363 U.S. 603 (1960)
Ephram Nestor was born in Bulgaria in 1898 and immigrated to the United States in 1913, where he lived continuously until 1956.1 From December 1936 to January 1955 Nestor and his employers made regular payments into the federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund under the Social Security Act.2 In November 1955 he became eligible for and began receiving old-age insurance benefits.3
In July 1956 Nestor was deported to Bulgaria under section 241(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 on the ground that he had been a member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1939.4 Shortly after the deportation the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare terminated Nestor's benefits pursuant to section 202(n) of the Social Security Act, a provision enacted in 1954 that directed termination of benefits for aliens deported after September 1, 1954 on any of fourteen specified grounds including past Communist Party membership.5
Nestor then filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking a declaratory judgment that section 202(n) was unconstitutional.6 On cross-motions for summary judgment the District Court ruled for Nestor, holding that the statute deprived him of an accrued property right in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.7
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment, though on the ground that section 202(n) was a bill of attainder prohibited by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard argument on February 24, 1960.9
Whether section 202(n) of the Social Security Act deprives a deported alien of an accrued property right in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?10
A person covered by the Social Security Act has a right to benefits that is not a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment.11 The interest of a covered employee under the Act is of a noncontractual nature.12 Congress may amend the Act at any time to increase, reduce, or even eliminate benefits.13
No. The established facts demonstrate that Nestor had paid regular Social Security taxes and acquired a fully insured status.14 Yet the statutory scheme treats the right to benefits as noncontractual and subject to congressional alteration at any time.15 The termination of benefits upon deportation after 1954 rests on a rational basis connected to limiting payments to those likely to remain in the United States rather than constituting an arbitrary deprivation.16
Section 202(n) does not deprive Nestor of an accrued property right in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.17
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Warren, C. J., And Douglas And Brennan, Jj.
Justice Black dissented on the ground that section 202(n) deprives Nestor of his statutory right to old-age benefits in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.18 Nestor came to the United States in 1913 and lived here for forty-three years until his deportation in 1956.19 During that time he and his employers made regular payments into the old-age and survivors insurance trust fund.20
The termination of benefits after deportation takes Nestor's insurance without just compensation.21 This result reveals a complete misunderstanding of the purpose Congress and the country had in passing the Social Security law, which was intended to create earned rights rather than gratuities subject to arbitrary withdrawal.22 Black would affirm the District Court judgment holding the statute unconstitutional.23
Justice Douglas joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Black.24 He emphasized that Social Security benefits are not gratuities but products of a contributory system in which funds are raised by payments from employees and employers alike.25 Taking those benefits away from one person for vindictive reasons constitutes a bill of attainder that violates due process.26
Douglas noted that Congress could have imposed residence requirements on all beneficiaries.27 Yet it chose instead to single out a narrow class of deportees for loss of accrued benefits.28 This selective deprivation of property interests earned through years of covered employment cannot be reconciled with constitutional protections.29
Justice Brennan concluded that the statute imposes punishment in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws and without a judicial trial.30 The distinctions drawn by Congress between the fourteen grounds that trigger termination and the four grounds that do not demonstrate that the sole legislative concern was with the person or class of persons disqualified.31 Rather than regulation of the activity or status, the statute targets individuals. Brennan observed that the common element among the covered grounds is blameworthy conduct, while the excluded grounds involve less culpable circumstances such as becoming a public charge.32
This pattern confirms that Congress aimed at punishing past membership or acts rather than advancing neutral administration of the Social Security program.33
Whether the termination of Social Security benefits under section 202(n) constitutes punishment so as to violate the constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws?34
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.35 The same is true if the statute is penal in character.36 The sanction here is not punishment in the constitutional sense because it is the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit without affirmative disability or restraint.37
No. The established facts show that section 202(n) was enacted as part of a revision of the Social Security laws.38 Congress's purpose was to limit benefits to those likely to remain residents of the United States, as reflected in the House and Senate Reports.39 The statute does not apply across the board to all deportees but draws classifications within Congress's wide latitude for social welfare legislation.40
The termination of benefits under section 202(n) does not constitute punishment so as to violate the constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Warren, C. J., And Douglas And Brennan, Jj.
Justice Black dissented on the ground that the statute singles out a particular group of persons and imposes on them a sanction that is punitive in character.42 The termination of benefits earned through years of labor is a severe penalty that constitutes a form of punishment which cannot be imposed without a judicial trial.43 Black further concluded that the statute violates the ex post facto clause by imposing punishment for past conduct that was not illegal when engaged in.44
The legislative act stamps the individual as unworthy to receive benefits for which he has paid, without any court adjudication of guilt.45
Justice Douglas concluded that the 1954 law is a classic example of a bill of attainder.46 It inflicts punishment without a judicial trial by cutting off a person's livelihood through denial of accrued social benefits that are part of his property interests.47 Punishment in the sense of a bill of attainder includes the deprivation or suspension of civil rights.48
Douglas stressed that Social Security benefits are earned through a contributory system.49 Congress may not confiscate them from a deportee on the basis of past Communist membership any more than it could seize his home or savings accounts upon deportation.50
Justice Brennan determined that the common sense of the statute is that Nestor has been punished severely for his past conduct.51 The distinctions drawn by Congress between the fourteen grounds that trigger termination and the four grounds that do not demonstrate that the sole legislative concern was with the person or class of persons disqualified. Rather than with regulation of the activity or status, the focus was on the individuals.52
Brennan noted that the excluded grounds involve conduct that modern standards do not regard as worthy of censure, confirming that Congress selected only blameworthy acts for the penalty of lost benefits.53