392 U.S. 83 (1968)
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.1 That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies.2
Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.3 They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities.4
The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants.5 Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools.6
The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.7
They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes.8 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing.9 A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.10 The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.11
Whether a three-judge district court was properly convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 to hear a challenge to the administration of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965?12
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 a three-judge court must be convened in any action to enjoin the enforcement or operation of an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds.13
Yes. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional to the extent it authorized the challenged expenditures.14 It also sought an injunction restraining the defendants from approving further expenditures for those purposes.15 The complaint presented both nonconstitutional and constitutional grounds for relief.16 The injunctive relief sought extended to any program possessing the unconstitutional features alleged.17 These determinations satisfied the statutory requirements for convening a three-judge court and preserved direct appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.18
The three-judge district court was properly convened and the Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal.19
Whether seven federal taxpayers who pay income taxes have standing to maintain an action challenging the expenditure of federal funds under Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 on the ground that the expenditures violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment?20
A federal taxpayer possesses standing to challenge a federal spending program when the taxpayer establishes a logical nexus between taxpayer status and the type of legislative enactment attacked and a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.21
Yes. The taxpayer-appellants satisfied both nexuses required for standing.22 Their constitutional challenge was made to an exercise by Congress of its power under Article I Section 8 to spend for the general welfare and the challenged program involved a substantial expenditure of federal tax funds.23 They alleged that the challenged expenditures violate the Establishment Clause which operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power.24
The Establishment Clause was designed to prevent the use of the taxing and spending power to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.25 The facts show that the plaintiffs alleged the use of funds for instruction and materials in religious schools under the specific statutory criteria of the Act directly implicating the prohibition on establishment.26
The appellants have standing to maintain the action as federal taxpayers.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment.28 He stated that the test laid down by the Court is not durable and urged that Frothingham should be overruled to permit taxpayers standing to challenge any federal expenditure violating a specific constitutional prohibition.29 He emphasized that taxpayers serve as vigilant private attorneys general whose stake may be de minimis financially yet substantial when measured against a constitutional mandate.30
He argued that the judiciary must protect individuals against prohibited conduct by the other branches rather than await congressional authorization for suits.31
Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice Harlan dissented. He argued that the distinction drawn between Frothingham and the present case is illusory because both cases involve challenges to the constitutionality of federal statutes by taxpayers whose interests remain remote and indeterminate. He warned that the decision would open the federal courts to a flood of litigation by taxpayers disagreeing with expenditures.32
It would thrust the judiciary into the role of a super-legislature and undermine separation of powers.33 He would have affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing.34
Justice Stewart joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan.35 He would have affirmed the judgment below on the ground that the appellants lacked standing.36 He agreed that the distinction between this case and Frothingham was illusory because in both cases the taxpayer is challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute and the taxpayer's interest is the same.37
He concluded that the decision threatened to undermine separation of powers by inviting excessive taxpayer litigation.38
Justice Fortas concurred in the judgment.39 He would confine the ruling to the proposition that a taxpayer may challenge a federal expenditure on the ground that it violates the Establishment Clause.40 He noted that the historical purposes of that Clause supply a unique nexus between the taxing and spending power and the constitutional prohibition sufficient to confer standing.41
He expressed no view on whether other types of expenditures could be attacked solely on taxpayer status.42 He stressed the fundamental impact of the church-state issue on the life of the taxpayer and all citizens.43