328 U.S. 463 (1946)
In March 1944 petitioner Fisher, the janitor at the library of the Cathedral of Saint Peter and Saint Paul in Washington, D.C., killed librarian Catherine Cooper Reardon inside the library building between eight and nine o'clock on the morning of March 1.
Reardon had complained a few days earlier to the verger about Fisher's care of the premises, and the verger had informed Fisher of the complaint.
Fisher and Reardon were alone in the library at the time of the homicide.1
Fisher testified that Reardon spoke insulting words about his work, after which he slapped her impulsively.2
He ran up a flight of steps toward an exit but turned back, seized a stick of firewood, struck her, and when the stick broke choked her to silence.3
He then dragged her to a lavatory and left the body to clean up some spots of blood on the floor outside.4
While Fisher was doing this cleaning up, the victim started hollering again.5
Fisher then took out his knife and stuck her in the throat.6
After that he dragged her body down into an adjoining pump pit, where it was found the next morning.7
Fisher's accounts of the events varied.8
His original confession made no reference to insulting words from Reardon.9
His written confession mentioned them, and his trial testimony amplified their effect on him.10
In the written confession he admitted his main reason for assaulting her was that she had reported him for not cleaning the floor.11
The Deputy Coroner testified that the knife wound was not deep and only went through the skin.12
Defense psychiatrists testified that Fisher was a psychopathic personality of a predominantly aggressive type, mentally somewhat below average, with minor stigmata of mental subnormalcy, and that he was unable by reason of a deranged mental condition to resist the impulse to kill.13
The prosecution introduced competent evidence that Fisher was capable of understanding the nature and quality of his acts.14
All evidence offered by the defense was received by the trial court.15
Fisher was tried in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia on an indictment charging killing by choking and strangling with deliberate and premeditated malice.16
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the first count, and the court imposed a sentence of death.17
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the judgment and sentence.18
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of the defendant's psychopathic aggressive tendencies, low emotional response, and borderline mental deficiency in determining whether he acted with the deliberation and premeditation required for first-degree murder?19
The established law in the District of Columbia is that an accused in a criminal trial is not entitled to an instruction based upon evidence of mental weakness, short of legal insanity, which would reduce his crime from first to second degree murder.20
No. The District of Columbia courts have long held that evidence of mental defects short of legal insanity does not entitle a defendant to a partial responsibility instruction reducing first-degree murder to second-degree murder, as confirmed by the refusal in United States v. Lee and followed in this case.21 Fisher testified that he killed Reardon after she spoke insulting words about his work, slapping her impulsively, seizing firewood to stop her screaming, choking her, cleaning blood, and then stabbing her when she screamed again, with variations in his confessions omitting or amplifying the insults.22 Defense psychiatrists testified that Fisher was a psychopathic personality of a predominantly aggressive type, mentally below average with minor stigmata of mental subnormalcy, and unable to resist the impulse to kill due to a deranged mental condition, yet the trial court admitted all such evidence and instructed the jury on insanity, irresistible impulse, malice, deliberation, and premeditation.23 Under those instructions the jury could have found the homicide lacked premeditation and deliberation, and the requested instruction was properly refused because it sought to introduce a theory of partial responsibility not recognized in District law.24
The trial court did not err in refusing the requested instruction on partial responsibility.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter dissented because the instructions on premeditation were inadequate for this capital case.26 The instructions consisted of threadbare generalities and a jumble of empty abstractions.27 They left the jury without clear guidance on the distinctive facts involving Fisher's low-grade mentality.28
The sequence of instinctive responses to the insult and screaming excluded any basis for premeditation.29 In his view inadequate direction denied Fisher the substance of a fair trial.30
Joined by Justice Frankfurter And Justice Rutledge
Justice Murphy joined the view that the charge was deficient.31 He focused primarily on the broader refusal to allow consideration of mental deficiency.32 The jury should have been permitted to weigh Fisher's general mental impairment in determining capacity for deliberation and premeditation.33
Congress had already distinguished degrees of murder by those elements.34 Excluding psychiatric evidence on partial impairment forced juries into an all-or-nothing choice between death and acquittal.35 This approach differed from the treatment given to intoxication cases.36
Justice Rutledge joined Justice Murphy's opinion.37 He added that the defendant was entitled to the requested instruction or one of similar import.38 Congress did not intend the 1901 Code's premeditation requirement to change preexisting law only for intoxication cases.39
He further agreed with Justice Frankfurter that the abstract form of the instructions magnified the deficiency on the crucial issues of premeditation and deliberation in this capital case.40
Whether this Court should require the courts of the District of Columbia to recognize a rule of partial responsibility that would allow mental deficiency short of legal insanity to reduce a homicide from first-degree to second-degree murder?41
A radical departure from common law concepts of criminal responsibility is more properly a subject for the exercise of legislative power or at least for the discretion of the courts of the District of Columbia.42 This Court will not disturb the administration of local criminal law absent egregious error.43
No. Although some states have adopted the partial responsibility theory and others have rejected it, and although evidence of intoxication may reduce degree in the District, this Court will not impose a new rule requiring juries to consider mental deficiency short of legal insanity when determining capacity for deliberation and premeditation.44 Fisher presented psychiatric testimony that he was a psychopathic personality unable to resist the impulse to kill, yet remained sane under the M'Naghten test and capable of controlling impulses under Smith v. United States, and the prosecution countered with evidence of his capacity to understand his acts.45 Forcing the District to adopt the rule would constitute a fundamental change in common law theory of responsibility that Congress has not enacted despite its 1901 division of murder into degrees.46 Matters of local law enforcement are entrusted to the District's courts with deference from this Court especially where the challenged rule is long established.47
This Court declines to require the District of Columbia to recognize the partial responsibility rule.48
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter reinforced the refusal to defer to the District's long-established rule when a death sentence is at stake.49 This Court cannot escape responsibility for affirming a capital judgment.50 Failure to guide the jury adequately on premeditation does not reflect a deeply rooted practice warranting deference.51
The policy of deference to local courts is out of place in capital cases at the seat of government.52
Joined by Justice Frankfurter And Justice Rutledge
Justice Murphy dissented on the ground that mental deficiency not amounting to complete insanity is a scientifically established fact.53 The jury should be allowed to consider it when determining whether a defendant possessed the deliberation and premeditation required for first-degree murder.54 The Hopt v. People principle permits consideration of drunkenness or other conditions affecting capacity for premeditation.55
It applies equally to permanent mental impairment.56 Shutting the door on psychiatric assistance makes the jury's decision less intelligent while encouraging acquittals of partially insane defendants.57
Justice Rutledge joined Justice Murphy and expressly rejected the limitation of the Code's premeditation requirement to intoxication cases.58 Congress intended the distinction between degrees of murder to apply more broadly.59 The defendant was entitled to an instruction allowing the jury to consider his mental condition on the issues of premeditation and deliberation.60
The charge was deficient in not including the requested instruction or one substantially similar.61