411 U.S. 677 (1973)
Congress established a scheme for fringe benefits to members of the uniformed services through 37 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. and 10 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq. Under these statutes, a male member could claim his wife as a dependent without regard to whether she was in fact dependent upon him for any part of her support.1 A female member could not claim her husband as a dependent unless he was in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support.2
Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits for her husband Joseph Frontiero on the ground that he was her dependent.3 Joseph Frontiero was a full-time student at Huntingdon College in Montgomery, Alabama.4 His living expenses, including his share of the household expenses, totaled approximately $354 per month.5 He received $205 per month in veterans benefits.6 Her application was denied because she failed to demonstrate that her husband was dependent on her for more than one-half of his support.7
The Frontieros commenced this suit in the three-judge District Court for the Middle District of Alabama contending that the statutes unreasonably discriminate on the basis of sex. The District Court rejected the contention and sustained the constitutionality of the provisions making the distinction.8 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.9
The legislative history of the statutes sheds virtually no light on the purposes underlying the differential treatment accorded male and female members.10 A majority of the District Court surmised that Congress might reasonably have concluded that, since the husband in our society is generally the breadwinner in the family, it would be more economical to require married female members claiming husbands to prove actual dependency than to extend the presumption of dependency to such members.11 Approximately 99 percent of all members of the uniformed services are male.12
Whether the difference in treatment between male and female members of the uniformed services under 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomen in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?13
A statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated and therefore involves the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.14
Yes. The sole basis of the classification established in the challenged statutes is the sex of the individuals involved.15 A female member of the uniformed services seeking to obtain housing and medical benefits for her spouse must prove his dependency in fact, whereas no such burden is imposed upon male members.16 The Government concedes that the differential treatment accorded men and women under these statutes serves no purpose other than mere administrative convenience.17
The Government offers no concrete evidence tending to support its view that such differential treatment in fact saves the Government any money.18 Administrative convenience is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality.19 The challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her husband.20
The difference in treatment constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomen in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.21
Whether classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny?22
Classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.23
Yes. Sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.24 The sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.25 Our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.26
Statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.27 Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious.28 Therefore, classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.29
Classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell agreed that the challenged statutes constitute an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomen in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.31 However, he could not join the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan holding that all classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect.32 He noted that Reed v. Reed abundantly supports the decision today without adding sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently suspect.33
There is another compelling reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny.34 The Equal Rights Amendment has been approved by Congress and submitted for ratification by the States.35 By acting prematurely, the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures are debating the proposed Amendment.36
Democratic institutions are weakened when the Court appears unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political importance at the very time they are under consideration within the prescribed constitutional processes.37