494 U.S. 516 (1990)
Albert Ferens, a Pennsylvania resident, lost his right hand when it became caught in a combine harvester manufactured by Deere & Company while he was working on his farm in Pennsylvania.1 For reasons not explained in the record, Ferens delayed filing a tort suit, and Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period expired.2 In the third year after the accident, Ferens and his wife filed a diversity action against Deere in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, raising contract and warranty claims as to which the Pennsylvania limitations period had not yet run.3 The Ferenses are Pennsylvania residents, and Deere is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Illinois.4
In the same year the Ferenses filed a second diversity suit against Deere in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging negligence and products liability.5 They chose the Mississippi forum because they knew that under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. the federal court would apply the same choice-of-law rules that Mississippi state courts would apply.6 A Mississippi court would apply Mississippi’s six-year statute of limitations to the tort claim arising under Pennsylvania law.7 The Ferenses then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the Mississippi action to the Western District of Pennsylvania on the ground that Pennsylvania was a more convenient forum.8 They acted on the assumption that after transfer the Mississippi choice-of-law rules, including application of the Mississippi statute of limitations, would continue to govern the suit.9
Deere did not oppose the motion, and the District Court in Mississippi granted the transfer after accepting that the Ferenses resided in Pennsylvania, the accident occurred there, the claim had no connection to Mississippi, a substantial number of witnesses resided in the Western District of Pennsylvania but none in Mississippi, most documentary evidence was located in Pennsylvania but none in Mississippi, and the warranty action pending in Pennsylvania presented common questions of law and fact.10 The District Court in Pennsylvania consolidated the transferred tort action with the pending warranty action but declined to apply the Mississippi statute of limitations.11 It ruled that because the Ferenses had moved for transfer as plaintiffs the rule from Van Dusen v. Barrack did not apply, and it dismissed the tort action under Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period.12
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initially affirmed on due process grounds.13 After the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the Third Circuit again affirmed.14 This time it held that a transferor court’s choice-of-law rules do not apply after a § 1404(a) transfer on a motion by a plaintiff.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether, following a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) initiated by a plaintiff, the transferee court must apply the choice-of-law rules that prevailed in the transferor court?17
Section 1404(a) permits a district court to transfer a civil action to any other district where it might have been brought for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.18 When such a transfer occurs in a diversity case, the transferee court must apply the choice-of-law rules that prevailed in the transferor court, regardless of whether the plaintiff or the defendant initiated the transfer.19 This rule, extending the holding of Van Dusen v. Barrack, preserves the state-law advantages that would have existed absent the transfer, prevents the creation of new opportunities for forum shopping, and ensures that transfer decisions rest on considerations of convenience rather than changes in applicable law.20
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Albert Ferens, a Pennsylvania resident, suffered the loss of his right hand in an accident involving a combine harvester manufactured by Deere & Company on his farm in Pennsylvania.21 After Pennsylvania's two-year tort limitations period expired, the Ferenses filed a contract and warranty action in the Western District of Pennsylvania.22 They also filed a separate negligence and products liability action in the Southern District of Mississippi.23 They selected the latter forum to obtain the benefit of Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations through that state's choice-of-law rules.24 They then moved under § 1404(a) to transfer the Mississippi action to Pennsylvania on grounds of convenience, with the explicit assumption that Mississippi choice-of-law rules would continue to govern.25
The District Court in Mississippi granted the unopposed transfer after finding that the Ferenses resided in Pennsylvania, the accident occurred there, no witnesses or evidence existed in Mississippi, and the Pennsylvania warranty action raised common issues.26 Upon transfer and consolidation, the Pennsylvania District Court declined to apply Mississippi's limitations period and dismissed the tort claims under Pennsylvania law.27 The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff-initiated transfers do not carry forward the transferor court's choice-of-law rules.28
Application of the rule to these facts requires reversal. Because the Ferenses initiated the transfer from Mississippi, the transferee court in Pennsylvania must apply Mississippi choice-of-law rules, including the six-year statute of limitations that would have governed had the action remained in Mississippi.29 This outcome follows directly from the policies of preserving Erie advantages, discouraging manipulative forum selection through transfer, and focusing § 1404(a) decisions solely on convenience.30 The same result would obtain if Deere had moved for transfer, confirming that the identity of the moving party does not alter the governing choice-of-law framework.31
Yes, following a plaintiff-initiated transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the transferee court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the transferor court, so Mississippi's statute of limitations governs the Ferenses' tort action.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that extending Van Dusen to plaintiff-initiated transfers violates the Rules of Decision Act and the principles of Erie and Klaxon.33 He argued that the majority's approach creates a new form of forum shopping that Klaxon was designed to prevent.34 This approach allows plaintiffs to evade the uniformity of law within a state by using federal diversity jurisdiction as a vehicle for carrying favorable choice-of-law rules across state lines.35
Scalia further contended that the rule would increase rather than reduce systemic costs by encouraging filing-and-transfer strategies. The proper approach is to apply the law of the state in which the transferee court sits.36