472 U.S. 703 (1985)
In early 1975, Donald E. Thornton began working for Caldor, Inc., a chain of New England retail stores, managing the men’s and boys’ clothing department in its Waterbury, Connecticut store.1
At that time Caldor’s Connecticut stores were closed on Sundays pursuant to state law.2 In 1977, after the state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws, Caldor opened its Connecticut stores for Sunday business and required managerial employees to work every third or fourth Sunday.3 Thornton, a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially complied with the new schedule and worked a total of 31 Sundays in 1977 and 1978.4
Thornton was transferred to a management position in Caldor’s Torrington store and continued working Sundays during the first part of 1979.5 In November 1979 he informed Caldor that he would no longer work on Sundays, invoking Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b).6 He rejected Caldor’s offers to transfer him to a management job in a Massachusetts store closed on Sundays or to a nonsupervisory position in Torrington at lower salary.7
In March 1980 Caldor transferred Thornton to a clerical position in the Torrington store. Thornton resigned two days later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration alleging violation of the statute.8 After an evidentiary hearing the Board found Thornton’s claim rested on a sincere religious conviction, sustained the grievance, and ordered reinstatement with backpay and compensation for lost fringe benefits.9
The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s ruling.10 The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed.11 Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut, and the administrator of his estate continued the suit.12 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether a state statute that provides employees with the absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?14
Under the Religion Clauses, government must guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom. In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause cases, the Court has frequently relied on our holding in Lemon v. Kurtzman for guidance. To pass constitutional muster under Lemon a statute must not only have a secular purpose and not foster excessive entanglement of government with religion, its primary effect must not advance or inhibit religion.15 The Connecticut statute has a primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious practice.16
Yes. The statute guarantees every employee who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath the absolute right not to work on that day.17 Thornton invoked the protection after he had worked 31 Sundays and then refused further Sunday shifts at Caldor.18 This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses.19
The statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.20 The statute imposes on employers an absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates.21 There is no exception for special circumstances, economic burdens, or reasonable accommodation proposals.22
The Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
The Court applies the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman and concludes that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) has a primary effect that impermissibly advances religion.
I agree and join the Court’s opinion and judgment.24 In my view, the Connecticut Sabbath law has an impermissible effect because it conveys a message of endorsement of the Sabbath observance.25 All employees would value the benefit which the statute bestows on Sabbath observers yet Connecticut requires private employers to confer this valued benefit only on those employees who adhere to a particular religious belief.26
The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special and absolute protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees.27 An objective observer would perceive this statutory scheme as endorsement of a particular religious belief to the detriment of those who do not share it.