422 U.S. 205, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975)
In January 1972 the City of Jacksonville adopted municipal code section 330.313.1 The ordinance declared it unlawful for any ticket seller, projectionist, manager, owner, or other person connected with a drive-in theater to exhibit a motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown if the exhibit is visible from any public street or public place.2
On March 13, 1972, Richard Erznoznik, manager of the University Drive-In Theatre, was charged with violating the ordinance.3 He had exhibited the film "Class of '74," which contained scenes of uncovered female breasts and buttocks visible from public streets.4 The movie had received an "R" rating from the Motion Picture Association of America.5
With the consent of the city prosecutor, Erznoznik successfully moved to stay his criminal prosecution so that the ordinance's validity could be tested in a separate declaratory action.6 In that proceeding the city introduced evidence that the theater screen was visible from two adjacent public streets and a nearby church parking lot.7 Testimony also indicated that people had been observed watching films while sitting outside the theater in parked cars and on the grass.8
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of police power that did not infringe First Amendment rights.9 The District Court of Appeal, First District of Florida, affirmed in reliance on a Fifth Circuit precedent.10 The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari with three judges dissenting.11 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.12
Whether a municipal ordinance that prohibits drive-in theaters from exhibiting any films containing nudity when the screen is visible from a public street or place is facially valid under the First Amendment?13
A content-based restriction on protected speech is invalid under the First Amendment unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest and does not sweep substantially beyond the interests it is designed to protect.14
No. The ordinance described in the established facts prohibits exhibition of any motion picture showing bare buttocks, breasts, or pubic areas if visible from public streets or places.15 It was applied to Richard Erznoznik's screening of Class of '74 at the University Drive-In Theatre.16 The city's justifications for the restriction fail strict scrutiny because the ordinance is not limited to obscene material.17 It does not target only material that intrudes on substantial privacy interests in an intolerable manner.18
The ordinance is both overinclusive as to minors and underinclusive as a traffic measure.19
The ordinance is facially invalid under the First Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas joined the majority in concluding that the ordinance is fatally overinclusive in some respects and fatally underinclusive in others.21 He emphasized that the ordinance discriminates among movies on the basis of their content.22 Legitimate interests in protecting captive audiences or promoting highway safety cannot justify attempts to discriminate among movies on the basis of content.23
A pure movie is apt to be just as distracting to drivers as an impure one and just as intrusive upon the privacy of an unwilling but captive audience.24 Any ordinance which regulates movies on the basis of content, whether by an obscenity standard or by some other criterion, impermissibly intrudes upon the free speech rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.25
Chief Justice Burger dissented because the majority mechanically applied general principles from unrelated cases without regard to the specific facts.26 He argued that the majority ignored the unique visual medium of drive-in screens.27 Such screens are invariably huge, and photographs in the record show that the screen of petitioner's theater dominated the view from public places including nearby residences and adjacent highways.28
The combination of color and animation against a dark background attracts and holds the attention of all observers.29 He maintained that the ordinance regulates only nudity on drive-in movie screens without suppressing ideas.30 The First Amendment interests involved in this case are trivial at best compared with the legitimate police-power interests in traffic safety and public mores.31
Whether the ordinance may be justified as a means of protecting citizens from unwilling exposure to offensive materials?32
Government may not selectively shield the public from particular kinds of protected speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. This rule applies unless the speech intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes avoidance impractical.33
No. The ordinance in the established facts singles out films containing nudity for prohibition when visible from public streets and the church parking lot.34 Persons on public streets can readily avert their eyes from the screen of the University Drive-In Theatre.35 The city introduced no evidence that the intrusion was so obtrusive as to make avoidance impossible.36
The ordinance cannot be justified as a means of protecting citizens from unwilling exposure to offensive materials.37
Whether the ordinance may be justified as a means of protecting minors from exposure to nudity?38
No. The ordinance in the established facts forbids display of all films containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts irrespective of context.41 It would therefore bar a film showing a baby's buttocks, a war victim's body, or newsreel scenes of a beach or art exhibit.42 The restriction is therefore overbroad even when aimed at protecting minors.43
The ordinance cannot be justified as a means of protecting minors from exposure to nudity.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White dissented on the ground that the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad even as an exercise of the police power to protect children from exposure to nudity.45 Because the ordinance is unconstitutionally over-broad even as an exercise of the police power to protect children, it is fatally overbroad as to the population generally.46 This conclusion renders the unwilling-exposure analysis in Part II-A surplusage.47
He therefore dissented from the majority's approach to the privacy issue on public streets.48
Whether the ordinance may be justified as a traffic safety regulation?49
A traffic regulation that discriminates on the basis of the content of expression is invalid unless there are clear reasons for the distinctions drawn among different types of speech.50
No. The ordinance in the established facts applies to movie screens visible from public places as well as streets.51 It singles out movies containing even fleeting nudity while leaving other potentially distracting scenes such as violence or soap opera untouched.52 The city offered no justification for the content-based distinction.53
The ordinance cannot be justified as a traffic safety regulation.54
Whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face?55
A statute or ordinance may be invalidated on its face only if it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by state courts and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial.56
Yes. The ordinance in the established facts is not readily susceptible of a narrowing construction.57 The Florida courts made no effort to limit its application.58 Its deterrent effect is real and substantial because theater owners and managers such as Richard Erznoznik must either restrict movie offerings or construct expensive protective fencing to avoid prosecution of themselves and their employees.59
The ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.60