460 U.S. 491 (1983)
On January 3, 1978, two plainclothes detectives from the Dade County Public Safety Department observed Mark Royer at Miami International Airport as he purchased a one-way ticket to New York City under the name "Holt" and checked two suitcases bearing identification tags with that name and the destination La Guardia.1 The detectives believed Royer's appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions matched the drug courier profile, including paying cash for the ticket and appearing nervous, so they approached him, identified themselves as police officers, and asked if he had a moment to speak.2
Royer agreed to the encounter and produced his airline ticket in the name of Holt along with his driver's license in his correct name.3 When questioned about the name discrepancy, Royer explained that a friend had made the reservation.4 The detectives then informed Royer they were narcotics investigators who suspected him of transporting narcotics.5 They did not return his ticket or license. Instead they asked him to accompany them to a small room approximately 40 feet away.6
Royer went with the officers without objection to the room, which Detective Johnson later described as a large storage closet in the stewardesses' lounge containing a desk and two chairs.7 Without Royer's consent, one detective retrieved his luggage using the baggage check stubs and brought the suitcases to the room.8 The officers asked Royer if he would consent to a search of the suitcases, and he produced a key to unlock one, which the detective opened to reveal marijuana.9
Royer stated he did not know the combination to the second suitcase but said "no, go ahead" when asked if he objected to it being opened, and the officers pried it open to find more marijuana.10 Approximately 15 minutes had elapsed from the initial approach until Royer was placed under arrest.11 Prior to trial on charges of felony possession of marijuana, Royer moved to suppress the evidence from the search, but the trial court denied the motion after finding the consent freely and voluntarily given.12
Royer then entered a nolo contendere plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was convicted.13 The Florida District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction.14 The Florida Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether Royer was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the detectives identified themselves as narcotics investigators, informed him of their suspicions, retained his ticket and driver's license, and asked him to accompany them to a small room?16
Yes. The detectives retained Royer's ticket and driver's license after identifying themselves as narcotics investigators and informing him of their suspicions.19 They then directed him to a small room forty feet away without returning his documents or indicating he could depart.20 Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, converting the encounter into a seizure.21
Royer was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes at the point the officers retained his documents and directed him to the small room.22
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Justice Brennan joined the plurality opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that the case does not involve whether police may question a person stopped without reasonable suspicion.23 He stressed that Royer was seized when the officers took him to the interrogation room because the officers' actions created a situation in which Royer reasonably believed he was not free to leave.24
Brennan further noted that any exception broad enough to cover a seizure as intrusive as the one here would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are reasonable only if based on probable cause.25 He viewed the move to the room and continued questioning as exceeding Terry limits.26
He also dissented from the plurality's view that the initial stop was legal, arguing that asking for identification and the ticket effected a seizure unsupported by reasonable suspicion.27
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment and agreed that the officers had reasonable suspicion for an initial stop based on the drug courier profile and the name discrepancy.28 He concluded, however, that retaining the ticket and identification while moving Royer to the small room created a situation in which no reasonable person would feel free to leave, rendering the detention an arrest.29
Powell emphasized that Royer found himself in a small, windowless room alone with two officers who had already obtained possession of his checked luggage without consent, and that neither the evidence nor common sense suggested Royer was free to walk away.30 He agreed that as a practical matter Royer was under arrest and his surrender of the luggage key cannot be viewed as consensual.31
Whether the detectives possessed reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that Royer was transporting narcotics at the time they detained him?32
Yes. The officers observed that Royer paid cash for a one-way ticket to a target city, traveled under an assumed name, checked two heavy American Tourister suitcases, appeared nervous, and failed to complete baggage tags with full identifying information.35 Viewed collectively through the lens of the drug courier profile and the officers' training, these facts supplied the requisite reasonable suspicion for a temporary detention.36
The detectives possessed reasonable suspicion to justify an initial investigative detention of Royer and his luggage.37
