(Pa. Super. 1976)
Thomas Fredericks was a passenger in a Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission vehicle driven by Donald Terwilliger on the morning of January 24, 1968.1 Just prior to the accident, Terwilliger pulled onto the berm of the four lane turnpike preparatory to making a U-turn through an opening in the divider fence.2 As the vehicle proceeded to cross the two eastbound lanes, it was struck by a truck driven by Charles Castora and owned by Tube City Iron and Metal Company, which had been following at a distance of about 600 to 800 feet.3 Another truck, driven by Melvin Whiteacre in the scope of his employment with J.M. Rudisill and Son, Inc., in an attempt to pass the wreckage, jack-knifed.4
Fredericks was seriously injured in the collision.5 Thomas Fredericks brought suit against the two truck drivers, Castora and Whiteacre and their two respective employers, Tube City Iron and Metal Company and J.M. Rudisill and Son, Inc.6 Subsequently, Donald Terwilliger and the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission were joined as additional defendants.7
Following a jury trial a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff Fredericks against the additional defendant Donald Terwilliger, and in favor of Charles Castora, Tube City Iron and Metal Company, Melvin Whiteacre and J.M. Rudisill and Son, Inc.8 The plaintiff and Terwilliger appealed from the judgment.9
On appeal, the appellants argued that the defendants Castora and Whiteacre should be held to a higher standard of care than is usually applied to the operator of a motor vehicle.10 This argument was made because both defendants were professionals who drove trucks for a living and had done so for over 20 years. They also challenged the trial judge's charge to the jury on proximate cause.11 They specifically objected to language defining it in terms of foreseeability and probability.12 Additionally, they contended that a response by defendant Castora to a question asked by defense counsel, in which the defendant mentioned the recent death of one of his children, was prejudicial despite the court's immediate instruction to the jury to disregard the testimony.13
Whether professional truck drivers with over twenty years of experience should be held to a higher standard of care than ordinary motorists in a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle collision?14
The operator of a motor vehicle is held only to the standard of ordinary care required of all motorists under the circumstances.15 Length or nature of experience does not impose a higher standard of care.16 This was established in Adley Express Co. v. Willard where a similar U-turn collision led the court to reject a higher duty for the truck driver.17
No. The established facts indicate that Castora and Whiteacre were professional truck drivers with over twenty years of experience.18 Yet the trial court instructed the jury on the ordinary standard of due care applicable to the average motorist under the circumstances.19
This aligns with the principle that varying the standard according to experience would render uniform application impossible.20 The court properly declined to adopt a higher standard for experienced drivers as no precedent supported such a distinction in vehicle negligence cases.21
The trial court did not err in its instruction on the degree of care.22
Whether a jury instruction defining proximate cause that includes language tying the concept to foreseeability and probability misstates the law?23
Proximate cause requires that negligent conduct be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.24 Foreseeability relates to the existence of a duty in negligence.25 Its inclusion in the proximate cause definition is not reversible error when the charge as a whole repeatedly emphasizes the substantial factor test and the facts present no unusual or bizarre harm.26
No. The established facts show that the injuries were the normal and customary result of a collision between motor vehicles on a high speed turnpike, both in their extent and the manner of their occurrence.27
The trial judge defined proximate cause as a substantial factor and repeated that concept multiple times throughout the charge, including in the plaintiff's points for charge.28 Any single reference to foreseeability was not emphasized and could not have misled the jury.29
The instruction did not constitute reversible error.30
Whether a defendant's unsolicited mention during testimony of the recent death of one of his children, followed by an immediate instruction to the jury to disregard it, requires reversal on grounds of prejudice?31
No. The established facts establish that Castora mentioned the recent death of one of his children in response to a question.34 Plaintiff's counsel immediately objected and the court immediately sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard the testimony.35
Because plaintiff's counsel failed to demand a clarification of the instruction at the time and did not include the matter in his points for charge, the objection was waived.36
The mention does not require reversal on grounds of prejudice.37