518 U.S. 651 (1996)
In 1976, Ellis Wayne Felker approached Jane W. as she exited her car, used deceptions to lure her to his trailer, forcibly raped and sodomized her, and was later convicted of aggravated sodomy and sentenced to twelve years in prison.1 He was paroled after serving four years.2 On November 23, 1981, Felker met Joy Ludlam at the lounge where she worked and used similar deceptions to induce her to visit him the following day at a business he owned.3 Joy Ludlam was last seen alive that evening, and her body was discovered two weeks later in a creek, showing signs of beating, rape, sodomy, and strangulation.4
Forensic evidence included hair resembling Felker's on the victim's body and clothes, hair resembling the victim's in Felker's bedroom, and clothing fibers matching the victim's coat in Felker's car; a neighbor also reported seeing the victim's car at Felker's house on the day of her disappearance.5 A jury convicted Felker of murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment, resulting in a death sentence on the murder charge.6 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1984, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.7
After a state trial court denied collateral relief and the Georgia Supreme Court declined to issue a certificate of probable cause, the Supreme Court again denied certiorari in 1992.8 Felker then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia raising claims of insufficient evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper use of hypnosis, and double jeopardy violations from the prior crime against Jane W.9 The district court denied the petition, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 1995, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1996.10
The State scheduled Felker's execution for May 2 through 9, 1996.11 On April 29, 1996, Felker filed a second petition for state collateral relief, which the state trial court denied on May 1 and the Georgia Supreme Court denied on May 2.12 On April 24, 1996, the President signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act into law, which amended federal habeas procedures including provisions governing second or successive applications.13
On May 2, 1996, Felker filed in the Eleventh Circuit a motion for stay of execution and for leave to file a second federal habeas petition, seeking to raise a due process claim regarding jury instructions equating reasonable doubt with moral certainty and a claim based on new expert forensic evidence suggesting an alibi during the period when Joy Ludlam died.14 The Eleventh Circuit denied both motions the same day.15 Felker then filed a pleading in the Supreme Court styled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution, leading the Court to grant the stay and certiorari on May 3, 1996.16
Whether Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 precludes the Supreme Court from entertaining an original application for a writ of habeas corpus?17
Title I of the Act does not repeal the Supreme Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. No provision of Title I mentions this authority, in contrast to its amendment of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to bar original habeas petitions in the courts of appeals.18 Repeals by implication are not favored, and the continued exercise of original habeas jurisdiction is not repugnant to the limitation on review of gatekeeping decisions, following the precedent of Ex parte Yerger.19
No. The Act's gatekeeping system in § 2244(b)(3) applies only to applications filed in the district court, leaving this Court's original jurisdiction under § 2241 intact.20 On May 2, 1996, Felker filed in the Eleventh Circuit a motion for stay of execution and for leave to file a second federal habeas petition, seeking to raise a due process claim regarding jury instructions equating reasonable doubt with moral certainty and a claim based on new expert forensic evidence suggesting an alibi.21 Felker then filed his petition in this Court as an original habeas matter, and the Court granted certiorari and a stay.22 Because the Act does not affect this Court's authority to entertain such petitions, it does not preclude review.23
The Court reviewed the claims and found they did not warrant relief under Rule 20.4(a), which requires exceptional circumstances.24
Title I of the Act does not preclude the Supreme Court from entertaining an original application for a writ of habeas corpus.25
Whether the Act's restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions violate the Suspension Clause?26
The Suspension Clause provides that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in cases of rebellion or invasion.27 The Act's restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on abuse of the writ, that falls well within the evolutionary process of habeas corpus practice and does not amount to a suspension.28
No. The Act requires a habeas petitioner to obtain leave from the court of appeals before filing a second habeas petition in the district court. This requirement simply transfers a screening function previously performed by the district court.2930 The Act also codifies some of the pre-existing limits on successive petitions and further restricts the availability of relief.31 These added restrictions are well within the compass of the evolutionary process described in McCleskey v. Zant.32
In Felker's case, the second petition raised claims that did not satisfy the Act's standards or pre-Act standards, yet the Court retained authority to consider the original habeas petition and deny relief on the merits.33 Judgments about the proper scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make.34 The restrictions here do not suspend the writ.35
The Act's restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions do not violate the Suspension Clause.36
Whether the Act's limitation barring review of court of appeals gatekeeping decisions violates the Exceptions Clause of Article III?37
The Exceptions Clause allows Congress to make exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.38 The Act removes authority to review gatekeeping decisions by appeal or certiorari but preserves the Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions, so there is no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2.39
No. Although § 2244(b)(3)(E) precludes review by appeal or petition for certiorari of a court of appeals order denying leave to file a second habeas petition, the Act does not repeal the Court's authority to entertain an original habeas petition.4041 In Felker's case, after the Eleventh Circuit denied the motions for stay and leave to file, Felker filed a pleading in this Court styled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution.42 The Court granted the stay and certiorari, demonstrating that the availability of original habeas relief obviates any Exceptions Clause claim.43 The Act removes authority to entertain an appeal or certiorari to review a gatekeeping decision but leaves intact the habeas route.44
The Act's limitation barring review of court of appeals gatekeeping decisions does not violate the Exceptions Clause of Article III.45
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Souter joined the Court's opinion.46 The statute's text does not necessarily foreclose all of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, such as through certified questions from courts of appeals or authority to issue writs in aid of appellate jurisdiction under the All Writs Act.47 Because petitioner sought only a writ of certiorari, which Congress has foreclosed, and a writ of habeas corpus, which the Court would deny under traditional criteria, the statute is not on its face or as applied here unconstitutional.48
If it should later turn out that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed, the question whether the statute exceeded Congress's Exceptions Clause power would be open, particularly if courts of appeals adopted divergent interpretations of the gatekeeper standard.49
Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion.50 The Act does not purport to limit the Court's jurisdiction under § 1254(2) for certified questions, under the All Writs Act, or to review interlocutory orders.51 He outlined three reasons for rejecting the Exceptions Clause argument.52
If the Court retains jurisdiction to review gatekeeping orders pursuant to the All Writs Act, such orders are not immune from direct review.53 A court of appeals may enter an appropriate interlocutory order providing an opportunity for review.54 In the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction the Court may consider earlier gatekeeping orders to inform its judgments and provide the functional equivalent of direct review.55
In this case the Court correctly denied the writ because the claims did not satisfy pre-Act jurisprudence or the Act's standards.56