215 U.S. 1 (1909)
The plaintiff and E. W. Fall were married in Indiana in 1876.1 Subsequently they moved to Nebraska, where by their joint efforts, accumulations, and earnings they acquired the land in controversy through a single conveyance.2 In 1889 the couple relocated to Washington and continued to reside there as husband and wife until their separation in January 1895.3
On February 27, 1895, E. W. Fall, then a resident of King County, Washington, filed suit for divorce against the plaintiff in the Superior Court of that county.4 He alleged that he owned the Nebraska land as his separate property purchased with money from his parents and prayed for a divorce together with a just and equitable division of the property.5 The plaintiff appeared by answer and cross-complaint, denied the allegations, asserted that the property was community property purchased with the proceeds of their joint labor after marriage, and prayed that the property be set apart to her as her separate property subject only to a $1,000 mortgage.6
The Washington Code provision then in effect authorized the court in granting a divorce to make such disposition of the property of the parties as appeared just and equitable.7 The Washington court entered a decree granting the plaintiff a divorce, setting apart the Nebraska land to her as her separate property forever free from any claim by E. W. Fall, and ordering him to convey all his right, title, and interest in the land within five days.8 When he failed to comply, the court appointed a commissioner who executed a deed conveying the land to the plaintiff.9
Thereafter E. W. Fall executed a mortgage on the land to W. H. Fall and subsequently conveyed the property by deed to defendant Elizabeth Eastin.10 In 1897 the plaintiff filed suit in Hamilton County, Nebraska, to quiet title to the land and to cancel the mortgage and deed as having been made without consideration and for the purpose of defrauding her.11 W. H. Fall disclaimed any interest and released the mortgage while Eastin answered putting in issue the legal sufficiency of the complaint and setting forth the loan transaction and deed in satisfaction of the debt.12 No personal service was had upon E. W. Fall in the Nebraska action.13
The Nebraska trial court entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, but after rehearing the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed that decree.14
Whether a deed to land situate in Nebraska, made by a commissioner under the decree of a court of the State of Washington in an action for divorce, must be recognized in Nebraska under the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States?15
The full faith and credit clause requires that a judgment rendered in one state be given conclusive effect on the merits of the claim in the courts of every other state. It does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one state to property situated in another state.16 A court of equity having jurisdiction over the person may indirectly affect land in another state by compelling the party to convey it. Neither the decree itself nor a deed executed by a commissioner under the decree operates to transfer legal title to the land.17
No. The Washington court had jurisdiction over the parties to the divorce action.18 E. W. Fall filed the suit there, and the plaintiff appeared by answer and cross-complaint asserting community property rights in the Nebraska land.19 The court entered a decree granting the plaintiff a divorce, setting apart the Nebraska land to her as separate property, and ordering E. W. Fall to convey his interest within five days.20 When he failed to comply, a commissioner appointed by the court executed the deed.21
Under the doctrine that the disposition of real estate must be governed by the law of the state where the land is situated, the Washington decree and the commissioner's deed could not operate to convey title to Nebraska land.22 The Supreme Court of Nebraska applied its own statutes and precedents. Those statutes and precedents provide that courts in divorce proceedings have no power or jurisdiction to award the husband's real estate to the wife in fee as alimony.23 Any such decree is void and subject to collateral attack. The full faith and credit clause therefore does not require Nebraska to recognize the commissioner's deed as affecting title to the land.24 The Nebraska Supreme Court properly reversed the trial court's decree quieting title in the plaintiff.25
The deed to land situate in Nebraska made by the commissioner under the Washington divorce decree need not be recognized in Nebraska under the due faith and credit clause.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Holmes concurred in the judgment on different grounds. He viewed the Washington decree as establishing a personal obligation of the husband to convey the land to his former wife, which obligation travels with the person and would be binding in Nebraska between the parties under full faith and credit, just as a contract valid under Washington law would be.27 He noted that a personal decree is within the jurisdiction of a court having power over the person, regardless of its ground.28
Nevertheless, he agreed with the result because the Nebraska court avoided saying the decree would not bind the original parties and instead based its decision on the effect upon purchasers, which is a matter of state policy regarding equity and notice that does not deny the decree its full constitutional effect.29