396 U.S. 435 (1970)
In 1911, United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised a tract of land to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon for use as a park and pleasure ground exclusively for white people, with control vested in a Board of Managers composed entirely of white persons, and the will expressed the Senator's view that the two races should be forever separate while providing that the property under no circumstances was to be devoted to any other purpose.1
The city accepted the trust and initially operated the park on a segregated basis, but after it began allowing Negroes to use the park, members of the Board of Managers sued in state court to remove the city as trustee and appoint new trustees, prompting Negro citizens to intervene in the proceedings.2
Following the city's resignation as trustee, the Georgia courts appointed private trustees, but in Evans v. Newton the United States Supreme Court held that the park must be operated without racial discrimination, leading the Georgia Supreme Court to determine that the purpose of the trust had become impossible to fulfill and to remand the case for further proceedings.3
The trial court declined to apply the cy pres doctrine, ruled that the trust had failed, and determined that the property had reverted to Senator Bacon's heirs, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; petitioners, the Negro citizens of Macon who had sought integration of the park, challenged the termination of the trust, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.4
Whether the Georgia courts' termination of the Baconsfield trust and reversion of the property to Senator Bacon's heirs violates petitioners' rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment?5
State courts applying neutral, long-standing principles of state trust law to determine that a charitable trust has failed because its racially restrictive purpose has become impossible to fulfill under the Constitution do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, provided the decision rests on the testator's intent rather than any state-imposed discrimination.6
No. The Georgia courts applied Georgia's cy pres statutes and the resulting-trust provision to Senator Bacon's will.7 They found that the will's explicit language limiting the park to white persons only was an essential and inseparable part of the testator's plan.8 Therefore the doctrine of cy pres could not be used to strike the restriction and preserve the trust.9 This conclusion followed directly from the will's text.10
The text stated that the property under no circumstances was to be devoted to any other purpose.11 It expressed the Senator's view that the races should remain forever separate in their social relations.12 Because the state courts fairly applied ordinary principles of will construction to these facts without injecting racial animus, the termination and reversion did not deny petitioners equal protection or due process.13
The Georgia courts' termination of the trust does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.14
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Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that reverting the property to the heirs did as much violence to Senator Bacon's purpose as integration would have.15 Bacon had left all remainders and reversions to the City of Macon.16 He had directed that the property never be devoted to any other purpose.17
Douglas argued that the Georgia cy pres statute required the court to carry out the testator's intention as nearly as possible.18 This would be done by allowing continued municipal use open to all citizens.19 Such use would still fulfill a larger share of Bacon's desire for a public park than complete destruction of the trust.20
Whether the Georgia courts' decision imposes an unconstitutional penalty on the City of Macon and its citizens for complying with the constitutional mandate to integrate the park?21
A state court's enforcement of a testator's intent to terminate a trust when its discriminatory purpose cannot be carried out does not impose an unconstitutional penalty on a municipality for complying with the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The result flows from neutral state trust doctrines and the private testator's choice rather than from any state policy of discrimination.23
No. Although the loss of Baconsfield as a public park is regrettable, the Georgia courts' decision rests on Senator Bacon's will and Georgia's established trust laws, which are neutral with respect to race.24 The will itself supplied the justification for termination by making clear that the Senator preferred failure of the entire trust over any deviation from the whites-only limitation.25 Evans v. Newton required only that the park not be operated on a segregated basis.26 It did not compel the state courts to rewrite the will or to apply cy pres when the testator's specific intent could not be honored.27
The resulting reversion therefore cannot be characterized as a penalty inflicted by the state for constitutional compliance.28
The Georgia courts' decision does not impose an unconstitutional penalty.29
Whether the Georgia courts' enforcement of the racial restriction in Senator Bacon's will constitutes state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause?30
Judicial enforcement of a private testator's racially restrictive charitable trust under neutral state law does not constitute unconstitutional state action.31 This holds where the state courts are merely effectuating the testator's intent and the resulting termination eliminates rather than perpetuates discrimination against any class.32
No. The Georgia courts did not affirmatively enforce a scheme of discrimination against Negroes.33 Instead their decision ended all racial discrimination in the park by terminating the trust and returning the property to the heirs.34 Unlike Shelley v. Kraemer, where state courts enforced private covenants to prevent willing parties from dealing with one another, here the state action removed the facility entirely, imposing the same loss on white and Negro citizens alike.35 The record contains no indication that the Georgia judges were motivated by racial animus.36
The racial restriction originated solely from Senator Bacon's own social philosophy rather than from any state inducement.37 Consequently the enforcement of the will under ordinary trust principles does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.38
The Georgia courts' enforcement of the will does not constitute unconstitutional state action.39
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Justice Brennan dissented, concluding that the closing of Baconsfield was permeated with state action.40 He emphasized that Georgia statutes had expressly authorized racially restricted parks.41 The city had accepted the trust and spent public funds on it for decades.42
The state court was now enforcing the racial restriction to prevent willing parties from continuing to use the park together.43 Brennan argued that a state may not close a public facility solely to avoid its constitutional duty to desegregate.44 The reversion here conveyed an unambiguous message of community involvement in racial discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.45