442 U.S. 707 (1979)
Robert Yeager was murdered during a robbery of his home on January 19, 1976.1 A small truck registered in the name of respondent Michael C.'s mother was identified near the Yeager home at the time of the killing, and witnesses saw a young man matching respondent's description near the truck and home shortly before the murder.2
On February 4, 1976, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Van Nuys police took respondent into custody.3 Respondent then was 16 1/2 years old and on probation to the Juvenile Court.4 He had been on probation since the age of 12.5 He had a record of several previous offenses, including burglary of guns and purse snatching, stretching back over several years.6
Two police officers interrogated respondent alone at the Van Nuys station house.7 After fully advising him of his Miranda rights, the officers asked whether he wished to give up his right to remain silent and talk about the murder and whether he wanted an attorney present.8 Respondent asked if he could have his probation officer there.9 The officers explained they could not reach the probation officer immediately, confirmed his rights, and respondent agreed to talk without an attorney present.10
Respondent then answered questions and drew sketches that incriminated him in the murder.11 Probation authorities filed a petition in Juvenile Court alleging respondent had murdered Robert Yeager.12 Respondent moved to suppress his statements and sketches, calling his probation officer as a witness who testified that he had instructed respondent to contact him immediately upon any police contact.13 The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress.14 It held that the question whether respondent had waived his right to remain silent was one of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.15 The court found that the facts of this case showed a "clear waiver" by respondent of that right.16 The Supreme Court of California reversed.17 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Whether a juvenile's request during custodial interrogation to speak with his probation officer constitutes a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona?19
The Miranda per se rule requires that interrogation cease upon an accused's request for an attorney.20 This rule rests on the unique role of counsel in the adversary system as the protector of Fifth Amendment rights.21 A probation officer does not occupy an equivalent position because the officer is a state employee untrained in law, not an advocate, and bound by duties to report wrongdoing and serve the juvenile court system.22
No. The per se invocation of Fifth Amendment rights applies exclusively to a request for an attorney, as only counsel can provide the independent legal assistance necessary to protect against compelled self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.23 In the established facts, respondent Michael C., after receiving full Miranda warnings, asked whether he could have his probation officer present rather than requesting an attorney.24 The officers explained they could not reach the probation officer immediately, confirmed his rights, and proceeded only after he stated he wanted to talk without an attorney.25 Because the probation officer's statutory obligations align him with the state rather than the juvenile in the manner of retained or appointed counsel, the request did not trigger automatic cessation of questioning under Miranda.26
A juvenile's request to speak with his probation officer does not constitute a per se invocation of Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda.27
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Joined by Mr. Justice Brennan And Mr. Justice Stevens
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that Miranda's prophylactic requirements must be construed broadly to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation of juveniles.28 He maintained that a request for a probation officer, whom California law designates as a trusted guardian figure with a duty to represent the minor's interests, constitutes both an attempt to obtain advice and a general invocation of the right to silence.29 In his view, the majority's refusal to treat the request as per se invocative withdraws Miranda safeguards from those most vulnerable to coercive pressures, and he declined to second-guess the California Supreme Court's assessment of the probation officer's role under state law.30
Whether the admissibility of a juvenile's statements made after requesting his probation officer is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation?31
After Miranda warnings are given, the question whether an accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived the Fifth Amendment privilege and the right to counsel is resolved by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.32 This includes the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and capacity to understand the warnings and the consequences of waiver.33
Yes. The totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry is the proper standard for determining waiver even when the suspect is a juvenile.34 It permits courts to account for special concerns of youth while avoiding rigid rules that would burden law enforcement without advancing Miranda's protective purposes.35 In the established facts, the Juvenile Court found that respondent, a 16-and-a-half-year-old with several prior arrests, time served in a youth camp, and years on probation, understood the warnings.36
He was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.37 The officers fully explained the rights, confirmed his comprehension, and obtained his affirmative statement that he wanted to proceed without an attorney.38 These circumstances establish a knowing and voluntary waiver.39
The admissibility of the juvenile's statements is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell dissented separately, agreeing that the California Supreme Court had erred in creating a per se rule but concluding that the particular facts did not demonstrate a fair interrogation free from inherently coercive circumstances.41 He emphasized respondent's youth, emotional state, limited education, and the probation officer's testimony that the minor had been instructed to contact him immediately upon any police contact.42 Given the prolonged two-on-one questioning after the request was refused and the absence of counsel, Powell would have affirmed the suppression order.43
He sought to ensure the greatest care was taken to confirm that a juvenile's admission was voluntary and not the product of ignorance or adolescent vulnerability.44