326 U.S. at 101, 110–11
Harry Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State.1 He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train.2 He also claimed that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks.3 To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State.4
The Erie Railroad Company denied liability, and the case was tried by a jury.5 The railroad insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser.6 It contended that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers.7 The railroad further contended that it is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence unless the conduct is wanton or wilful.8
Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts.9 He contended that since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law.10 The trial judge refused to rule that Pennsylvania law precluded recovery.11 The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000, and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.12
The Erie had contended that application of the Pennsylvania rule was required by section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789.13 Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved?15
The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is disapproved.16 Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.17 There is no federal general common law.18 Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or general.19
Yes. The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson permitted federal courts to exercise independent judgment on questions of general law rather than applying state common law as declared by the state's highest court.20 This approach produced grave discrimination by allowing non-citizens to select a more favorable federal forum and prevented uniformity in the administration of state law.21 The Court holds that section 34 requires federal courts to regard the laws of the several States, unwritten as well as written, as rules of decision.22
In this case, the Circuit Court of Appeals erred when it treated the railroad's duty to Tompkins as a question of general law instead of applying Pennsylvania law.23
The oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is disapproved.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Mcreynolds
Justice Butler dissents on the ground that no constitutional question was suggested or argued below or here.25 He maintains that the Court should not decide a question not raised by the petition for certiorari.26 He argues that the long-settled construction of section 34 should not be abandoned without reargument and without affording the United States an opportunity to intervene under the Act of August 24, 1937.27
Butler would reverse the judgment on the separate ground that the evidence conclusively showed contributory negligence under Pennsylvania decisions.28
Justice Reed concurs in the result and in the disapproval of Swift v. Tyson but does not join the majority's constitutional reasoning.29 He states that it is sufficient to hold that the word laws in section 34 includes decisions of state courts, without declaring the prior course of decision unconstitutional.30 Reed notes that stare decisis in statutory construction is a useful rule though not inexorable.31
He concludes that it is preferable to overturn the established construction of the Judiciary Act rather than reach the constitutional question.32
Whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law?33
No. Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789 provides that the laws of the several States shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.34 Federal courts must apply state common law as declared by the state's highest court.35
No. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the question of the railroad's responsibility for injuries caused by its servants was one of general law on which federal courts could exercise independent judgment.36 Under the rule now announced, that holding was error.37 The parties disputed whether Pennsylvania decisions established that users of longitudinal pathways along railroad rights of way are trespassers to whom the railroad owes only a duty to refrain from wanton or wilful injury.38 Because the lower court declined to decide this issue of state law, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion.39
The federal court was not free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law.40