524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class.1 The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury.2 Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences.3
Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973.4 Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate.5
Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house.6 The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community.7
During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs.8 The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance.9 Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity.10
The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues.11 The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.12
Whether neighboring property owners and subdivision trustees have standing to seek an injunction preventing demolition of the house directed by will?13
Standing exists when plaintiffs allege a specific, personal injury in fact to a legally protectible interest within the zone of interests protected by the law governing private nuisance, restrictive covenants, and public policy, as applied in United States v. S.C.R.A.P. and Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, rather than a generalized grievance.14
Yes. The neighboring property owners and subdivision trustees pleaded and proved that demolition would cause direct harm including $10,000 depreciation to adjoining properties, loss of landmark continuity described as a missing front tooth, and adverse effects on their residences and the private place covenants, satisfying the injury-in-fact and zone-of-interests tests applied to environmental and aesthetic interests shared with the community.15
The neighboring property owners and subdivision trustees have standing to seek the injunction.16
Whether the testamentary direction to raze the house at #4 Kingsbury Place is contrary to public policy?17
A testamentary condition directing destruction of property is void as against public policy when it is capricious, serves no useful purpose, and causes substantial harm to the estate, neighbors, and community, as recognized in M'Caig's Trustees v. Kirk-Session of the United Free Church of Lismore, In re Scott's Will, Brown v. Burdett, and Restatement, Second, Trusts § 124.18
Yes. The direction requires razing a $40,000 house and lot for a $5,000 vacant lot after $4,350 in demolition costs, producing a $39,350 net loss to the estate, $10,000 depreciation to adjoining properties, loss of a designated city landmark, and waste of scarce urban housing stock in a city that lost over 14% of its units in the 1960s, serving only the unexplained caprice of the testatrix with no benefit to any party.19
The testamentary direction to raze the house is contrary to public policy and the injunction must issue.20
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Clemens dissented from the majority's public policy holding.21 He contended that courts may not create public policy but must find it in the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions.22 In re Rahn's Estate requires clear prejudice to the public interest before voiding a testamentary provision.23
He maintained that the law favors the free and untrammeled use of real property.24 Mrs. Johnston had the right during her lifetime to have her house razed.25 Plaintiffs failed to show substantial impairment from a second vacant lot.26
Therefore, the trial court should be affirmed.27
Whether demolition of the house would create a private nuisance actionable by the neighboring owners?28
A private nuisance is actionable by injunction when the threatened conduct substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of neighboring property, causing injury that is more than conjectural.29
No. The court did not reach a decision on the merits of the nuisance claim.30 The court expressly declined to address the nuisance claim after resolving the case on public policy grounds.31 It observed that the contentions may have merit based on the pleaded depreciation, loss of architectural continuity, and increased risk of detrimental uses on the resulting vacant lot.32
The court did not decide whether demolition would create an actionable private nuisance.33
Whether the demolition would violate the restrictive covenants of the Kingsbury Place trust indenture?34
Restrictive covenants in a subdivision trust indenture are enforceable by neighboring owners or trustees when the proposed use or condition breaches the general scheme of maintaining the property as desirable high-class residence property.35
No. The court did not reach a decision on the merits of the covenant claim.36 The court expressly declined to address the covenant claim after resolving the case on public policy grounds.37 It observed that the contentions may have merit given the indenture's requirements for preservation as residence property of the highest class and the landmark designation of the street.38
The court did not decide whether demolition would violate the restrictive covenants.39