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Justice Powell agreed that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Royer for investigative purposes based on the drug courier profile and the name discrepancy.38 He parted company with the plurality only on whether the subsequent actions remained within Terry bounds, noting that the initial observations justified a temporary stop but that the officers' later conduct crossed the line into an arrest.39
Powell stressed the public interest in detecting drug traffickers at airports and the need for trained officers to assess the totality of circumstances, but he found the escalation here unreasonable.40
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, maintained that the combination of cash payment, assumed name, heavy luggage, nervousness, and incomplete tags provided articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the entire encounter, including the move to the room.41 He argued that the facts were typical of those facing narcotics officers and that the officers' conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard.42
Rehnquist criticized the plurality for losing sight of the Amendment's text and for applying an overly rigid least-intrusive-means analysis that is not supported by precedent.43 He would have held the detention lawful from start to finish.44
Whether the officers' actions in moving Royer to the small room, retrieving his luggage without consent, and questioning him there exceeded the permissible scope and duration of a temporary investigative detention?45
Yes. The officers moved Royer to a small storage closet, retrieved his luggage without consent, retained his ticket and license throughout, and questioned him for fifteen minutes without informing him he was free to leave.49 These steps transformed the encounter into a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause and exceeded the narrow limits of a Terry stop.50
The officers' conduct exceeded the permissible bounds of an investigative detention under the Fourth Amendment.51
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Justice Brennan stressed that any exception covering a seizure as intrusive as the one in this case would swallow the general rule that seizures are reasonable only if based on probable cause.52 He viewed the move to the room and continued questioning as exceeding Terry limits because the officers had already obtained possession of Royer's luggage without consent and retained his documents, creating a custodial atmosphere.53
Brennan emphasized that Terry was a very limited decision authorizing only carefully defined protective searches and that subsequent cases like Brignoni-Ponce and Dunaway confirm the narrow scope of investigative stops.54 He argued that the officers' actions here required probable cause from the outset.55
Justice Blackmun dissented and concluded that the fifteen-minute detention remained minimally intrusive and consistent with the formula for lesser intrusions approved in Brignoni-Ponce.56 He found the officers' polite requests for consent at each step kept the encounter within reasonable bounds. Royer was questioned where he was found with all questions directly related to the purpose of the stop.57
Blackmun emphasized the special need for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug couriers given the extraordinary obstacles to detection and the strong public interest in suppressing drug trafficking.58 He would have upheld the officers' conduct as supported by reasonable suspicion throughout.59
Whether Royer's consent to the search of his suitcases was the product of an unlawful detention and therefore invalid?60
Yes. Because Royer was being illegally detained when he produced the key and consented to the search, the consent was the product of the unlawful seizure.64 No break in the chain of illegality occurred.65 The State failed to show that the consent was sufficiently an act of free will independent of the detention.66
Royer’s consent to the search was tainted by the unlawful detention and therefore invalid.67
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Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist dissented and would have held the detention lawful, rendering the consent valid.68 He emphasized that Royer voluntarily accompanied the officers and immediately consented once inside the room, with no evidence of coercion or show of force.69
Rehnquist noted that the officers were polite, did not display weapons, and that Royer was informed why they wished to question him further.70 He argued that the presence of consent further justified the action taken and that the plurality's analysis improperly faulted the officers for steps that were reasonable under the circumstances of an airport encounter.71
Whether probable cause to arrest Royer existed at the time he consented to the search of his luggage?72
Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge would warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. The officers themselves acknowledged they lacked probable cause until the suitcases were opened.73
Probable cause to arrest Royer did not exist when he consented to the search.77
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Justice Blackmun dissented from the conclusion that probable cause was required.78 He maintained that the minimal intrusion was justified by reasonable suspicion given the strong public interest in detecting drug traffickers and the extraordinary obstacles to their detection at airports.79
Blackmun argued that the officers followed the formula for lesser intrusions set forth in Brignoni-Ponce by seeking consent at each step and that the fifteen-minute encounter was short-lived and minimally intrusive.80 He would have balanced the character of the detention against its justification and upheld the conduct as reasonable.81