489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989)
The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act provides that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits if he has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed or to accept suitable work when offered him.1 In April 1984, William Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him by Kelly Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday.2 Frazee told Kelly that, as a Christian, he could not work on the Lord's day.3 Frazee then applied to the Illinois Department of Employment Security for unemployment benefits claiming that there was good cause for his refusal to work on Sunday.4
His application was denied.5 Frazee appealed the denial of benefits to the Department of Employment Security’s Board of Review, which also denied his claim.6 The Board of Review stated that when a refusal of work is based on religious convictions, the refusal must be based upon some tenets or dogma accepted by the individual of some church, sect, or denomination, and such a refusal based solely on an individual’s personal belief is personal and noncompelling and does not render the work unsuitable.7 The Board of Review concluded that Frazee had refused an offer of suitable work without good cause.8
The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Peoria County, affirmed, finding that the agency’s decision was not contrary to law nor against the manifest weight of the evidence.9 Frazee’s claim was again rejected by the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.10 The court characterized Frazee’s refusal to work as resting on his personal professed religious belief and made it clear that it did not question the sincerity of the plaintiff.11 The Illinois Supreme Court denied Frazee leave to appeal.12
The mandatory appellate jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(2), since the state court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Illinois’ statutory “good cause” requirement as applied in this case.13 The Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1988.14
Whether Illinois could deny unemployment compensation benefits to an applicant who refused a job requiring Sunday work on the basis of his personal religious convictions as a Christian without membership in an established religious sect or church?15
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an individual who refuses suitable work due to sincerely held religious beliefs.16 Protection extends to such beliefs even when the claimant is not a member of an established religious sect or church and even when the belief does not reflect a formal tenet or dogma of any religious organization.17 Prior decisions establish that a state may not force an individual to choose between fidelity to religious belief and employment by withholding benefits.18 Sincerity of the belief, once conceded, satisfies the threshold for invoking constitutional protection.19
No. Frazee refused the temporary retail position offered by Kelly Services solely because it required Sunday work, informing the employer that as a Christian he could not work on the Lord's day.20 The Board of Review denied benefits on the explicit ground that the refusal rested on a personal belief rather than tenets or dogma accepted by a church, sect, or denomination.21 Both the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit and the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, upheld the denial, emphasizing that Frazee belonged to no established religious organization whose teachings forbade Sunday labor.22 These facts match the elements of the rule: Frazee's conviction was religious in nature and sincerely held, as the Board itself characterized the views as religious convictions and the courts below expressly declined to question sincerity.23 The state's requirement of organizational membership or formal dogma therefore imposed an impermissible additional hurdle not found in the governing constitutional standard.24 No evidence in the record demonstrated any compelling interest, such as widespread unemployment or disruption of commerce, sufficient to justify the burden placed on Frazee's religious exercise.25
The lower courts' distinction between personal religious belief and sect-based belief finds no support in the precedents that protect any sincere religious conviction compelling refusal of work.26 Because the denial of benefits directly penalized Frazee's adherence to his religious convictions, the application of the Illinois statute violated the Free Exercise Clause.27
Illinois could not constitutionally deny unemployment compensation benefits to Frazee on the ground that his religious convictions against Sunday work lacked the endorsement of an established religious sect or church.28 The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Free Exercise Clause.29