394 U.S. 731 (1969)
Petitioner Martin Frazier was convicted in an Oregon state court of second-degree murder in connection with the September 22, 1964, slaying of Russell Anton Marleau.1 After the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, Frazier filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.2 The District Court granted the writ, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three contentions of error.4
Frazier had been indicted jointly with his cousin Jerry Lee Rawls, who pleaded guilty to the same offense.5 Prior to trial, defense counsel told the prosecutor that Rawls would invoke his privilege against self-incrimination if called to the stand.6 The prosecutor nevertheless included in his opening statement a summary of the testimony he expected to receive from Rawls, based on consultations with a police officer who had spoken to Rawls, Rawls' probation officer, and some of Rawls' close relatives. When called to the stand, Rawls asserted his privilege against self-incrimination regarding questions about his activities on the morning of September 22, 1964, and was dismissed after two or three minutes.7
Frazier was arrested about 4:15 p.m. on September 24, 1964, and taken to headquarters where questioning began at about 5 p.m. The interrogation ended slightly more than an hour later, and by 6:45 p.m. Frazier had signed a written version of his confession.8 During the questioning, an officer told Frazier falsely that Rawls had been brought in and had confessed.9 Frazier stated, “I think I had better get a lawyer before I talk any more. I am going to get into trouble more than I am in now,” but the officer replied, “You can’t be in any more trouble than you are in now,” and the questioning continued.10
While arresting Rawls, police officers asked him if they could have his clothing and were directed to a duffel bag being used jointly by Frazier and Rawls that had been left in Rawls' home.11 Both Rawls and his mother consented to the search of the duffel bag.12 During the search, the officers came upon Frazier's clothing and seized it.13
Whether the prosecutor's opening statement summarizing the expected testimony of a jointly indicted codefendant who later invoked the privilege against self-incrimination denied the petitioner his right of confrontation?14
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments secure the right of confrontation. Not every reference during an opening statement to an anticipated codefendant statement violates that right when the prosecutor reasonably expects the codefendant to testify, the summary is brief and unemphasized, and the trial court instructs the jury that counsel's statements are not evidence.15 This situation is distinguishable from Douglas v. Alabama and Bruton v. United States, where powerfully incriminating evidence was placed before the jury without opportunity for cross-examination and formed a vital part of the prosecution's case.16
No. The established facts show that the prosecutor consulted a police officer, Rawls's probation officer, and relatives before including a brief summary of expected testimony in the opening statement.17 Rawls appeared on the stand for only two or three minutes and asserted the privilege.18 The trial court instructed the jury that statements by counsel were not evidence.19 Unlike the repeated reading of a confession in Douglas or the critical weight added in Bruton, Rawls's statement was not touted as crucial here.20
The limiting instruction therefore sufficed to protect the confrontation right.21
The prosecutor's opening statement did not deny the petitioner his right of confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.22
Whether the petitioner's confession, obtained after an officer falsely stated that the codefendant had confessed and after the petitioner mentioned obtaining a lawyer, was admissible?23
Because the trial occurred after Escobedo v. Illinois but before Miranda v. Arizona, only Escobedo's specific holding applies.24 A suspect's ambiguous remark about obtaining counsel does not require immediate cessation of questioning when the suspect continues to answer questions.25 A confession is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances when the suspect is mature, questioning is brief, partial warnings are given, and a police misrepresentation does not overcome the suspect's will.26
Yes. The established facts establish that Frazier was arrested at 4:15 p.m., questioning began at 5 p.m., and he signed a written confession by 6:45 p.m. He received partial warnings of his rights.27 His statement that he thought he had better get a lawyer was not pursued, and he continued answering questions.28 The officer's false statement that Rawls had confessed is relevant but, given the short duration, Frazier's maturity, and the partial warnings, does not render the confession involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.29
The petitioner's confession was admissible at trial.30
Whether police officers could lawfully seize the petitioner's clothing from a duffel bag used jointly with his codefendant after obtaining consent from the codefendant and his mother?31
Under the Fourth Amendment, a joint user of a container possesses authority to consent to its search.32 Officers may seize evidence discovered during a lawful consent search.33 A person who permits another to use a bag and leaves it in that person's home assumes the risk that the other user will allow a search of the bag.34
Yes. The established facts show that the duffel bag was used jointly by Frazier and Rawls and had been left in Rawls's home.35 While arresting Rawls, officers obtained consent from both Rawls and his mother to search the bag.36 During that search the officers discovered and seized Frazier's clothing.37 Because Rawls was a joint user with authority to consent, the seizure was lawful.38
The seizure of the petitioner's clothing did not violate the Fourth Amendment.39