504 U.S. 255 (1992)
In 1985, the Georgia General Assembly passed a private bill authorizing the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County to rezone a 12.58-acre tract of land near the intersection of Briarcliff Road and North Druid Hills Road.1 Petitioner Evans was a member of the Board.2
In 1986, the FBI began an investigation into political corruption in the Atlanta area.3 An FBI agent posing as a real estate developer met with Evans and offered him $7,000 in cash and $1,000 in campaign contributions in exchange for his assistance in having the property rezoned.4 Evans accepted the cash payment, promised to introduce the agent's proposal at the next Board of Commissioners meeting, and agreed to vote in favor of the rezoning.5 Evans also told the agent that he would contact other members of the Board on the agent's behalf.6
At the next meeting of the Board, Evans introduced the proposal and voted in favor of it.7 The proposal was approved by a vote of 5 to 0.8 Shortly thereafter, Evans was arrested and charged with one count of extortion under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act.9
At trial, the Government's evidence included a videotape of the meeting between Evans and the undercover agent.10 Evans testified in his own defense, admitting that he had accepted the cash payment but contending that he had not promised to do anything in return.11 The District Court instructed the jury that the Government was not required to prove that the defendant induced the extortionate payment.12 It further instructed that if a public official accepts a personal benefit knowing that it was offered to him in exchange for taking an official action, that is sufficient to satisfy the induced requirement.13 The jury found Evans guilty, and the District Court sentenced him to three years' probation and fined him $30,000.14
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits over whether an affirmative act of inducement by a public official is an element of the offense of extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act.16
Whether an affirmative act of inducement by a public official is an element of the offense of extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act?17
At common law, extortion under color of official right was an offense committed by a public official who took money or other things of value not due to him, knowing the payment was made in return for official acts.18 The offense did not require an affirmative act of inducement.19 The Hobbs Act adopts this common-law definition, with the word induced modifying only the force-or-fear clause and not the official-right clause.20
No. The statutory structure separates the clauses with or, confirming that induced applies only to the force clause while the official-right prong requires only knowing receipt of a payment to which the official was not entitled.21 Applied to the established facts, Evans accepted the $7,000 cash payment from the undercover FBI agent knowing it was offered in exchange for rezoning assistance and his favorable vote.22 The jury instructions required the jury to find that Evans knew the payment was made in return for official acts, and the evidence of his acceptance, introduction of the proposal, and vote satisfied that burden without any proof of a demand or request by Evans.23
An affirmative act of inducement by a public official is not an element of the offense of extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Scalia, And Chief Justice Rehnquist As To Parts Ii And Iii
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Hobbs Act requires proof that the official induced the payment.25 The statutory language shows that induced modifies both clauses in the definition of extortion.26 Common-law extortion required the official to demand or request the payment under color of office.27
The legislative history of the Hobbs Act confirms that inducement is an element.28 The jury instructions were therefore inadequate because they did not require the jury to find that Evans induced the payment.29
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.30 She joined Parts I and II of the majority opinion because in her view they correctly answered the question on which the Court granted certiorari, namely whether an act of inducement is an element of the offense of extortion under color of official right.31 O'Connor declined to join Part III of the majority opinion.32
The additional issue raised by the dissent concerning whether common-law extortion required a false pretense of official right was not fairly included in the question presented under this Court's Rule 14.1(a).33 Sound prudential reasons also suggested that the Court should not address the issue without briefing from the parties.34 She therefore expressed no view on the merits of that question.35
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.36 He agreed that the statute does not require the official to initiate the transaction.37 Kennedy stressed that a quid pro quo remains essential because the official must intend the payor to understand that payment is necessary to secure favorable official action.
The jury instructions in this case satisfied the quid pro quo requirement.38 He therefore concurred in the judgment affirming the conviction.39