372 U.S. 391 (1963)
In 1942 Charles Noia was convicted in the County Court of Kings County, New York, together with Santo Caminito and Frank Bonino, of felony murder arising from the shooting death of Hammeroff during a robbery.1 The sole evidence against each defendant was his signed confession.2 Caminito and Bonino appealed their convictions to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, but Noia allowed the time for a direct appeal to lapse without seeking review.3
Subsequent legal proceedings resulted in the release of Caminito and Bonino after their confessions were found to have been coerced in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 It was stipulated that the coercive nature of Noia's confession was also established.5 Noia then applied to the sentencing court for relief in the nature of coram nobis.6 That court set aside his conviction, but the Appellate Division reversed and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed reinstatement of the judgment on the ground that Noia's failure to appeal barred the collateral attack.7
Noia sought certiorari from the Court of Appeals decision, which was denied.8 He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.9 The district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the ground that Noia had not exhausted available state remedies because of his failure to appeal.10 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and ordered that Noia's conviction be set aside and that he be discharged from custody unless given a new trial.11
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether federal courts have power under the federal habeas statute to grant relief despite the applicant's failure to have pursued a state remedy not available to him at the time he applies?13
Federal courts have power under the federal habeas statute to grant relief despite the applicant's failure to have pursued a state remedy not available to him at the time he applies.14 The doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to constitute an adequate and independent state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review is not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts under the federal habeas statute.15
Yes. The historical development of the writ shows that it lies to test any restraint contrary to fundamental law.16 This principle was confirmed by the 1867 Act extending jurisdiction to state prisoners.17 Consistent holdings establish that jurisdiction attaches upon allegation of unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by state proceedings.18
The exhaustion requirement codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is a rule of comity rather than a limitation on power.19 It refers only to remedies still open at the time of the federal application.20 Noia's failure to appeal created no bar because the direct appeal remedy was no longer available when he sought habeas relief.21
Federal courts possess the power to grant habeas corpus relief in these circumstances.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Clark
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the federal courts lack statutory or constitutional power to release Noia from state detention.23 His custody rests on a state judgment supported by an adequate and independent state ground of procedural default.24 He argued that the adequate state ground doctrine has constitutional dimensions rooted in federalism and the limits of Article III.25
The doctrine applies equally to habeas as to direct review because ordering release nullifies the state judgment and invalidates the state procedural rule.26 The majority's approach abolishes the doctrine in all state criminal cases involving federal questions and exceeds the Court's constitutional authority.27
Whether Noia's failure to appeal was a failure to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254?
Noia's failure to appeal was not a failure to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That requirement refers only to a failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files his application for habeas corpus in the federal court.
No. Section 2254 codifies the judicially evolved exhaustion rule as a doctrine of timing and comity.28 It is not a rule of forfeitures for past defaults.29 The statute's text and history limit it to presently available remedies.30 Noia had no state remedy open when he filed his federal petition.31 The time for direct appeal had long expired and coram nobis had been denied on procedural grounds.32
Noia's failure to appeal did not constitute a failure to exhaust under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.33
Whether Noia's failure to appeal can under the circumstances be deemed an intelligent and understanding waiver of his right to appeal such as to justify the withholding of federal habeas corpus relief?
Noia's failure to appeal cannot under the circumstances be deemed an intelligent and understanding waiver of his right to appeal such as to justify the withholding of federal habeas corpus relief. The controlling standard is the Johnson v. Zerbst definition of waiver as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.34 A federal habeas judge has limited discretion to deny relief only where the applicant has deliberately bypassed state procedures.35
No. Noia made a choice not to appeal after consultation with counsel.36 The choice was driven by the substantial risk of a death sentence on retrial given the trial judge's comments at sentencing.37 This was not a tactical or strategic litigation decision amounting to deliberate bypass under the Johnson v. Zerbst standard.38 Therefore the federal court was not justified in withholding relief on waiver grounds.39
Noia's failure to appeal cannot be deemed a waiver justifying denial of habeas relief.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clark joined Justice Harlan's dissent and emphasized that the decision makes an abrupt break with the Constitution, the statute, and past decisions, disrupting the delicate balance of federalism so important in law enforcement.41 The ruling will cause a rash of new applications from state prisoners, most of them frivolous, burying meritorious claims in a flood of worthless ones.42 It substitutes habeas corpus for appeal, seriously disturbing the orderly disposition of state prosecutions and jeopardizing the finality of convictions.43
This undermines the States' comprehensive procedural safeguards.44 Clark noted that the only practical remedy may now lie in congressional legislation to restore the writ to its proper place as a remedy against illegal restraint, not a substitute for appeal.45
Whether the adequate and independent state procedural ground doctrine that bars direct Supreme Court review also bars federal habeas corpus relief?46
The adequate and independent state procedural ground doctrine that bars direct Supreme Court review does not bar federal habeas corpus relief.47 Habeas jurisdiction is not appellate but an original civil remedy testing the lawfulness of detention.48 State procedural rules must yield to the overriding federal policy of providing plenary review for constitutional claims.49
No. The adequate state ground rule is a function of the limitations of appellate review and the prohibition on advisory opinions.50 Federal habeas jurisdiction depends only on custody in violation of federal law.51 It is independent of the state judgment.52 Enforcing state forfeitures on habeas would nullify the federal remedy Congress provided in 1867 and contradict the historic office of the writ.53
The adequate state ground doctrine does not bar federal habeas relief.54
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Clark
Justice Harlan maintained that the adequate state ground doctrine rests on constitutional principles of federalism and the division of judicial power.55 It applies with equal force on habeas because ordering release nullifies the state judgment and invalidates the state procedural rule.56 He argued that the majority's waiver substitute is inadequate to protect state interests and exceeds the Court's constitutional authority under Article III.57