505 U.S. 123 (1992)
Forsyth County, Georgia, a primarily rural county approximately 30 miles northeast of Atlanta, had a troubled racial history.1 In 1912 its entire African-American population of over 1,000 citizens was driven from the county following the rape and murder of a white woman and the lynching of her accused assailant.2 Seventy-five years later the county population remained 99 percent white.3
Spurred by this history, Atlanta city councilman Hosea Williams organized a "March Against Fear and Intimidation" for January 17, 1987.4 Approximately 90 civil rights demonstrators encountered some 400 counterdemonstrators who shouted racial slurs and eventually forced the parade to a premature halt by throwing rocks and beer bottles.5 The following weekend, on January 24, approximately 20,000 marchers participated in a second demonstration protected by more than 3,000 state and local police and National Guardsmen.6 The demonstration cost over $670,000 in police protection.7
As a direct result of these demonstrations, the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners enacted Ordinance 34 on January 27, 1987.8 The ordinance was amended on June 8, 1987, to require every permit applicant to pay in advance a sum not more than $1,000 for each day of the activity.9 The county administrator was empowered to adjust the amount to meet expenses incident to administration of the ordinance and maintenance of public order.10
In January 1989, respondent The Nationalist Movement proposed to demonstrate in opposition to the federal holiday commemorating the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.11 In Forsyth County, the Movement sought to conduct a rally and speeches for one and a half to two hours on the courthouse steps on a Saturday afternoon.12 The county imposed a $100 fee based on 10 hours of the county administrator's time in issuing the permit.13 The county administrator testified that the cost of his time was deliberately undervalued and that he did not charge for the clerical support involved in processing the application.14 The Movement did not pay the fee or hold the rally.15 Instead it filed this action on January 19, 1989, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia seeking injunctive relief.16 The District Court denied relief.17 The Eleventh Circuit reversed this aspect of the District Court's judgment.18 After further briefing, the court issued a per curiam opinion reinstating the panel opinion in its entirety.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1991.20
Whether the Forsyth County ordinance grants the county administrator unbridled discretion to set permit fees without narrow, objective, and definite standards?21
A permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official.22 A law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.23
Yes. The Forsyth County ordinance as implemented leaves the decision whether to charge a fee at all and how much to charge for administrative time or police protection entirely to the administrator's whim.24 There are no articulated standards or requirement to rely on objective factors or provide explanations.25 The administrator assessed a $100 fee for the Nationalist Movement's 1989 application based solely on his own judgment of reasonable time spent.26
He deliberately undervalued his hours and excluded clerical and security costs.27 He charged $25 for a bike race and $5 for a Girl Scouts event on other occasions without any consistent criteria or review process.28 This practice demonstrates that nothing in the ordinance or county construction prevents arbitrary fee setting that could encourage some views and discourage others.29
The ordinance is facially invalid under the First Amendment because it vests unbridled discretion in the county administrator.30
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented on this issue and would have remanded for lower court findings rather than invalidating the ordinance on its face.31 He noted that the ordinance language parallels the statute upheld in Cox v. New Hampshire, which allowed adjustable fees to meet administrative and public order expenses.32 He argued that the mere fact of differing fee amounts in four instances does not prove unbridled discretion without district court findings on whether the county policy actually permits arbitrary imposition.33
Rehnquist emphasized that the Court should not make its own factual findings at this stage on the scope of the administrator's authority.34
Whether the ordinance requires fees based on the content of speech by tying the amount to the anticipated costs of maintaining public order in response to listeners' reactions?35
Yes. The ordinance requires the administrator to examine the content of the message to estimate the hostile response and calculate the number of police needed.38 This ties the fee directly to the anticipated costs of protecting participants from listeners' reactions.39 In the two 1987 demonstrations that prompted the ordinance, large hostile crowds forced early termination of one march and required over 3,000 officers for the second at a cost exceeding $670,000.40
The county explicitly justified the fee provision as recouping expenses for necessary protection of persons participating in or observing the activities.41 The administrator's authority to adjust fees for maintenance of public order therefore incorporates a heckler's veto by making unpopular speech more expensive.42
The ordinance is facially invalid because it imposes content-based fees in violation of the First Amendment.43
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented on this issue as well and would have remanded for factual findings on whether the county actually plans to base fees on anticipated hostile crowds.44 He pointed out that the district court found the $100 fee in this case was based solely on processing costs with no evidence that opposition crowds were considered.45
Rehnquist argued that the Court should not assume the ordinance incorporates a heckler's veto without lower court development of the record on the county's actual implementation.46
Whether a $1,000 maximum fee cap or a nominal-fee requirement renders the ordinance constitutional under the First Amendment?47
No. Neither the $1,000 daily cap nor any nominal cap saves the ordinance because the constitutional defects lie in the content-based nature of the fee and the absence of narrow standards, not in the size of the maximum charge.50 The Court of Appeals had invalidated the ordinance on the ground that even the $1,000 cap exceeded a nominal amount.51 The Supreme Court held that the level of the fee is irrelevant when the scheme permits content discrimination and unbridled discretion, as a small content-based tax remains unconstitutional.52
The $1,000 cap and any nominal-fee requirement do not render the ordinance constitutional.53