81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972)
Clifford Freehe filed a personal injury action against his wife, the defendant, alleging that he sustained injuries as a result of the defendant's negligent maintenance of a tractor and her failure to warn him of the tractor's unsafe condition.1 The accident took place on a farm that was the separate property of the defendant, who operated the farm under the business name Hazel Knoblauch.2 The tractor and all other assets and income of the farm were the separate property of the defendant, and the farming business was conducted separately from any community business of the spouses.3 The plaintiff had no interest in the farming operation and was not employed by the defendant in connection with the farm.4
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, disposing of the case solely on the basis of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.5 The plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Washington.6
The Supreme Court granted review to consider the continued validity of the common-law rule of interspousal tort immunity in the context of this case, which presented a proper factual setting for reexamination of the doctrine.7
Whether the common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity bars one spouse from recovering damages from the other for personal injuries sustained during marriage?8
The common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is of court-made origin and is abandoned because its supporting reasons, including the unity of husband and wife and preservation of domestic tranquility, are no longer valid, and no statute establishes the rule.9
No. The common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not bar the plaintiff's claim.10 Clifford Freehe seeks compensation for personal injuries allegedly caused by his wife's negligent maintenance of a tractor and failure to warn of its unsafe condition on her separate-property farm.11 The court examined the historical bases for the immunity, including supposed spousal unity and preservation of domestic tranquility, and found all of them insufficient to justify denying a remedy.12 Because the rule is court-made and no statute mandates it, the court abandoned the doctrine as applied to personal injury actions between spouses.13
The common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not bar one spouse from recovering damages from the other for personal injuries sustained during marriage.14
Whether RCW 26.16.150 permits a married person to sue his or her spouse for personal injuries as if unmarried?15
RCW 26.16.150 expressly states that every married person shall have the same right and liberty to sue and be sued as if he or she were unmarried, allowing suits for personal injuries against the tortfeasor spouse.16
Yes. RCW 26.16.150 provides that every married person has the same right and liberty to sue and be sued as if unmarried.17 This statute permits a spouse to bring an action for personal injuries against the tortfeasor spouse to the extent the spouse has an individual interest in compensation for those injuries.18 The court interpreted the statute according to its plain meaning, allowing the suit in this case where the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries sustained due to the defendant's negligence.19
RCW 26.16.150 permits a married person to sue his or her spouse for personal injuries as if unmarried.20
Whether damages recovered in an interspousal personal injury action should be allocated between separate and community property interests?21
Damages in interspousal personal injury actions are allocated such that special damages are recoverable by the community, general damages for loss of future earnings are recoverable one-half by the injured spouse as separate property, and general damages for pain and suffering are fully recoverable as separate property of the injured spouse.22
Yes. The court determined that damages in interspousal personal injury actions should be allocated to compensate the injured spouse without unduly benefiting the tortfeasor spouse.23 Special damages are recoverable by the community as they represent out-of-pocket expenses that are a community liability.24 General damages for loss of future earnings are recoverable one-half by the injured spouse as separate property.25
General damages for pain and suffering are fully recoverable as the separate property of the injured spouse.26 This allocation was fashioned by the court to apply to the facts of the present case involving the plaintiff's claim for personal injuries.27
Damages recovered in an interspousal personal injury action should be allocated between separate and community property interests according to the specified formula.28