381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1965)
In 1962 Billy Sol Estes was indicted in Reeves County, Texas, for swindling by inducing farmers to sign chattel mortgages on nonexistent fertilizer tanks and equipment.1
The case produced massive pretrial publicity totaling 11 volumes of press clippings which had given it national notoriety, prompting a change of venue to Smith County at Tyler, approximately five hundred miles away.2 The trial was originally set for September 24, 1962.3
On September 24 and 25, 1962, the trial court conducted hearings on defense motions to bar television, radio, and still photography from the courtroom and to continue the case.4 At least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom throughout the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the proceedings.5 Cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table.6 It is conceded that the activities of the television crews and news photographers led to considerable disruption of the hearings.7 These initial hearings were carried live by both radio and television.8
The court denied the motion to exclude cameras but granted the continuance until October 22, 1962, after which the original jury panel was released.9 Before the October trial the judge issued an order allowing a booth to be built at the rear of the courtroom for cameras.10 Live telecasting was prohibited during a great portion of the actual trial.11 Only the opening and closing arguments of the State, the return of the jury's verdict and its receipt by the trial judge were carried live with sound.12 Although the order allowed videotapes of the entire proceeding without sound, the cameras operated only intermittently, recording various portions of the trial for broadcast on regularly scheduled newscasts later in the day and evening.13 Four of the jurors ultimately seated had seen and heard all or part of the broadcasts of the earlier proceedings.14 The trial itself lasted only three days and ended in Estes's conviction for swindling.15
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.16 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether the televising and broadcasting of the petitioner's criminal trial deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment?17
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that criminal trials be conducted in an atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial.18 When a state procedure such as the televising of a criminal trial involves such a probability that prejudice will result, the procedure is deemed inherently lacking in due process.19 Reversal is required even without a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused.20 This principle was applied in cases like Rideau v. Louisiana and Turner v. Louisiana, where the Court struck down convictions on the ground that prejudice was inherent in the practice employed.21
Yes.22 The facts of the case demonstrate that the televising of Estes's trial created an inherently prejudicial atmosphere that violated due process.23
The two-day pretrial hearing was televised live and repeated on tape in the same evening, reaching approximately 100,000 viewers.24 In addition, the courtroom was a mass of wires, television cameras, microphones and photographers.25 The petitioner, the panel of prospective jurors, the witnesses and the lawyers were all exposed to this untoward situation.26 The judge decided that the trial proceeding would be telecast.27 This emphasized the notorious nature of the coming trial.28 It increased the intensity of the publicity on the petitioner.29 Together with the subsequent televising of the trial beginning 30 days later, it inherently prevented a sober search for the truth.30
The trial judge was himself harassed by recurring orders made necessary by the presence of television.31 His day-to-day orders made the trial more confusing to the jury, the participants and to the viewers.32 It resulted in a public presentation of only the State's side of the case.33 These circumstances made the procedure inherently suspect and required reversal without a showing of actual prejudice.34
The televising and broadcasting of the petitioner's criminal trial deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the conviction must therefore be reversed.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice Douglas And Mr. Justice Goldberg
Chief Justice Warren joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that the condemnation of televised criminal trials is based on the specific record in this case, which presents a vivid illustration of the inherent prejudice.36 He detailed the extensive coverage of the September hearings, including live television with commercials, the construction of the booth, and the judge's multiple rulings on coverage that distracted from the trial.37 Warren argued that the televising diverts the trial from its proper purpose by impacting all participants, gives the public the wrong impression about trials, and singles out defendants like Estes who attract public interest for prejudicial conditions.38
He concluded that the practice violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it undercuts the reliability of the trial process and equates it with entertainment.39
Justice Harlan concurred in the result but limited his agreement to notorious criminal trials of widespread public interest such as this one.40 He noted that the constitutional issue is whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from employing television in the courtroom over the defendant's objection in such cases.41 Harlan stressed that while television has mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere of the judicial process, in run-of-the-mill cases the issue might be different.42
He found that the element of professional showmanship introduced by television carries grave potentialities for distorting the integrity of the judicial process, and that the strong possibility of influence on jurors and other participants required the ban in this context, though he left open the question for other types of cases.43
Joined by Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Brennan And Mr. Justice White
Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that the introduction of television into the courtroom, while unwise as a policy matter, does not rise to a constitutional violation on the specific record of this case.44 He emphasized that there was no claim of isolatable prejudice, the cameras were unobtrusive in a booth, no live coverage of most of the trial occurred, jurors were sequestered and saw no broadcasts, and the trial proceeded without any disruption or influence on participants.45 Stewart concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit all television cameras from a state courtroom and that the Constitution does not make the Court the arbiter of the image a televised trial projects to the public.46
Joined by Mr. Justice Brennan
Justice White dissented, agreeing with Stewart that a finding of constitutional prejudice on this record would erect a flat ban on cameras in the courtroom.47 He argued that it is premature to promulgate such a broad constitutional principle because this is the first case on the subject, experience is limited, and the materials assessing the effect of cameras are too sparse.48 White stated that as further experience becomes available, the use of cameras might prove to pose a serious hazard, but at present the Court should not discourage further study by imposing a constitutional ban without a showing of specific prejudice.49