applied.19 The Florida Supreme Court remanded for written findings as required by statute.20 The trial judge reiterated the findings, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's conviction and sentences after rejecting two of the four aggravating circumstances but concluding that the remaining two outweighed the absence of mitigating circumstances.21 The Florida Supreme Court found that there was no direct evidence at trial that Earl Enmund was present at the back door of the Kersey home when the plan to rob the elderly couple led to their being murdered.22 However, the jury could have concluded he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes waiting to help the robbers escape.23
We granted Enmund's petition for certiorari presenting the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.
Whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life?24
The Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.25
No. The established facts demonstrate that Enmund was the person in the car parked by the side of the road approximately 200 yards from the Kersey house waiting to help the robbers escape.26 There was no direct evidence that he was present at the back door during the killings or that he intended to take life.27 The Florida Supreme Court held that this conduct made Enmund a principal in the first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule and law of principals.28 Yet the record does not support any finding that Enmund killed, attempted to kill, or intended that lethal force be used.29
Because Enmund's personal culpability was limited to participation in the robbery without intent to kill, the death penalty is disproportionate.30 It violates the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized consideration focused on the defendant's own conduct and moral guilt.31
Death is not a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion.33 However, he adhered to his view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.34 This view, first expressed in his dissent in Gregg v. Georgia, means that Brennan would invalidate capital punishment in every case, providing an even broader ground for reversing Enmund's death sentence than the majority's focus on lack of intent.35
Justice O'Connor dissented on the ground that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposition of the death penalty for felony murder even where the defendant did not kill or intend to kill, because legislative enactments in numerous states permit it, jury verdicts do not conclusively reject it, the penalty is proportional to the harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness, and the sentencer is best positioned to assess the defendant's blameworthiness based on the unique facts of each case.36