372 U.S. 726 (1963)
The State of Kansas enacted a statute making it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of debt adjusting except when done as an incident to the lawful practice of law in the state.1 The statute defined debt adjusting as the making of a contract with a debtor whereby the debtor agrees to pay money periodically to the debt adjuster who distributes it among specified creditors according to an agreed plan.2
Appellee Skrupa, doing business as Credit Advisors, operated such a debt adjusting business in Kansas.3 Skrupa filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas alleging that his business was useful and desirable, that it was not inherently immoral or dangerous, and that the statute could not absolutely prohibit it.4 Kansas state officials presented evidence that debt adjusting lends itself to grave abuses against distressed debtors, particularly those in lower income brackets, and noted that twelve other States have outlawed the business of debt adjusting.5
A three-judge district court heard this evidence and found that Skrupa's activities fell within the statute's proscription.6 The district court concluded that the Kansas statute was prohibitory rather than regulatory and that even if viewed as regulatory it unreasonably regulated a lawful business in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 One judge dissented from this conclusion.8
The court enjoined enforcement of the statute, relying in part on a similar decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Stone.9 The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 from the judgment of the three-judge district court.10
Whether a Kansas statute making it a misdemeanor to engage in the business of debt adjusting except as an incident to the lawful practice of law violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?11
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely. Legislatures have broad scope to experiment with economic problems. Courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.12
No. The State of Kansas enacted a statute that made it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of debt adjusting except when done as an incident to the lawful practice of law in the state.13
The three-judge district court found that Skrupa's activities fell within the statute's proscription.14 The district court concluded that the Kansas statute was an unreasonable regulation of a lawful business in violation of the Due Process Clause.15
Appellee Skrupa operated a debt adjusting business in Kansas.16 He alleged that his business was useful and desirable and not inherently immoral or dangerous.17 State officials presented evidence of grave abuses against distressed debtors and that other states had outlawed the business.18
The district court relied on outdated precedent such as Adams v. Tanner and Commonwealth v. Stone.19 The Supreme Court has long since discarded the Lochner-era doctrine that due process authorizes courts to strike down laws regulating business because they may be unwise.20 The Court has returned to the proposition that it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.21
The Kansas Legislature was free to decide for itself that legislation was needed to deal with the business of debt adjusting.22 Arguments showing the social utility of the business are properly addressed to the legislature, not to the courts, which refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.23
The Kansas statute does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Related opinions on this issue
Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the judgment on the ground that this state measure bears a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
483, 491.25 This concurrence provides a succinct endorsement of the rational basis standard for reviewing state economic regulations. It diverges from the majority's extensive historical analysis by directly invoking the established precedent in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. Harlan's approach confirms that the Kansas statute meets constitutional requirements through its reasonable relation to protecting the public from debt adjusting abuses.
His separate opinion reinforces the principle that legislatures have wide latitude in addressing commercial practices.
Whether the exception in the Kansas statute for lawyers denies nonlawyers the equal protection of the laws?26
Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection of the laws. It is only invidious discrimination which offends the Constitution.27 The business of debt adjusting gives rise to a relationship of trust in which the debt adjuster will, in a situation of insolvency, be marshalling assets in the manner of a proceeding in bankruptcy, and the client may need advice as to the legality of claims or remedies under debtor-creditor laws or the Bankruptcy Act which a nonlawyer cannot lawfully give.28
No. The Kansas statute excepts from its prohibition debt adjusting done as an incident to the lawful practice of law.29 This classification is not invidious discrimination because the debt adjuster's client may need advice as to the legality of claims against him, remedies existing under state laws governing debtor-creditor relationships, or provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.30 If the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it.31
The exception for lawyers does not deny nonlawyers the equal protection of the laws.32