570 U.S. 297 (2013)
Abigail Fisher, a Caucasian applicant, was denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin's 2008 entering class after submitting one of 29,501 applications, of which 12,843 were admitted and 6,715 enrolled.1
Fisher sued the University and school officials in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging that the University's consideration of race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause.2 The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the University. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.3
Prior to 1997 the University considered an applicant's Academic Index reflecting test scores and high school performance along with race.4 After the Fifth Circuit's 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas, the University stopped considering race and substituted a Personal Achievement Index measuring leadership, work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and socioeconomic factors.5 The Texas Legislature enacted the Top Ten Percent Law granting automatic admission to the top 10 percent of students at each qualifying high school.6
Following this Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, the University adopted its current program in 2004.7 It included a student's self-identified race from five predefined categories as a component of the Personal Achievement Index score.8 The Proposal relied on a study of undergraduate classes with five to twenty-four students showing limited minority enrollment and on anecdotal student reports, concluding that the University lacked a critical mass of minority students.9
Over the dissent of seven judges the Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari, which was granted.10
Whether the Court of Appeals applied the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Bakke when reviewing the University's race-conscious admissions program?11
Under Grutter and Bakke, strict scrutiny requires that any race-conscious university admissions program be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest in the educational benefits of student body diversity.12 A university receives deference on whether diversity is essential to its educational mission.13 It receives no deference on narrow tailoring.14 The university must prove that its means are necessary.15 It must show that each applicant is evaluated as an individual rather than having race as the defining feature.16 It must also show that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.17
No. The Fifth Circuit held that petitioner could challenge only whether the University's decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.18
It placed on petitioner the burden of rebutting that presumption.19
The Fifth Circuit undertook the narrow-tailoring inquiry with a degree of deference to the University.20
This approach conflicts with Grutter's command that all racial classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.21
Strict scrutiny demands a searching examination of how the process works in practice.22
It does not permit acceptance of the school's assertions without close analysis of the evidence.
The District Court and Fifth Circuit confined the strict scrutiny inquiry too narrowly by deferring to the University's good faith instead of requiring proof that the program ensures individual evaluation and that race-neutral alternatives are insufficient.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which he joined the Court's opinion in full.26 He adhered to the view he expressed in Grutter v. Bollinger that the Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race and that state-provided education is no exception.27 The petitioner did not ask the Court to overrule Grutter's holding that a compelling interest in the educational benefits of diversity can justify racial preferences in university admissions.28
Accordingly, he joined the majority opinion without reservation.
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion agreeing that the Court of Appeals failed to apply strict scrutiny to the University's use of race in admissions.29 He wrote separately to explain that he would overrule Grutter v. Bollinger and hold that a State's use of race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.30 In his view, the educational benefits allegedly flowing from student body diversity do not constitute a compelling state interest.31
He emphasized that racial discrimination is never benign, regardless of the government's asserted motives, and would have invalidated the program outright rather than remanding.32
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion.33 She argued that the University's admissions policy is patterned after the Harvard plan referenced as exemplary in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and follows the model approved by the Court in Grutter.34 The thorough opinions below already demonstrate that the policy flexibly considers race only as a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor and is subject to periodic review to ensure necessity.35
In her view, the Court of Appeals has already completed the narrow tailoring inquiry, so its judgment merits affirmance without remand.36